

THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

MARITIME HISTORY & ARTS



VOLUME 54, NUMBER 3

SUMMER 1994

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Support of the journal depends upon receipts from subscriptions; no payment is made for contributions or for editorial work. Subscriptions are

accepted for a one-year period and begin with the issue published following receipt of the subscriber's order.

The editors of *The American Neptune* assume editorial responsibility, but they and the Peabody Museum of Salem and Essex Institute, Incorporated, do not necessarily endorse the opinions expressed by authors and book reviewers. "Guidelines for Contributors" to *The American Neptune*, a style sheet for manuscript preparation, will be sent to prospective contributors upon their request to the managing editor.

The American Neptune (ISSN 0003-0155) is published quarterly at \$39.00 per year for individual domestic subscribers, \$45.00 for institutions; \$42.00 per year for individual foreign subscribers, \$48.00 for institutions; \$10.00 per single issue, by the Peabody Museum of Salem and Essex Institute Incorporated, East India Square, Salem, Massachusetts, 01970. To subscribe, write to *The American Neptune*, Publications Department, enclosing a check or money order in U.S. dollars and drawn on a U.S. bank made payable to *The American Neptune*, or your credit card number (M/C, A/E, or VISA), expiration date, and signature. Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be addressed to the Managing Editor. Second-class postage is paid at Salem, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Neptune*, Publications Department, Peabody Essex Museum, East India Square, Salem, Massachusetts 01970-0783.

THE AMERICAN NEPTUNE

A QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF MARITIME HISTORY & ARTS



Volume 54, No. 3

Summer 1994

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SALEM, MASSACHUSETTS

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COVER ILLUSTRATION

Henry Smartley

***Queen Victoria's Close Encounter*, 1851**

Of the seven ships built in the shipbuilding town of Bath, Maine in 1838, *Queen Victoria* was the largest. Built by Johnson Rideout, she was 144 feet in length, and 712 tons. Her first master was Willis T. Thompson of New York, who shared ownership with Rufus K. Page of Hallowell, Maine. This painting records an embarrassing event in 1851 at the entrance to the port of Havre in France.

Queen Victoria was registered in New York, and spent several years in triangular trade between New York, the Gulf of Mexico and Havre. Sold to Pillsbury and Sanford of New York in 1853, she was dropped from the registers in 1859, and her later history is unknown.

Oil on Canvas
Peabody Essex Museum Collection
Gift of Mrs. C.G. Hutchinson

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Editor's



Note

Several recent events in the maritime field are worthy of note. *The American Neptune* published the controversial articles on the USS *Constellation* currently in Baltimore's inner harbor. The controversy over her provenance, especially the dating and authenticity of the vessel, have been hotly contested. In 1993 at Annapolis, a session on the *Constellation* focused on these questions which were argued on the auditorium stage of Mahan Hall at the U.S. Naval Academy where I was invited to represent the *Neptune*. All arguments aside concerning the presentation of *Constellation* as a frigate or sloop-of-war, the greater concern is her survival. Like many vessels whose condition reflects lengthy neglect, the *Constellation* is desperately in need of renovation. The mayor of Baltimore has appointed a civic commission chaired by Gail Shawe to study the vessel and find a means to gather the resources necessary to save the ship. Already her masts have been stripped for fear that the rigging might let go and fall on crew or visitors. The hull is in poor condition, which poses an even greater threat to her ability to remain open to the public. The bottom line is not whether she is a frigate of 1797 or a much remade vessel of 1855, it is that the *Constellation* should be saved and should continue to serve as an educational institution to inform the public about America's maritime heritage.

The *Constitution* continues to receive the attention she deserves at Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston, where her renovation continues under the supervision of the U.S. Navy. A conference on restoration and preservation is scheduled on 12-14 September in Boston so that the lessons learned from this massive project can be shared with others. This meeting was followed on 15-17 September by the sixth National Maritime Heritage Conference, also in Boston.

The focus on preservation of the American maritime tradition is echoed (or an echo) of efforts undertaken around the globe to acknowledge and

appreciate the maritime heritage. Ships are the object of most of this attention, but the important role of maritime museums must not be overlooked. In addition to directing campaigns to save and restore vessels such as at South Street in New York or Mystic Seaport in Connecticut, museums are our best avenues to reach the public and gain its support. New museums continue to appear. A D-Day Museum is planned in New Orleans aided by a \$4 million allocation from Congress. Nauticus — The National Maritime Center, recently opened in Norfolk, Virginia at a cost of \$52 million and includes interactive and simulation exhibits. The Hampton Roads Naval Museum is a part of the center.

Indeed, it is in the maritime museums that the visitors can discover the drama, the excitement, the skill involved in humanity's mastery of the world's seas and waterways. Some museums focus on highly specialized aspects of this story in places as distant as Perth, Australia, Roskilde, Denmark or Vermilion, Ohio. Today's preservation efforts demand not only the care of vessels, but of marine artifacts and structures ranging from lighthouses to rope walks. Underwater archaeologists have notably enhanced our understanding of the maritime heritage while compounding preservation efforts because their discoveries must be funded, and ships and artifacts conserved if recovered. Questions of priority immediately arise and remind us that those involved in the monumental tasks of preserving the maritime heritage should consider the truism that the most difficult decision is to decide what is of value and deserves to be preserved. This issue is complicated by the serendipity of underwater archaeological discovery, which can rearrange priorities in a single dive. But discovery and research is why the field is alive and exciting.

TIMOTHY J. RUNYAN

Cleveland, Ohio

Forbidden Prizes

DONALD A. PETRIE

In May of the year 1813 the United States brig *Argus*, provisioned and ready for sea, lay in New York harbor awaiting secret orders from the secretary of the navy. Those orders would dispatch her on a voyage which would ultimately determine American national policy on a major issue of naval prizes.

At ten years of age, *Argus* was one of the sharpest and fastest ships of her rate in the world, with an enviable combat record.¹ Her captain, twenty-eight-year-old Lt. William Henry Allen, was the very model of a naval officer of the era. His father, William Allen, had been an army officer during the Revolution and subsequently served as brigadier general of the Rhode Island militia. His mother was the sister of the governor of that state. In 1800, at the age of fifteen, William Henry Allen entered the United States Navy as a midshipman, disappointing his parents, who had planned a liberal education for him.² He adapted quickly to the navy and in his first six years saw service in the Mediterranean under Captains William Bainbridge, John Rodgers, and James Barron.³

This is the second in a series of essays planned by the author to illustrate aspects of the law of nations. The first, dealing with the ransom of vessels, appeared in the Spring 1993 issue of *The American Neptune*. The author is indebted to Mary S. Cook for suggesting these essays and to his assistant, Lori K. Anderson, for her tireless efforts in preparing the manuscripts. Dr. W. M. P. Dunne of Long Island University, Southampton, and Virginia Steele Wood of the Library of Congress have, as always, been generous with their help, tutelage, and encouragement. Ronald Mirvis of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has produced volumes long lost from other libraries. Edward Gordon of De Jure Antiquarian Books, Washington, D.C., has generously shared his extensive knowledge of volumes of archaic law. Antonia Macarthur of Kew, England, has retrieved elusive documents of the British Admiralty and has persuaded the Royal Navy that they ought, at last, to share their code of secret signals with citizens of their erstwhile enemy in the War of 1812. Finally, the author is indebted to Frederick C. Leiner, Esq. for reviewing the text with the eye of a knowledgeable lawyer.

1. W. M. P. Dunne has collected and privately published an invaluable data file comprising 227 pages of quotations from original sources on the ten-year history of *Argus*.

2. Oliver Oldschool, "Life of Captain William Henry Allen," *Port Folio*, ser. 3, no. 1 (January 1814): 1-23.

3. Allen's letters to his family reveal a young man of lofty ideals and high patriotic purpose who was also self-assured, judgmental of others, and not hesitant to criticize his superior officers. Edward H. Tatum and Marion Tinling, eds., "Letters of William Henry Allen," *The Huntington Library Quarterly* 1 (October 1937): 101-132.

In 1807, at age twenty-two, Allen was a lieutenant on the ill-fated frigate *Chesapeake* when that vessel, totally unprepared for combat, came under murderous attack in peacetime by the British warship *Leopard*. Of the hundreds of men on board *Chesapeake* that day, Allen alone succeeded in returning the British attack by discharging a single cannon, which he fired with a coal carried from the cook stove in the ship's galley.⁴ During the War of 1812 an America hungry for heroes heard of William Henry Allen again. As first lieutenant of the frigate *United States* under Commodore Stephen Decatur, his ceaseless training of the crew at naval gunnery contributed substantially to *United States'* capture of the British frigate *Macedonian* on 12 October 1812. It was the first naval combat in which a British frigate was brought into port and added to the fighting force of America's fledgling navy.⁵ Commodore Decatur acknowledged his high regard for the younger man by pressing for his promotion to master commandant.⁶ In 1813 Decatur, still commanding *United States*, expected his protégé to join him on an extended cruise against the enemy.

Events far away in eastern Europe intervened, however. Joel Barlow, the American minister plenipotentiary to the French government, died in Poland while carrying out his diplomatic duties pursuing the traveling court of Napoleon Bonaparte.⁷ The United States and France were not allies, but they shared a common enemy in the British Empire, and the maintenance of diplomatic contact was of the utmost importance to American interests. President James Madison selected Senator William H. Crawford of Georgia as Barlow's successor, and on 10 May 1813 Secretary of the Navy William Jones wrote to Decatur, warning darkly that the president would require the "special services" of Allen and *Argus*, which should,

4. Edward L. Beach, *The United States Navy* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1986), 64.

5. Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 297.

6. Oldschool, "Life of Allen," 14. Allen's commission as master commandant was confirmed by the Senate on 24 July 1813. William S. Dudley, *The Naval War of 1812*, 2 vols. (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1992), 2: 217.

7. Daniel Knowton Smith, ed., "Journal of William H. Crawford," *Smith College Studies in History* 2, no. 5 (October 1925): 64.

meanwhile, be kept in “. . . a perfect state of efficiency and preparation for departure at a moment’s notice.”⁸

Secretary Jones made clear the nature of these “special services” in confidential orders to Allen. First, Allen was to transport Minister Crawford to his diplomatic post “directing your course, without deviating, for any other object, to the first Port you can make in France.”⁹ Allen discharged his responsibility with dispatch. Sailing from New York on 18 June 1813, he eluded the British blockade, made a swift crossing, and arrived in L’Orient, France twenty-three days later. En route he captured and sank the British schooner *Salamanca*, but, lest the secretary of the navy should think that he might have “deviated” for this object, he explained that the encounter occurred “in pursuing our course.”¹⁰

To understand the second part of the secretary’s orders requires a brief recapitulation of the naval situation between Britain and the United States in June 1813. Members of the British government did their inefficient best to avoid war with America during 1812 because the demands of the Napoleonic conflict strained even the vast resources of the Royal Navy. The defeat of three British frigates by American vessels in 1812 wounded traditional British pride in matters maritime but did not cause the Admiralty to deviate from its principal objective on the European continent.

By the spring of 1813 the situation had changed. The success of Wellington on the Iberian peninsula and the defeat of Napoleon’s armies in Russia enabled the British to mobilize a fleet in American waters sufficient to blockade major ports and to a large extent drive American naval and merchant vessels from the Atlantic. The consequent frustration of Secretary of the Navy William Jones is evident in the second part of his orders to Allen:

It is exceedingly desirable that the enemy should be made to feel the effect of our hostility, and of his barbarous system of warfare and in no way can we so effectually accomplish that object, as by annoying and destroying his commerce, fisheries, and coasting trade. The latter is of the utmost importance, and is much more exposed to the attack of such a vessel as the *Argus*, than is generally understood. This would carry the war home to their direct feelings and interests, and produce an astonishing sensation . . .¹¹

8. William Jones to Stephen Decatur, 10 May 1813, Confidential Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy (hereafter CS), Entry 7, Record Group 45, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter RG 45, NA).

9. Jones to William Henry Allen, 5 June 1813, CS, 1813, pp. 29-31, RG 45, NA.

10. Allen to Jones, 12 July 1813, *Niles Weekly Register* 5, p. 46.


11. Jones to Allen, 5 June 1813, CS, 1813, pp. 29-31, RG 45, NA.



Lieutenant William Henry Allen, commander of the U.S. brig *Argus* in 1813. Photo courtesy of the Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

To this end Jones ordered *Argus*, immediately after delivering Crawford safely to France, to proceed on a search-and-destroy mission against British coastal vessels from the chops of the Channel to the Irish coast, into the Irish Sea, and along the northwest coast of England. The secretary emphatically cautioned the young captain that his responsibility was to destroy British shipping, not to take prizes, “because the chances of reaching a safe port are infinitely against the attempt.” He pointed out that the commitment of crew members to prize crews could weaken *Argus* “and expose you to an unequal contest with the enemy.”¹²

12. Ibid.



Sail plan of the U.S. brig of war *Argus*, by Howard I. Chapelle. Photo courtesy of Eric A. Ronnberg, Jr.

But for seagoing Americans in 1813, the lure of prizes was strong. Indeed, some naval officers became wealthy from the prizes they captured during their careers.¹³ Not everyone succeeded, but many tried. The leading contemporary compiler of prize data, Hezekiah Niles, estimated that American naval vessels and privateers captured 2,500 prizes during the War of 1812.¹⁴

Argus left L'Orient on 21 July, proceeding northwest toward the Irish coast.¹⁵ For the next three weeks Allen commanded *Argus* with energy, courage, and skill — if not always in strict compliance with his orders. The first capture he made, on 24 July, was the British schooner *Matilda*, bound from Brazil to London.¹⁶ Despite Secretary Jones's injunction, Allen put a prize crew on board her and sent her for France. Jones's advice had been sound,

however. *Matilda* was quickly recaptured by a British frigate.¹⁷ The net result of Allen's deviation from orders was the loss of eleven of his men to British prison hulks and an early warning to the Royal Navy of his presence in its home waters. By 9 August, Allen had captured six more British merchantmen off the Irish coast and had either released them as prisoner cartels or destroyed them.¹⁸ In one dramatic instance he sailed ten miles up the Shannon estuary and, in full view of a shore "lined with inhabitants," burned a British government supply ship.¹⁹

On the foggy night of 10 August 1813 in the Irish Sea, Allen achieved the ambition of every American privateer and public cruiser: he got in among a returning West Indies convoy without observation by the escort

13. McKee, *Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession*, 346-347.

14. *Niles Weekly Register*, 12 August 1815.

15. Log of the *Argus* kept by an unidentified officer, entry for 23 July 1813, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library.

16. *Ibid.*, entry for 24 July 1813.

17. *Bell's Weekly Messenger*, 31 July 1813, 247, 255.

18. Journal of James Inderwick, surgeon of the *Argus* (hereafter *Inderwick Journal*), entries for 24 July 1813 to 9 August 1813, Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library. For an explanation of prisoner cartels, see the author's "The Ransoming of *Eliza Swan*," *The American Neptune* 53, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 105-106.

19. *Inderwick Journal*, entry for 1 August 1813.

vessels.²⁰ The June sugar convoy from the Leeward Islands had sailed on 1 July from Antigua, escorted by the ship of the line *Cressy*, 74; two sixth rates, *Coquette*, 20, and *Mercury*, 28; and a brig sloop, *Frolic*, 18.²¹ The convoy had split two days before, with seventy-nine merchantmen escorted by *Mercury*, *Frolic*, and the flagship heading southeast toward the English Channel, and *Coquette* escorting eighty-nine vessels northeast toward Bristol and ports in Scotland and Ireland.²²

Argus entered the latter portion of the fleet under dramatic circumstances. At 2 A.M. Allen observed four large vessels close at hand to windward. As day broke the crewmen of *Argus* found themselves in the midst of a great number of ships.²³ One of the large vessels appeared to them to be a frigate but was actually the sixth rate *Coquette*. She made the secret signals 84 ("Pass within hail") and 275 ("The ship coming into the fleet, or joining company, to make her name known"),²⁴ to which *Argus* was able to make no response. *Coquette* made sail and sought to pursue, but *Argus*'s speed and weatherly position put her beyond reach.²⁵

On two other occasions that morning *Argus* had close encounters with British warships. Emerging from the fog, she found a brig of war hove to in her path. With admirable *sang froid* Allen quietly ordered his fighting men concealed at their battle stations and sailed by the brig at close quarters and in total silence. In the words of *Argus*'s surgeon James Inderwick, "... we passed and she did not molest us."²⁶ Later that morning, while *Argus*'s crew was engaged in destroying the cargo of the schooner *Cordelia* from Antigua, the fog lifted to reveal the hull and gun ports of a passing British frigate whose spars were totally obscured. Blinded by fog, the frigate's lookouts aloft saw nothing of *Cordelia* or her captor. Allen put all his prisoners on board *Cordelia* and released her as a cartel.²⁷

Passing through the convoy as it was dispersing, *Argus* captured four of the sugar ships. Allen destroyed three of these but the fourth, the ship *Betsy*, again tempted

him to put a prize crew on board. Once again his prize was quickly recaptured by the Royal Navy, and once again his crew was fruitlessly depleted.²⁸ Allen also captured eight other vessels, all Irish Channel coasters, as intended by the secretary of the navy, and destroyed them or sent them off with prisoners.²⁹

In the early morning of 14 August off St. David's Head, Wales, *Argus* encountered the larger and heavier Royal Navy brig-sloop *Pelican*.³⁰ Allen's instructions were to cruise "against the commerce and light cruizers (sic) of the enemy,"³¹ and many observers believe that he could have escaped and continued his mission.³² Instead, he chose to shorten sail and offer battle. For the third time he deviated from the spirit of his orders. This time the outcome was fatal to him and his mission. *Argus*, her fighting men depleted by prize crews sent off and exhausted by their exertions of recent days, was captured and her captain mortally wounded.³³

In the course of the previous twenty-three days, the crew under the command of William Henry Allen had captured twenty vessels, of which two were sent to France as prizes, five were released as prisoner cartels, twelve were destroyed in accordance with the orders of the secretary of the navy, and one is unaccounted for.³⁴ Allen was a dead hero, but he had demonstrated the vulnerability of the British to attack on their coastal commerce. Had he followed his orders more strictly and survived to tell his tale, his example might have had a significant impact on American naval tactics during the remainder of the War of 1812, and he might now have a firmer place in history.

28. The *Times* (London), 19 August 1813.

29. Inderwick Journal, entries for 11 August to 13 August 1813. Of the twenty-one vessels captured by Allen, only one, *Defiance*, a Scottish ship of nineteen guns, offered resistance, sustaining two of *Argus*'s broadsides before surrendering (Inderwick Journal, entry for 12 August 1813). A parallel example of Scottish feistiness is presented by the raid in the Irish Sea of a squadron of ships of the Continental Navy during the American Revolution. The squadron, led by Captain Lambert Wickes, captured eighteen merchant ships in May and June of 1777. The only resistance recorded was from a Scottish brig which fought off her captors for half an hour. Nathan Miller, *Sea of Glory* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974), 293.

30. Inderwick Journal, entry for 14 August 1813.

31. Jones to Allen, 5 June 1813, CS, 1813, pp. 29-31, RG 45, NA.

32. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1882), 198; Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America* (New York: The Library of America, 1986), 831.

33. Inderwick Journal, entry for 18 August 1813. Allen died in Plymouth four days after the battle.

34. Inderwick reports a total of nineteen captures, but he does not account for the disposal of one, the pilot boat cutter *Jane*. Inderwick does not mention the sloop *Flame* of Anstruther, Scotland, reported to have been captured by *Argus* on 13 August and released with prisoners. Sir Robert Peel, Secretary for Ireland, to Vice Admiral Sir Edward Thornbrough, 16 August 1813, PRO ADM 1/4226.

20. Ibid., entry for 10 August 1813. Inderwick incorrectly described the sugar convoy as comprised of "400 sail." It never exceeded 180.

21. Sir Francis Laforey, C-in-C Leeward Islands Station, to John Wilson Croker, Secretary to the Admiralty, 22 June 1813, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), ADM 1/334.

22. Journal of HMS *Frolic*, entry for 8 August 1813, PRO ADM 51/2408.

23. Inderwick Journal, entry for 10 August 1813.

24. MS, Admiralty Signal Book for Ships of War, 1808, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England. The author has been unable to secure a document number.

25. Journal of HMS *Coquette*, entry for 10 August 1813, PRO ADM 51/2044.

26. Inderwick Journal, entry for 10 August 1813.

27. Ibid.



HMS *Pelican* captures the U.S. brig *Argus* in this watercolor by an unknown artist. Photo courtesy of the Beverly R. Robinson Collection, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

THE CLAIM

William Henry Allen died without will or widow. His affairs became the responsibility of his younger brother, Thomas J. Allen, who conceived a plan to augment the estate of his deceased brother by a claim against the United States for prize money in the amount to which William Henry would have been entitled if the thirteen vessels which he destroyed had been brought into port and adjudicated in a prize court. Thomas reasoned that only his brother's dutiful compliance with the orders of the secretary of the navy prevented his family from enjoying substantial remuneration. After an investigation, he calculated that the vessels and their cargoes were worth \$2.5 million. Under the provisions of the prize statute then in force,³⁵ William Henry Allen would, under Thomas Allen's theory, have been entitled to 7.5 percent of such value or \$187,500 — a fortune in those days.³⁶

35. The Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, approved 23 April 1800, Sec. 6, in Benjamin Homans, ed. *Laws of the United States in Relation to the Navy and Marine Corps* (Washington, 1843), 59.

36. American State Papers (hereafter ASP), Naval Affairs, 4 vols. (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1824), 1: 373.

It is generally accepted that one of the attributes of sovereignty is that citizens may not sue their sovereign without the sovereign's consent.³⁷ Thus, naval officers and their personal representatives could not bring suit against the United States for prize money they felt entitled to receive.³⁸ Instead, they addressed petitions, called "memorials," to Congress, which had the power to enact private legislation for their benefit. For many years the Naval Committee of the Senate and the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives accepted memorials on which they held hearings, heard arguments, listened with patience and conscientiousness, and reported to their respective houses. It was not uncommon for a Congressional committee to issue a report recommending

37. In *Kawananakoa v. Polyblank*, 205 U.S. 349, at 353 (1907), Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: "Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes (*Leviathan*, c. 26, 2). A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."

38. After Congress created the Court of Claims in 1855, a forum was available for such claimants.

legislation to pay memorialists amounts ranging from \$19.91 to \$419.45.³⁹ The naval committees acted as quasi-judicial bodies, blending the law of nations, United States prize statutes, precedent, public policy, and the politics of patriotism. The law of nations was, inherently, the first question to be examined.

THE LAW OF NATIONS

The law of nations, sometimes called public law, was a body of rules and understandings that originated during the Renaissance among the nations of Europe and the Mediterranean for the delineation of rights and obligations among themselves or between one nation and the nationals of another in peace and in war.

No child of the Anglo-Saxon common law, the law of nations was born of disparate parents. On the theoretical side there were the theologians and philosophers of natural law, men who argued that even kings ruling by divine right were subject to the limitations imposed by nature's God, especially in their warlike acts. Advocates of an early internationalism, these visionaries themselves constituted an international community.⁴⁰ They and other scholars of their persuasion derived the theoretical basis of an international system to regulate warfare at sea from Greek philosophy (particularly Stoic), the Roman legal code of the Emperor Justinian, and the theology of the Roman Catholic Church. They supplied their ideas to a community of European and Mediterranean powers eager for certainty and reciprocity in maritime affairs.

The other parents of the law of nations were neither scholarly nor philosophical. They were the local officials and judges who administered the maritime codes and customs of medieval seaports in Europe.⁴¹ These givers of law dealt with the practical, everyday problems of thriving commercial ports: the rights of seamen and of shippers, prizes, salvage, wrecks, lost or damaged goods, and the like. But they did their jobs with such consistency, fairness, and devotion to the fostering of international trade that the laws they gave earned respect among mariners, shippers, and ship owners everywhere. The civil

laws of these port cities blended with the philosophical foundation of the natural law scholars to produce a body of international law of surprising clarity and consistency and of widespread international acceptance. Without the benefit of a supervising international agency, the law of nations was largely effective well into the nineteenth century.

Thus, it was under this body of law that the claim for compensation brought by Thomas J. Allen would have to be judged, because the law of nations defined, for all its adherents, the nature of prizes captured in time of war.

THE NATURE OF PRIZES

In 1603, a vessel holding a letter of marque and reprisal from the Dutch government captured the Portuguese carrack *Catherine*. In due course a prize court made an award to the Dutch East India Company as successors in interest to the Dutch vessel. However, a group of the company's shareholders of Mennonite persuasion objected to the company's warlike activities. They refused to accept their share of prize money from *Catherine* and threatened to organize a competitor of pacifist principles. In the ensuing political squabble, the directors of the Dutch East India Company felt the need for legal and public relations support for their position. They employed Hugo Grotius, a twenty-year-old lawyer of awesome precocity, to prepare a supporting brief, which he wrote in 1604 and entitled *De Jure Praedae* (The Law of Prize and Booty).⁴² Though the treatise was not published in full text for more than two centuries, and not in English for more than three, it nevertheless had a profound impact after Grotius separately published Chapter Twelve as *Mare Liberum* (Freedom of the Sea).⁴³ In this work and his later masterpiece, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (On the Law of War and Peace), Grotius did not create the law of nations, but he synthesized and restated, from Greek, Roman, and biblical sources, the maritime law as accepted among the nations of Europe and the Mediterranean. Seldom in legal history have the writings of a single man had such a profound and durable effect on the development of a major field of law.

In *De Jure Praedae* Grotius argued, both from legal and from historical sources, the fundamental principal that all booty seized in warfare is the property of the captor

39. ASP, Naval Affairs, 2: 810 and 704.

40. Francisco de Vitoria (1486-1546) was Spanish; Alberico Gentili (1552-1608) was an Italian who taught at Oxford and practiced before the British courts; Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Cornelius Bynkershoek (1673-1743) were Dutch; Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) was a Saxon who made his career in Sweden; and Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) was Swiss. A brief bibliography of scholarly writings relating to their work appears as Appendix B on page 174.

41. Documentation of the origin and international migration of these codes and customs may be found in Travers Twiss, ed., *The Black Book of the Admiralty*, 4 vols. (1871-76; reprint, Abingdon: Professional Books, 1985).

42. Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Praedae Commentatus* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1950). Grotius was the Mozart of international law. The son of a prominent Dutch scholar, he wrote Latin elegies at the age of eight, entered the University of Leyden at eleven, and received his doctorate from the University of Orleans at fifteen while serving on a diplomatic mission to the court of Henry IV of France. On that occasion the king greeted him as "The Dutch Miracle." Alfred P. Rubin, *The Law of Piracy* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1988), 26.

43. Grotius, *De Jure Praedae*, xiii-xvi.

state and that the claims of the combatants who may have the prize or booty in their possession or control derive from the state.⁴⁴ He pointed out that Roman law required the legions to surrender all booty to an official called the *quaestor*, who held it for the benefit of the state or distributed it in accordance with the decision of the state as personified by the Senate or its chosen representative, the commanding general.⁴⁵ As the law of nations evolved, the process by which naval booty was distributed was left to the internal or "municipal" law of each nation. In Great Britain the law of nations and the applicable municipal law were administered by the High Court of Admiralty and its subsidiary Vice-Admiralty Courts in the colonies.

ADMIRALTY PRIZE JURISDICTION

The words "admiral" and "admiralty" are of Arabic origin. When the Norman Count Roger de Hauteville and his brother Robert Guiscard conquered the Saracen Kingdom of Sicily between 1061 and 1072, they adopted the Arabic term *emir* for their local governors. The Emir of Emirs who ruled Palermo also became the administrative head of its fleet of war vessels. Latin scribes translated his title as *ammiratus*, and in the following centuries the Normans adopted it as "admiral."⁴⁶

Unlike their countrymen in Sicily for whom a royal navy was an essential instrument of military power,⁴⁷ the Norman conquerors of England did not maintain a substantial fleet of public vessels of war. Instead, they relied primarily on private vessels commissioned in the Channel ports (the five largest of which were called the Cinque ports) for defense against invasion from the Continent. Initially, the Warden of the Cinque ports and later officials called "Admiral" had responsibility for marshalling and controlling these vessels as needed. In the fourteenth century other responsibilities were added, including the hearing and adjudication of maritime claims in three categories: criminal cases, suits between private parties ("instance jurisdiction"), and prize cases.⁴⁸

44. *Ibid.*, 142-145, 145-156.

45. *Ibid.*, 147.

46. John Julius Norwich, *The Other Conquest* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 276.

47. Dennis Mack Smith, *A History of Sicily*, 2 vols. (New York: Viking, 1968), 1: 17.

48. After a long and bitter struggle between the regular legal establishment of common law attorneys led by Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) and the specialized "civilian" practitioners before the courts of admiralty, instance jurisdiction, with its lucrative fees, was largely withdrawn from the admiralty bench and bar. Prize proceedings flourished as Britain established its supremacy at sea during the interminable maritime wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. Curiously, the portions of maritime jurisdiction lost to the admiralty courts of England were restored in America. Given the opportunity in 1815 to define admiralty jurisdiction under the 1787

A contemporary analogy may render the function of prize courts more intelligible. If a person agrees to buy a neighbor's automobile, pays the agreed price, and takes possession, he or she is the indisputable owner. But to the rest of the world, the neighbor still holds legal title, and legal title can be transferred only by the processing of appropriate title papers at the office of the state department of motor vehicles. Completion of that process and the issuance of new title papers to the buyer is requisite for a further resale to a stranger. In essence, that is what prize courts did for the captors of enemy vessels. The commanding officer of the captor had, and exercised, many of the attributes of ownership: he could appropriate for the use of his own vessel provisions, supplies, and tackle of the captured vessel, and he could freely choose whether to sink or burn her, ransom her, send her to port under command of his own men as a prize crew, or simply release her. But without the adjudication of a prize court he could not sell her or her cargo, for without such adjudication he could not obtain an unassailable title, "good against the world."⁴⁹

THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY

At the time of the American Revolution, the law of the land was the English common law (including the law of nations) for both state and federal governments.⁵⁰ The United States Constitution of 1787 assigned to Congress the exclusive power to regulate prizes and to the federal judiciary the sole power to sit as admiralty courts.⁵¹ Except to the extent that municipal enactments (i.e., Congressional legislation) intervened, the centuries of decisions in the High Court of Admiralty constituted binding precedential law in United States prize cases.

Constitution, Justice Joseph Story, citing pre-Cokian authorities, declared the great English common law judge to have been wrong and provided the federal admiralty courts with the full breadth of the original English jurisdiction. R. Kent Newmyer, *Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 123.

For a lively account of the civilians, thus called because of the large quantum of the Roman civil codes in their laws, see Daniel R. Coquillette, *The Civilian Writers of Doctors' Commons*, London (Berlin: Duncken & Humbolt, 1988).

49. Arnold W. Knauth, "Prize Law Reconsidered," *Columbia Law Review* 46 (1946): 69, 75.

50. In *The Siren*, 80 U.S. 389 (1871), Mr. Justice Swayne, for the Supreme Court, said, "While the American colonies were a part of the British empire, the English maritime law, including the law of prize was the maritime law of this country. From the close of the Revolution down to this time it has continued to be our law, so far as it is adapted to the altered circumstances and conditions of the country and has not been modified by the proper national authorities." An important link between British and American maritime law is discussed in Appendix A, p. 173.

51. U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sect. 8 and Art. 3, Sect. 2.

Central to those precedents was the great principle, illustrated by Grotius' reference to Roman *quaestor*, that all prizes were the king's except where parliamentary enactments provided for sharing a portion with the officers and crew of the captor vessel.⁵² Precisely the same principles controlled the distribution of prize money during the War of 1812. The totality of prize proceeds went to the United States except to the extent that Congressional legislators varied the rule. In the case of the 1813 cruise of *Argus*, the controlling statute was the Act of 23 April 1800, which provided in Section Five:

That the proceeds of all ships and vessels, and the goods taken on board them, which shall be adjudged good prize, shall, when of equal or superior force to the vessel or vessels making the capture, be the sole property of the captors; and when of inferior force, shall be divided equally between the United States and the officers and men making the capture.⁵³

In his petition to Congress, Thomas J. Allen argued that the Act of 1800 ". . . gives to captors the moiety of their captures; and I believe the position is correct, that the property in them vests the moment they are captured."⁵⁴ From this premise he urged that the secretary of the navy's order to destroy his brother's captured property was the unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without just compensation.⁵⁵ Had Thomas Allen been making his claim under the previous law, that of 2 March 1799, he might have been more persuasive. That law spoke of captured vessels as being the "property" of the United States and of the captors, respectively. But the Act of 1800 repealed the Act of 1799, and the language changed to give the crew an interest only in the "proceeds" after adjudication in a prize court. Without a prize court there could be no "proceeds" to claim. Legal authorities, from Grotius to the United States Supreme Court, have imposed upon claimants the burden of the ancient rule that all booty of war belongs to the sovereign unless the claimant can sustain the burden of proving a grant from the sovereign of all or part of that booty.⁵⁶ Allen's legal case foundered on that principle, but he could still appeal to Congress on the grounds of patriotism and policy.

52. *The Siren*, 80 U.S. at 392.

53. Homans, *Laws of the United States in Relation to the Navy and Marine Corps*, 68.

54. ASP, Naval Affairs, 2: 373.

55. U.S. Constitution, Amendment 5.

56. *The Siren*, 80 U.S. at 392.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ALTERNATIVE

Before the War of 1812, the naval forces of the young American republic had experienced combat in the Atlantic during the American Revolution, in the Mediterranean against the Barbary States, and in the Caribbean during the Quasi-War with France. Yet there existed in the American body politic a widespread skepticism, even opposition, toward a strong standing navy. This attitude was manifest in the policy of Congress to limit compensation for the crews of victorious vessels to the rigid parameters of existing prize and bounty statutes. They had declined, for example, to reward Stephen Decatur and his crew for burning the captured *Philadelphia* in Tripoli harbor.

The national attitude changed dramatically in late 1812 following the capture of two British frigates, *Guerriere* and *Java*, by the American frigate *Constitution*. These victories, which stunned the Royal Navy and the British people, filled America with a surge of patriotic pride. Following both battles the American commanders, Isaac Hull and William Bainbridge, respectively, destroyed the captured enemy warships to prevent their recapture by the enemy. But without a surviving prize vessel there were no proceeds of a prize adjudication to supply prize money for the victorious crews.⁵⁷

With the enthusiastic support of the president and the public, Congress voted an appropriation of \$50,000 in each case to be distributed among combatants in the proportion that the prize statutes would have prescribed had good prize been adjudicated in the admiralty court.⁵⁸ For the balance of the War of 1812, Congress followed the principle of granting compensation for enemy naval vessels sunk in battle or necessarily destroyed after capture.⁵⁹ Congress refused, however, to extend this principle to the capture and destruction of an enemy privateer in the Pacific⁶⁰ or an enemy store ship on Lake Superior.⁶¹

57. "Prior to the capture of the *Guerriere* by the *Constitution*, we believe, no case had occurred in which a pecuniary reward for a naval victory had been paid out of the public treasury. A share in the thing captured was all that the laws or usages of the country allows; and if that perished in the conflict, the victors went without their reward." Report of the Senate Naval Committee, "On Claim of the Officers and Crew of the Ketch *Intrepid* to Prize Money for the Destruction of the Frigate *Philadelphia* at Tripoli in 1804," 9 January 1828, ASP, Naval Affairs 3: 122.

58. *Laws of the United States of America* (hereafter *Laws of the U.S.*), vol. 4 (Philadelphia: John Bioren and W. John Duane, 1816), 522.

59. Claim of the *Intrepid*, ASP, Naval Affairs, 3: 122.

60. Report of the Senate Naval Committee, "On the Memorial of John M. Gamble, A Captain of Marines, for Compensation or Prize Money for Capturing one Enemy's Vessel in 1813" 2 March 1829, ASP, Naval Affairs, 3: 95.

61. Report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, "Claim for Prize Money for a British Vessel Destroyed on Lake Superior," February 5, 1817, ASP, Naval Affairs 1: 446.

In weighing the claim of Thomas J. Allen, the Senate's Naval Committee examined a report of the Navy Department covering seventy-four British vessels, other than warships, captured during the war by thirteen warships of the United States and destroyed pursuant to orders of the Navy Department similar to those issued to William Henry Allen.⁶²

In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Naval Affairs referred to a shift in American naval strategy which occurred late in the war.⁶³ Congress enacted a law authorizing the creation of a fleet of up to twenty small, fast vessels of eight to sixteen guns each, to be used to raid British shipping.⁶⁴ These vessels would have been incapable of manning their captures with prize crews and would have had to burn or sink them. Were

62. Report of the Senate Naval Committee, "Claim for Prize Money for Vessels Captured and Destroyed by the *Argus*," 18 December 1815, ASP, Naval Affairs, 1: 373.

63. Report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, "Claims for Prize Money on Vessels Captured by the *Argus* and Destroyed at Sea," 30 December 1816, ASP, Naval Affairs, 1: 430.

64. Homans, *Laws of the United States in Relation to the Navy and Marine Corps*, 101.

such a fleet to come into existence in the future, the Committee argued, the government could not bear the burden of paying for the crews' moiety of the value of ships and cargoes destroyed. A modern reader may gauge the wisdom of this concern by looking ahead a century and calculating the cost of rewarding submarine crews in relation to the value of vessels they have sunk in our time.

CONCLUSION: THE RULE DEDUCED

The policy of the United States during the War of 1812 appears clear. Congress would appropriate funds to reward officers and crews of United States naval vessels in relation to the value of warships of the Royal Navy necessarily destroyed during, or following, a battle victory, but under no other circumstances would Congress pay for enemy vessels destroyed.⁶⁵

65. Congress did, however, reimburse American captors for the prize value of enemy warships restored as part of a diplomatic settlement (see *Laws of the U.S.* 3: 590 and 6: 115) and for warships recaptured by the enemy through no fault of the American captors (ibid. 4: 453 and 6: 86).

Appendix A

The "Memorandum" of 1753.

In 1753 William Murray, Lord Mansfield (1705-1793), for thirty-four years chief justice of the Court of King's Bench, and three colleagues summarized the principles of proceeding in prize cases in a "Memorandum" to King George II. It was Mansfield, more than any other jurist, who was responsible for integrating the international law merchant into the English common law, thereby supplying the legal mechanisms to facilitate the industrial revolution. The awe in which Mansfield continues to be held by students of the common law is illustrated by the concise and masterful manner in which he and his colleagues summarized prize law practice for their monarch. For the benefit of those who, not being lawyers, have never had the pleasure of Mansfield's prose, the author supplies his central thesis verbatim:

When two powers are at war, they have a right to make prizes of the ships, goods and effects of each other, upon the high seas. Whatever is the property of the enemy, may be acquired by capture at sea; but the property of a friend cannot be taken provided he observes his neutrality.

Hence the law of nations has established,

That the goods of an enemy, on board the ship of a friend, may be taken.

That the lawful goods of a friend, on board the ship of an enemy, ought to be restored.

That contraband goods, going to the enemy with what enables him better to carry on the war, is a departure from neutrality.

By the maritime law of nations, universally and immemorably received, there is an established method of determination, whether the capture be, or be not, a lawful prize.

Before the ship, or goods, can be disposed of by the captor, there must be a regular judicial proceeding, wherein both parties may be heard; and condemnation thereupon as prize, in the court of admiralty, judging by the law of nations and treaties.

The proper and regular court, for these condemnations, is the court of that state to which the captor belongs.

The evidence to acquit or condemn, with or without costs or damages, must, in the first instance, come merely from the ship taken, viz.: the papers on board, and the examination on oath of the master, and other principal officers; for which purpose there are officers of admiralty in all the considerable seaports of every maritime power at war, to examine the captains, and other principal officers of every ship, brought in as prize, upon general and impartial interrogatories. If there do not appear from thence ground to condemn, as enemy's property or contraband goods going to the enemy, there must be an acquittal, unless from the aforesaid evidence the property shall appear so doubtful, that it is reasonable to go into farther proof thereof.

The law of nations requires good faith. Therefore every ship must be provided with complete and genuine papers; and the master at least should be privy to the truth of the transaction.

In 1794 John Jay (1745-1829), former chief justice of the United States, journeyed to London to negotiate the treaty which bears his name. While there, he asked William Scott, Lord Stowell (1745-1836), judge of the High Court of Admiralty, for suggestions for the United States judiciary with respect to admiralty practice. Scott and his colleague, Dr. John Nicholl, made the 1753 "Memorandum" the centerpiece of their reply. As a result of Jay's efforts the complete reply of Scott and Nicholl

was appended to Joseph Chitty, *Practical Treatise on the Law of Nations* (Boston: Bradford and Rad, 1812) and Henry Wheaton, *The Law of Maritime Capture and Prizes* (New York: R. McDermut & D. D. Arden, 1815), the two leading treatises of the period. The "Memorandum" received such wide circulation and reception in the United States that it has been called "the basis of American, as of British, prize law." (Thomas Baty, "Neglected Fundamentals of Prize Law," *Yale Law Journal* 30 [1920]: 34, 39.)

Appendix B

An Accessible Bibliography

Because the law of nations as applied to maritime affairs has been largely obsolete during this century, many sources are difficult to find. The author has prepared this bibliography of sources he has found accessible through out-of-print booksellers or the better law school, bar associations, and supreme court libraries.

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The Early Evolution of the Sloops of the Hudson River, 1620-1800

PAUL E. FONTENOT

The sloops of the Hudson River had their origin in the types of small craft brought to North America by the first European settlers. By 1800, the process of adaptation to suit a specific operating environment resulted in highly distinctive vessels that were ideally suited to local conditions of navigation and trade.

Shipbuilding by Europeans on the Hudson River began well before permanent settlement in the valley. Although a stockade, Fort Nassau, had been built on Castle Island, near Albany, during the winter of 1613-14, and there is evidence of a settlement or encampment on Manhattan Island that same winter, both of these sites seem to have fallen into disuse soon after the United New Netherlands Company's monopoly expired.¹ Several private merchants continued to trade for pelts on the Hudson River after 1617, and, under the auspices of the West India Company, permanent settlement finally began in the Hudson valley with the arrival of the ship *Nieu Nederlandt* and the erection of Fort Orange on the site of the present Albany in the summer of 1624. Construction of permanent dwellings on Manhattan Island followed.

During the winter of 1613-14, Adriaen Block and his men built the "jacht" *Onrust* to replace the ship *de Tijger*, which had been accidentally.² After the demise of the United New Netherlands Company, some of the independent traders on the river also "built there several sloops and tolerable yachts."³ These early vessels were undoubtedly constructed in the same manner to which the Dutch were accustomed, utilizing forms with which they were very familiar. Similarly, after permanent settlement began, the available boat builders were men who had been trained in the traditions prevalent in the Netherlands. Trained

shipwrights were sent out from the home country to the new settlements for the purpose of maintaining and replacing the vessels vital to transportation along the river valley, and the West India Company offered considerable inducements to skilled builders to persuade them to emigrate to Nieuw Amsterdam.⁴

By the time the Dutch arrived in America, a wide variety of small craft types had been developed in the Netherlands for use on their extensive waterways and along the coast. These vessels had remarkably specialized hull forms suited for service in particular localities, but only a limited range of rigs was employed for all these different craft. The designations of Dutch craft invariably referred to their hull forms and never to their rigs. The two types most often noted in early records of the New Netherlands were the "jacht" and the "sloop," which is hardly surprising, since these were the craft most often employed by the Dutch for exploration in coastal waters.⁵

The most familiar of all Dutch small craft types is the "jacht," but this familiarity is a potential trap. There was much variation in the size of "jachts," and they could be rigged with one, two, or three masts. This type was distinguished in particular from other coastal vessels by its relatively narrow hull and fine lines. Contemporary models and lines plans show that, although the type was described as having a narrow bottom, most of these vessels had no deadrise and virtually flat bottoms over a large part of their length, but the bow and stern were much finer than other Dutch coastal craft of the period. The tumble-home

1. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., *The Narratives of New Netherland* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), 47; Beauchamp Plantagenet, *A Description of the Province of New Albion* (London, 1648), 16-17.

2. Jameson, *Narratives*, 44; Edmund B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. (Albany, NY: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1856-87), 1: 12, 13, 15.

3. Jameson, *Narratives*, 47.

4. Tymen Jansen was sent to Nieuw Amsterdam by the West India Company in 1632; see O'Callaghan and Fernow, *Colonial Documents* 14: 17. One example of the offering of inducements was this resolution: "Marcus Hendrick Vogelsang, ship carpenter, intending to emigrate to New Netherland, requests that as much space may be granted to him in the most convenient locality on Manhattans Island as he may require for erecting a shipyard and dock and a house. The vote having been taken, it was decided to direct the Director to accommodate him in a convenient locality." O'Callaghan and Fernow, *Colonial Documents* 14: 181.

5. Nicolaes Witsen, *Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum ofte Aeloude en Hedendaegse Scheepsbouw en Bestier* (Amsterdam, 1671), 192-195.

of the hull was less extreme and the sheer rather flatter than that seen on many other types. Most had cabins, either in the stern under a raised quarterdeck or amidships under either a deck level with the top of the bulwarks or in a "statie" or trunk. A prominent beakhead was also a feature of almost all these vessels, and they generally featured far more decorative work than other small craft. Leeboards commonly were fitted to many of the smaller "jachts," but many others were without this feature.⁶

The large vessels of this type, such as Henry Hudson's *de Halve Maen*, were ship-rigged with three masts, and were known as "advijts-jachts."⁷ The smaller craft, which were rigged with one or two masts, were classified as either "zeyl-jachts" or "speel-jachts," and the latter group, as their name "play-yachts" indicates, were purpose-built for pleasure sailing. The former type were initially constructed to act as tenders to large ocean-going vessels in coastal waters and in harbor. They soon proved to be ideally suited for exploration and reconnaissance and, because of their speed and maneuverability, for use as dispatch vessels in naval operations or between ports. The "speel-jachts" were rigged most commonly with two masts, each carrying a fore-and-aft sail, and without standing rigging.⁸ The working "zeel-jachts" were more often fitted with the "bezaan" rig — a single mast whose mainsail had a very short gaff and long boom and a short bowsprit with one or two headsails. A more powerful arrangement, with a topmast and topsail, a long standing gaff for the mainsail, and auxiliary square sails, effectively became the standard rig of government vessels, termed "staten-jachts" or "prinses-jachts," by the mid-seventeenth century.⁹ From the 1640s on, other "zeel-jachts" carried the two-masted rig of the "speel-jacht," usually with the masts stepped vertically, and a bowsprit from which a jib was set.¹⁰

A close relative of the "jacht" was the "sloop," which was somewhat less finely modeled, and further distinguishable by being clench-built. "Sloeps" rarely exceeded sixty feet in length, most were smaller, and many were designed to be rowed easily in addition to being good

sailers. The "roei-sloeps" could be forty feet or more in length but were usually undecked. Few, if any, "sloeps" were equipped with leeboards, which would have caused grave inconvenience to oarsmen. This type was also very useful for exploration and colonial work, and many were built specifically for various overseas settlements. Single-masted rigs were used, both with or without bowsprits and topmasts.¹¹

The full repertory of hull forms and sail plans was available to builders and designers involved in the production of local vessels for service on the Hudson River after European settlement. These various small craft types had evolved over time to suit the specific requirements and demands of the trades and localities in which they were operated, and shipwrights were well aware of the benefits and penalties inherent in each design. This existing lore of shipbuilding was the basis upon which the builders on the Hudson River created fresh types to match the specific needs of the owners, operators, and traders in the new settlements.

Administrative documents provide some of the earliest information on the vessels in use on the Hudson at this time. Tymen Jansen testified to Cornelis van Tienhoven on 22 March 1639 that since 1633 he "has worked as ship's carpenter and has been engaged on all old and new work, which Mr. Twiller [Wouter van Twiller was then the director-general of New Netherland for the West India Company] ordered to be made."¹² The West India Company's ship's carpenter reported the construction or rebuilding of six yachts among other vessels: three, *Amsterdam*, *Prins Willem*, and an unnamed vessel were clearly of new construction; *Hoop* was a captured vessel which was "entirely rebuilt and planked up higher"; and the origins of the other two, *Wesel* and *Vreede*, is unclear. It is significant that these yachts were specifically distinguished from other vessel types in his report, and his mention that the unnamed vessel was a "yacht with a mizzen sold to Barent Dircksen" makes it very probable that the others were rigged with a single mast. Ships were apparently built up river as well, since Jansen mentions his construction of a vessel named *Omwal* at Fort Orange. Shipbuilding does not seem to have flourished under the Dutch, however. In 1652 the directors of the West India Company wrote to Peter Stuyvesant informing him it would be cheaper to build a replacement in Manhattan than in Amsterdam for the lost sloop belonging to the settlement on Aruba, but when he himself requested in 1657 that the Company send out ships' carpenters, he was

6. Witsen, *Aeloude*, 192-193 and plate 72. Cornelis Van Yk, *De Nederlandse Scheepsbouwkonst open Gestelt* (Amsterdam, 1697), 171.

7. G. C. E. Crone, *Nederlandsche Jachten, Binnenschepen, Visschervaartuigen en Darnmee Verwente Kleine Zeeschepen, 1650-1900* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1926), 252-270.


8. Witsen, *Aeloude*, 192.

9. Van Yk, *De Nederlandse Scheepsbouwkonst*, 331-332; Witsen, *Aeloude*, 192-195; F. Baay, *Bouwbeschrijving van een 17de Eeuws Statenjacht* (Rotterdam: Bosman, 1949); Crone, *Nederlandsche Jachten*, 77-149, and, for a thorough survey of "prinses-jachts," *De Jachten der Oranges* (Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1937); Willem Van Beuge, *17de Eeuws Statenjacht* (Bussum: C. A. J. van Dishoeck, 1980).

10. E. W. Petrejus, *Scheepmodellen II. Jachten* (Bussum: C. A. J. van Dishoeck, 1966), 29-31.

11. Witsen, *Aeloude*, 191-192 (particularly note the two "sloeps" built for service at Cabo Verde and Guinea); E. W. Petrejus, *Scheepmodellen I. Binnenschepen* (Bussum: C. A. J. van Dishoeck, 1964), 137.

12. O'Callaghan and Fernow, *Colonial Documents* 14: 17.



"Zweedts Koninglyk Jaght," from Nicolaes Witsen, *Architectura Navalis et Regimen Nauticum ofte Aeloude en Hedendaegse Scheepsbouw en Bestier* (Amsterdam, 1671).

informed that the small amount of shipping in Nieuw Amsterdam made this too expensive and, therefore, unnecessary.¹³

It is clear that at least some of these "jachts" had passenger accommodations, since some skippers complained of *Amsterdam* and *Prins Willem* "that they cannot keep anything dry in the cabin, in consequence of which the yachts suffer great damage which can be prevented by a little labor," leading Director-General Willem Kieft to "charge you [Jansen] herein to perform your bounden duty, so that the Company may not suffer loss and you be free from blame." Jansen responded that he was doing his best, but could not "know when a vessel is leaky, unless those in charge of her inform him of the fact."¹⁴

Illustrations of Manhattan in this period expand our knowledge of the shipping on the river. The earliest known view, published by Joost Hartgers in Amsterdam, depicts the settlement about 1626-1628.¹⁵ Three full-rigged ships, presumably engaged in the transatlantic trade, and

four native craft of two different types are shown, along with two small craft of European derivation. The vessel under sail is very similar to a "speel-jacht," with a high stern containing a low cabin, a foredeck covering another cabin, leeboards, and two sharply raking masts with triangular sails. The second vessel is under oars, and is very similar, except that no masts are shown, and it is not fitted with leeboards. This is the only European vessel whose crew is visible, but they seem to be vastly out of proportion, and it seems probable that both these small craft were similar in size — about forty feet in length.


A watercolor of Nieuw Amsterdam circa 1650 in the Royal Archives in The Hague shows a moderate-size full-rigged ship under sail, three native craft, again of two differing types, and six small European-style vessels.¹⁶ The only one of these under sail is rigged with a single mast carrying a large gaff sail and carries a staysail and a bowsprit, which probably could set a jib. A two-masted vessel is clearly shown, broadside on, to the right of the merchant ship. It is similar in appearance to a "speel-jacht" but with vertical masts, and it has its sails furled. Leeboards are prominent on both these craft and on another single-masted vessel moored in the background. The two-masted vessel is again about forty feet in length and appears to have a long raised quarterdeck over a stern cabin. The vessel under sail seems to be about the same

13. Ibid., 173; I. N. P. Stokes, *The Iconography of Manhattan Island*, 6 vols. (New York: R. H. Dodd, 1915-28), 4: 52; Joseph A. Goldenberg, *Shipbuilding in Colonial America* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1976), 26.

14. Edmund B. O'Callaghan, *The Register of New Netherland* (Albany: J. Munsell, 1865), 2: 97.

15. Kryn Fryderycks (attrib.), *t' Fort nieuw Amsterdam op de Manhatans* (Amsterdam, 1651), New York Public Library, published unchanged in Adriaen Van Der Donck, *Beschryvinge Van Nieuw Nederlant* (Amsterdam, 1655), 9.

16. *Nieuw Amsterdam ofte nue Nieuw Iorx opt 'Teylant Man*, Museum of the City of New York, New York, NY.



A general view of Manhattan from Brooklyn Heights, from Jasper Danckaerts' *Journal* (1678-1680). Illustration courtesy of the Brooklyn Historical Society, Brooklyn, New York.

size, but it is not possible to discern much of its deck arrangements since the mainsail obscures the hull abaft the mast, although two anchors stowed on the bulwarks are clearly discernible. The other small craft are much smaller, probably only twenty-five feet in length, and appear to be largely undecked. No sails are set, but they appear to be rigged with a gaff mainsail and a staysail set to the stem, without a bowsprit.

There is a very clear inset view of Nieuw Amsterdam on the map of New Netherland published by Nicolaes Johannes Visscher, which was probably drawn in late 1652 or early 1653. Four vessels are shown: a full-rigged ship, a native canoe, and two small vessels rigged as sloops, one moored, the other under sail. These again are undecked vessels about twenty-five feet in length. Both seem very similar in hull form to contemporary Dutch "sloops," having fairly fine lines, double ends, tumble-home, and no sign of leeboards.¹⁷

For the period around the time of the colony's transfer from the Dutch, the so-called Duke's Plan of New York, based on the survey by Jacques Cortelyou completed in September 1661 but not issued until 1664 after the town was in English hands, shows thirteen single-masted vessels of various sizes, all rigged as sloops, along with six large ships and a ketch. Every one of the sloops has a prominent stern cabin, and not one of the vessels is equipped with leeboards. Most of these vessels appear to be larger than those depicted in earlier views, probably around forty to fifty feet long on the deck, and the cabin under a raised

quarterdeck occupies between one-third and one-half of the length. The sloops are rigged with a large mainsail, possibly utilizing a short gaff only, and a staysail set to a bowsprit. The run of the stay on several of the vessels indicates that, in addition, a jib could have been set flying from the tip of the bowsprit, since the stay runs to a point only two-thirds of the length from the heel on these sloops. This plan is also useful in providing a color scheme, which is uniformly white to the level of the deck and treated wood above, with a black wale between.¹⁸

Vessels similar to those depicted on the Duke's Plan appear in a series of sketches by Jasper Danckaerts in his manuscript journal covering the period 1679-80.¹⁹ A general view of Manhattan from what is now Brooklyn Heights (above) shows at least seven sloops moored in the newly completed Great Dock. This sketch is extremely valuable, since a considerable amount of data has survived on the structure and dimensions of the dock, such as the width of the entrance and the spacing of the pilings, which facilitates accurate estimation of the sloops' dimensions. Five are moored along the west basin mole and are broadside on. The two smallest are approximately forty feet long on the deck; there are two sloops of fifty feet; and a larger vessel is almost sixty feet long. The masts of the small sloops are forty feet from deck to truck, with thirty-foot booms and bowsprits projecting fifteen feet beyond the stem. These sloops have two shrouds per side, a stay to the stemhead, and a jibstay to the bowsprit. The

17. Nicolaes Johannes Visscher, *Nieuw Amsterdam op t'Eylant Manhattans*, inset in map *Novi Belgii Novaeque Angliae nec non Partis Virginiae Tabula* (Amsterdam: N. J. Visscher, 1655), New York Public Library, New York, NY.

18. King's Collection of Maps, Vol. 121, *A Description of the Towne of Mannados or New Amsterdam*, British Museum, London.

19. Jasper Danckaerts and Peter Sluyter, *Journal of a Voyage to New York, 1679-80*, manuscript, Brooklyn Historical Society, Brooklyn, NY. For a printed edition of the journal, see n. 21 below.

largest vessel has a mast fifty-eight feet from deck to cap, a topmast which is twenty-eight feet long with an overlap of eleven feet, a thirty-nine-foot boom, and a bowsprit twenty-four feet long. The two intermediate sloops are also fitted with topmasts, and all three vessels with topmasts have three shrouds per side which are rattled down. The rigging otherwise is similar to the smaller craft. Two sloops are moored to the east basin mole, one depicted from the stern quarter, the other from astern. The perspective is somewhat distorted, making it unwise to calculate dimensional data from these illustrations, but a clear picture of the deck layout appears from these views. There is a high stern cabin, apparently with stern windows, which occupies approximately one-quarter of the length on deck. There appears to be a short foredeck ahead of the mast, with a hatch near its after edge, and abaft the mast there is a second hatch in the main deck. Two further sketches include sloops under sail and demonstrate that they had one or two headsails in addition to the loose-footed mainsail, which had a short gaff and a boom. From the steersmen's positions, it seems that the sloops were steered with a tiller. Once again, the large cabin aft is prominent, and again, none of the vessels in any of the sketches shows any sign of leeboards.²⁰

Danckaerts' journal itself describes his journey "in company with about twenty passengers of all kinds, . . . in a boat not so large as a common ferryboat in Holland," taking three days to reach Albany. Since the sloop, which he also termed a yacht, was anchored each night from nightfall until 9 o'clock the next morning, the actual sailing time for the voyage was only about twenty-seven hours. His return journey was much slower, lasting almost seven days with frequent stops to take on cargo and embark or disembark passengers. It is clear from the journal that, when sailing downstream, the sloops were more deeply laden, carrying both cargo (on this occasion it was grain) and passengers, since he remarks on the sloop grounding on several occasions, while there is no mention of a cargo from New York to Albany.²¹ Subsequent travelers' accounts corroborate that, at this period, the sloops' primary traffic northbound was passengers, with substantial cargoes added to the passenger load for the southbound voyage.

Direct pictorial evidence, amplified by the information provided by early documents and by the implications inherent in our knowledge that the early shipwrights were imported for the purpose of ship construction from the Netherlands, points to the conclusion that the basic designs

adopted for the earliest vessels constructed on the Hudson River were of Dutch origin. While the Dutch controlled the colony, during which time relatively few vessels seem to have been built, the evidence again points to a process of gradual adaptation of these designs to this new environment. Contemporary descriptions of navigational conditions on the Hudson River, most notably Robert Juet's of 1609, highlight the fact that the channel was largely clear of shoals until just below Albany. Presumably for this reason the use of leeboards was unnecessary. The evidence is absolutely clear, however, in showing that their use was entirely abandoned after the mid-1650s. Similarly, it is apparent that the most suitable vessel types by far among those used in coastal and riverine trades were found to be the "jacht" and the "sloop," and that the use of other types was limited. The builders and owners were well aware of the importance of passenger traffic on the river, and they made appropriate provisions for its accommodation as vessel design evolved. At the same time, the need for facilities for the carriage of bulky goods was equally well understood, and was met by the inclusion of substantial cargo-carrying capacity.


The clearest illustration of the developments which had occurred from the original Dutch designs comes from a comparison of Danckaerts' sketches with similar illustrations from the Netherlands.²² There are remarkably strong similarities in the basic hull forms, but there are noticeable changes too, which reflect the American vessels' environment. Most immediately obvious is the plainness of Danckaerts' vessels; there is a complete absence of carved work, and the projecting stem of the Dutch vessels has been eliminated. This is clearly a consequence of the relative lack of wealth in the New York colony and the need to conserve resources, and particularly labor, for more important projects. The greater attention to cargo facilities visible in the 1679 sketches again reflects the different conditions of trade from those prevalent in Visscher's 1627 prints. Also very significant is the complete disappearance of leeboards, which were not necessary for Hudson River conditions. Finally, the dominance of gaff sails over the sprit rig, which was so popular in the Netherlands, is also noticeable. During the first fifty years of colonization, builders in New York had developed a new design through incremental modification of the original forms that they had brought with them to America.

William Burgis's engraving of New York City circa 1717 is one of the most valuable illustrations of the development of sloops in the New York area in the early

20. Danckaerts *Journal*, sketches inscribed *York van ter syden dat is van de oost kant* and *N york van achteren of van de noort kant*.

21. Jasper Danckaerts and Peter Sluyter, *Journal of a Voyage to New York, 1679-80*, ed. and trans. Bartlett Burleigh James and J. Franklin Jameson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 185-228.

22. In particular, compare Danckaerts' sketches of sloops under sail with Nicolaes Johannes Visscher, *Icones Variarum Navium Hollandicarum* (Amsterdam: N. J. Visscher, 1627), plate inscribed *Boyers*, and the vessels in his large general view with Witsen, *Aeloude*, plate 72.



Details from William Burgis, *A South Prospect of ye Flourishing City of New York in the Province of New York in America*, ca. 1719, show the "Great Dock" and a large river sloop (left) and a small river sloop (right). Photos above and on page 181 courtesy of the I. N. Phelps Stokes collection, Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Division of Art, Prints and Photographs, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations.

eighteenth century.²³ The city is dominated by the shipping crowded into its surrounding waters, moored at its docks or to wharves, careened on mud banks for repair, or under construction in waterside shipyards. The work itself is large (seventy-seven by twenty and one-half inches), cleanly delineated, and highly detailed, so that it provides a wealth of information on vessels, construction methods, and operational procedures. Although the engraving was made in London, the original drawing was undoubtedly prepared on the spot. I. N. P. Stokes thoroughly analyzed the cityscape, compared the data presented by Burgis with other views and plans of New York, rechecked it against real estate records, and demonstrated that the entire view was remarkably accurate and free from errors of location or perspective.²⁴ It is therefore valid to utilize this engraving as documentary evidence of the state of development of shipping in New York early in the eighteenth century.

Sloops predominate in numbers among all the vessels depicted, with forty in sight. Each is a distinctive portrait; Burgis did not use a generic illustration for a multitude of sloops but accurately and painstakingly rendered the individual characteristics of the various vessels. Two types of sloops are visible: vessels which were armed for self-defense and were probably engaged primarily in the West India and other overseas trades, and unarmed vessels more likely to have been employed in the coastal and riverine trades. In general, the armed sloops tend to be larger, but some large, unarmed sloops also are visible in Burgis's panorama. All the sloops share some common characteristics. All are fully decked vessels and are generally very plainly finished. They have strongly raking masts, in complete contrast with the vessels seen in Danckaerts's sketches of some forty years earlier, whose masts were vertical. All those with sails set carry loose-footed mainsails with short gaffs, the "bezaan" rig, and the method used to stow the furled mainsail on the others, with the foot hoisted part-way up the mast, indicates that all these sails too were loose-footed. None of the sloops carry topsails, although a number are fitted with topmasts and

23. William Burgis, *A South Prospect of ye Flourishing City of New York in the Province of New York in America* (London, ca. 1719), New York Public Library.

24. Stokes, *Iconography* 1: 239-251.



Detail showing "Collonel Morris's Fancy," the first portrait of an American yacht, also from Burgis's *A South Prospect of ye Flourishing City of New York*.

have their shrouds rattled down, which would facilitate crewmen going aloft to handle gear and implies that at least a topsail set flying could be carried. A thorough study of every vessel, whether sloop or other type, in this detailed work, using a powerful lens, has completely failed to locate a single instance of the fitting of a leeboard.

The general length on deck of the unarmed sloops appears to be in the fifty-foot range, with some much larger, approaching sixty-five feet overall. Virtually all these sloops display the characteristic raised cabin top aft, which extends for about one-quarter of the length on deck. Several stern and quarter views of these sloops show that the cabins received some daylight through two stern windows in the transom, and that the cabin bulkhead was pierced by a central doorway flanked by very small windows. Forward there is strong evidence of a log windlass midway between the stem and the raking mast. From the limited views included of sloops on the ways or careening, it seems that they were relatively sharp bottomed but retained rather bluff bow forms. Of the unarmed sloops, approximately half are fitted with topmasts, and all of these carry both a staysail and a jib, whereas most of the vessels without topmasts are rigged with a jib

alone. It is interesting, too, to note that virtually every sloop depicted is rigged with a bobstay and a pair of bowsprit shrouds.

The large unarmed sloops are very powerfully rigged. One which is most clearly illustrated has a strongly raked mainmast seventy-eight feet tall from the deck to the cap, carrying a thirty foot topmast. The overlap at the mast head is thirteen feet, producing a total height of ninety-five feet from deck to truck. This mast is supported by three shrouds on each side, fitted with ratlines, a stay to the stemhead, and a jib-stay to the tip of the bowsprit. Each of these stays carries a large headsail, which together appear to fill almost entirely the space between the stays and the mast. The boom of the mainsail is sixty feet in length, and its gaff is twenty-four feet long. The sloop is fitted with a bowsprit with substantial steeve which projects twenty-seven feet beyond the stem. Although no topsail is shown, the presence of ratlines and a topmast is clear evidence of its existence. The hull of this sloop has strong sheer, and the maindeck is surrounded by bulwarks about four feet high. These are pierced with scuppers amidships to permit water to drain away easily from the deck. The stern cabin is some sixteen feet in length, has a crowned cabin top which is almost six feet above the maindeck, and the stern transom, from other illustrations, is probably fitted with two large windows for illumination.

A class of very small sloops is clearly distinguishable from all the others visible in Burgis's view. These vessels are only about twenty-five feet in length and are fully decked, but they have no stern cabin. Instead, they have a bench around three sides of the stern, rather like the sternsheets of an open boat. Forward, some type of crank-operated vertical windlass is fitted for handling anchors. The rigging on these vessels is similar to that of their larger sisters, with a loose-footed gaff mainsail and jib only, two shrouds on each side to support the mast, but no bowsprit rigging. The mast is about thirty-two feet from deck to truck, the boom some twenty feet in length, the gaff only five to six feet long, and the bowsprit projects about ten feet beyond the stem. With a simple rig, they were presumably easy to handle, and none have a crew of more than two men. Their role is uncertain, since it is obvious they were not intended for use requiring more than an occasional overnight voyage. It is possible they were employed rather as the later lighters were used within the harbor area or were owned by inhabitants of the smaller settlements on the lower reaches of the Hudson River, who used them for local transportation of passengers and produce or as ferries across the river.

There is one vessel, a sloop, which is particularly distinctive in Burgis's view of New York. Only two vessels are included in the key to features of special interest: the station ship (No. 18), which is an unidentified

warship of the Royal Navy, and this vessel (No. 24) "Collonel Morris's Fancy turning to Windward with a sloop of Common Mould." (See illustration on page 181.) Not only is this the first portrait of an American yacht, it is probably also the first illustration of a named American vessel of any description. *Fancy* appears to be of moderate size, about thirty-five feet long on deck, with a short stern cabin under an arched roof. Above the wale, which runs at deck level, is a band of carved or painted leaf-pattern scroll work, which particularly distinguishes this vessel from all the other sloops visible, which are finished very plainly. It is reasonable to assume that *Fancy's* hull form was somewhat sharper than the norm, since Burgis takes the trouble to compare the yacht with a sloop of "Common Mould." The rig is similar to that of many other sloops in sight — a raking mast with a loose-footed mainsail carried from a short gaff, a staysail set from the stem, and a jib set from near the bowsprit tip. The mast is about forty feet from deck to cap, carrying a short topmast which is ten feet long from the cap to its truck; the boom is just over thirty feet long; the gaff is only about seven feet in length; and the bowsprit, which is strongly steeved, projects over fifteen feet beyond the stem. A bobstay is fitted, but there are no bowsprit shrouds, and the mast is supported by three shrouds on each side, which are fitted with ratlines. Since *Fancy* carries a topmast, and has ratlines on the shrouds, it is very probable that a small square topsail was set when conditions were suitable.

The vessels in Burgis's view bear some resemblance to those shown in the Duke's Plan and are clearly influenced by English sloops. This type was derived from the early seventeenth-century English sloop or shallop, names which seem to have been used fairly indiscriminately to describe the same vessel type in the early part of the seventeenth century: a small decked vessel for cruising duties, usually rigged with two masts setting square sails.²⁵ Clearly, despite the similarity in name, this vessel bore no resemblance to the Dutch "sloop," which was more often than not an undecked craft using a fore-and-aft rig on a single mast. By mid-century these English sloops had grown a little. They were rigged with a single mast carrying a gaff mainsail and a bowsprit supporting one or two headsails. The lines of an early eighteenth-century example of one of these early sloops have survived as the draught for *Ferrett* and *Sharke*, whose general appearance is very similar to many of the sloops in Burgis's view, although the American vessels are again less decorated. This type had a hull form with good load-carrying capabilities, allied to relatively fine lines with appreciable deadrise.²⁶

25. William A. Baker, *Sloops and Shallops* (Barre, MA: Barre Publishing Co., 1966), 40-44.

26. Admiralty Collection of Draughts, Box 54, No. 3779, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.

Many illustrations of New York City and the Hudson Valley around the middle years of the eighteenth century provide further examples of this type of sloop. The common features of a broad hull, a powerful rig, generally with two headsails, and a prominent stern cabin are clearly visible in all these renderings. Two contemporary engravings show sloops on the Hudson River itself, one of which clearly illustrates the high transom incorporating windows for lighting the stern cabin,²⁷ and a vignette on a 1755 plan of New York City shows a sloop rigged with a square topsail.²⁸ The view of a sloop in the background of a portrait of Pau de Wandelaer, a prominent Albany merchant, is particularly useful in showing the appearance of these vessels (see illustration opposite).²⁹ The last view also provides an accurate contemporary color scheme of a dark hull, probably treated with tar or painted with a lamp-black compound, and bright red-orange bulwarks. Prominent in many of the illustrations is a boat towed astern, which also is mentioned in several contemporary travelers' narratives, often being termed a canoe or bateau.

This illustrative information is verified and amplified by an unusually interesting description of the Hudson River sloops and their trade written by a Swedish naturalist, Peter Kalm, who traveled from New York to Albany by sloop in June 1749:

All the boats which ply between Albany and New York belong to Albany. They go up and down the Hudson River as long as it is open and free from ice. They bring from Albany boards or planks, and all sorts of timber, flour, peas and furs, which they get from the Indians, or which are smuggled from the French. They come home almost empty, and only bring a few kinds of merchandise with them, the chief of which is rum The boats are quite large, and have a good cabin, in which the passengers can be very commodiously lodged. They are usually built of red cedar or of white oak. Frequently the bottom consists of white oak, and the sides of red cedar, because the latter withstands decay much longer than the former. The red cedar is likewise apt to split when it hits against anything, and the Hudson is in many places full of sand and rocks, against which the keel of the boat sometimes strikes.

27. Paul Sandby, *A View in Hudson's River of Pokepsey & the Catskill Mountains from Sopos Island, in Hudson's River* (London, 1761), New-York Historical Society, and *A View in Hudson's River of the Entrance of what is called the Topan Sea* (showing the transom), engraved by Peter Benazech (London, 1768), Eno Collection, New York Public Library.

28. F. Maerschalck, *A Plan of the City of New York from an actual Survey Anno Domini M,DCC,LV* (New York, 1755), Division of Maps and Charts, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

29. Pieter Vanderlyn (attrib.), *Pau de Wandelaer* ca. 1730, Albany Institute of History & Art, Albany, NY.



Detail showing a Hudson River sloop from a portrait of Pau de Wandelaer, by Peter Vanderlyn, c. 1730, oil on canvas. Photo courtesy of the collection of the Albany Institute of History and Art, gift of the Catherine Gansevoort Lansing Estate.

Therefore people choose white oak for the bottom, as being the softer wood, and not splitting so easily. The bottom, being continually under water, is not so much exposed to weathering and holds out longer.³⁰

Kalm's narrative is particularly valuable for the light it sheds on the trade pattern between New York and Albany at this time. The cargoes in both directions, but particularly downstream, were bulky and, with the possible exception of furs, not very valuable unless shipped in large quantities. It is obvious that this aspect of the river trade would drive a search for hull forms which were suited to the carriage of large volumes of goods, both in the hold and on deck, and would also tend to encourage a

trend towards larger size. In addition, the relative paucity of goods to be transported upstream, the general rugged nature of the country on either bank, the poor development of road communications along the banks of the river, and the fact that New York State north and west of Albany was at this time one of the principal pioneer areas, would tend to emphasize the relative importance of passenger accommodation in the design of the sloops, as Kalm's description bears out.

The information provided in this narrative on construction materials and rationale is especially important, since this type of data is virtually unobtainable from any other sources apart from building contracts, of which there is a dearth for this and later periods. Patrick M'Robert, writing twenty-five years later, confirmed Kalm's data. "They have great choice of wood in their ship-yards. Their upper timbers they make all of cedar, which they prefer to oak. They are very nice in the workmanship of ship-building here, and use a great deal of ornament and

30. Adolph B. Benson, ed., *The America of 1750; Peter Kalm's Travels in North America; the English Version of 1770, revised from the Original Swedish*, 2 vols. (New York: Wilson-Erickson, 1937), 1: 330.

painting about the vessels.”³¹ Furthermore, although Kalm should have been very familiar with leeboards, since there is ample evidence of their use in Swedish waters, he makes no mention of their employment on the Hudson River, despite his reference to the navigational problems of shoals, rocks, and sandbars in the channel.

Some five years earlier, Dr. Alexander Hamilton, a native of Edinburgh who had settled in Maryland and become a wealthy physician, traveled through the northern colonies for his health. His travel journal has survived, and it, too, makes clear the importance of passenger traffic on the Hudson River and provides an indication of the number and size of the sloops in the trade. “To this city [Albany] belongs about 24 sloops about 50 tons burden that go and come to [New] York. They chiefly carry plank and rafters.”³² James Birket, an English merchant visiting the West Indies and North American colonies in connection with his business activities, also noted that sloops in the Albany trade were large. Since much of the trade to the West Indies, even from England, was carried out in sloops, with which Birket, as an experienced merchant, would have been well acquainted, it is reasonable to conclude that the Albany sloops were notably larger than others in the coastal trades.³³

Thomas Pownall, who served as lieutenant governor of New Jersey and governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and South Carolina in the 1750s, also noted the size and comfort of the sloops on the river:

The Navigation from New York to Albany was intirely carried on in a kind of Sloop of about 60 tons called a Yacht. The Dutch Schippers of Albany are the Cheif Navigators. They had in 1754 twenty three of these Vessels in constant employ. From the Commodiousness & Cleanliness of these Vessels one enjoys the most agreeable passage that can be wished. These Yachts brought down the Produce of Albany County Wheat Flour Pease. The Produce of the Indian Trade &c to New York & their Back carriage was all sorts of European Goods & Produce Rum Sugar Salt & every article of manufacture both for the use of the Inhabitants & for the Indian Trade.³⁴

31. Patrick M’Robert, *A Tour through Part of the North Provinces of America: being, A Series of Letters wrote on the Spot in the Years 1774, & 1775*, ed. Carl Bridenbaugh (New York: New York Times, 1968), 2.

32. Carl Bridenbaugh, ed., *Gentleman’s Progress, The Itinerarium of Dr. Alexander Hamilton, 1744* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 49-79.

33. James Birket, *Some Cursory Remarks Made by James Birket on his Voyage to North America 1750-1751* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1916), 43-47.

34. Thomas Pownall, *A Topographical Description of the Dominions of the United States of America*, ed. Lois Mulkearn (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1949), 45.

As a British administrator, Pownall was particularly struck by the value of the Hudson River in opening “Communications with the Inland Parts of the Continent,” noting that the river was “navigable with Sloops to Albany,”³⁵ and strongly implying that they were of shallow draft to cope with the shoals between Kinderhook and Albany.

Almost twenty years after Kalm and Birket, Richard Smith, a Quaker from southern New Jersey, made the same journey from New York to Albany by sloop in 1769. His narrative provides further evidence of the relatively large size of these vessels and the attention devoted to passenger accommodation. “Our skipper says there are at Albany 31 sloops all larger than this, which carry from 400 to 500 Barrels of Flour each,” and “These Albany Sloops contain very convenient Cabins. We eat from a regular Table accommodated with Plates, Knives & Forks & enjoyed our Tea in the Afternoon. We had laid in some Provisions at N. York & the Capt. some more, so that we lived very well.”³⁶

Further useful information about the sloops on the Hudson River in the late eighteenth century comes from letters by Isaac Weld, Jr., who was visiting the United States to check the nation’s suitability for receiving emigrants from his native Ireland:

Our sloop was no more than seventy tons burthen by register; but the accommodations she afforded were most excellent, and far superior to what might be expected on board so small a vessel; the cabin was equally large with that in a common merchant vessel of three hundred tons, built for crossing the ocean. This was owing to the great breadth of her beam, which was no less than twenty-two feet and a half, although her length was only fifty-five feet. All the sloops engaged in this trade are built nearly on the same construction; short, broad, and very shallow, few of them draw more than five or six feet water, so that they are only calculated for sailing upon smooth water.³⁷

Other sources confirm the scale of passenger accommodation provided on these sloops. For example, Dirck Ten Broeck, when writing to his father in April 1790, mentioned that he had just traveled from Albany aboard a sloop carrying twenty-two passengers in its cabin.³⁸ John

35. *Ibid.*, 46 and note h.

36. Francis W. Halsey, ed., *A Tour of Four Great Rivers, the Hudson, Mohawk, Susquehanna and Delaware in 1769, Being the Journal of Richard Smith of Burlington, New Jersey* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906), 4.

37. Isaac Weld, Jr., *Travels through The States of North America and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada during the years 1795, 1796, and 1797*, 4th ed. (London: J. Stockdale, 1807), 269.

38. Dirck Ten Broeck to his father, 20 or 22 April 1799, Letters to his Father 1798-1802, New York State Library, Albany, NY.



"A View on the Hudson," from Isaac Weld, Jr., *Travels Through North America* (1807).

Maude, yet another English visitor to the Hudson valley, remarked that Peter Donnelly of the sloop *Sally*, on which he had traveled, had earned \$1,675 in passage money alone the previous year, and that his own fare had been \$2.³⁹ The few surviving business records from this period also verify the important place of passenger traffic in the river trade and indicate that the sloops carried between five and eight passengers on every voyage.⁴⁰

When he published his letters, Weld included a drawing he had made of the sloops, *View on the Hudson River* (above), which clearly shows the stern cabin, occupying a quarter of the vessel's length. The rig is large, comprising a big gaff mainsail, a staysail, and a jib. Three shrouds per side support the mast, and these are

fitted with ratlines to permit easy access aloft to the topsail, which is not shown, set from a short topmast.⁴¹ His letter highlights the salient features of Hudson River sloops at this date — shallow draft to facilitate riverine navigation, which led in turn to broad beam to permit the carriage of a large rig, including a topsail, and the transportation of large bulky cargoes. Finally, they had substantial, well-furnished cabin accommodation to cater to the important passenger traffic between New York and Albany. It also makes clear how very different these vessels were from sloops in service elsewhere.

In many ways the eighteenth century was the Hudson River sloops' finest hour. They provided the most comfortable, most reliable, and most efficient form of transportation in the valley, and they faced no serious competition for any of those titles. This was also a time of expansion, and the fact that upstate New York west of Albany was frontier territory provided a powerful incentive for the river trade, encouraging the better adaptation of the sloops to their purpose. The evidence is clear of the

39. John Maude, *Visit to the Falls of Niagara in 1800* (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne & Green, 1826), 20.

40. Henry J. Van Rensselaer, *Sloop Accounts Book, 1771-74*, Columbia County Historical Society, Kinderhook, NY; Randall, Dale, Lefferts, and Brinckerhoff *Account Book, 1771-84*, Robert Troup Papers, New York Public Library; accounts for Sloops *Clinton*, *King Bird*, and *Morning Star*, 1782-93, Peter Van Gaasbeck Papers, Senate House State Historic Site, Kingston, NY.

41. Weld, *Travels through North America*, 266.

evolution, by no later than the mid-eighteenth century, of a distinct local type of sloop which was uniquely fitted to meet the specific requirements of this traffic. They were readily differentiated from those in service elsewhere in the country, such as the Chesapeake Bay area or New England, by several special features. They were generally much larger than most sloops in coastal service, which were usually in the twenty- to thirty-ton range, whereas the sloops on the Hudson were frequently of sixty tons or more. Second, they were much beamier than most vessels of similar length, with a length-to-beam ratio of 2.5:1 or less and a notably shoal hull form. They had substantial, well-fitted passenger accommodations in a large cabin area under a raised quarterdeck which occupied about one quarter of their length, sometimes even more. Finally, this burdensome, capacious hull was propelled by a remarkably large and powerful rig.

These distinctive features clearly appeared as adaptations to the sloops' total operating environment. The river served as the main highway for the Hudson valley itself, for western Connecticut and Massachusetts, and, after 1768, for the emerging frontier settlements in upstate New York along the Mohawk valley. Traveling downstream, the sloops carried mainly pelts, agricultural produce, livestock, and lumber, all of which were bulky, requiring a relatively large vessel. Upstream traffic was primarily the manufactured goods needed by expanding settlements: trade goods and rum, hardwares, fabrics, furnishings, and even luxury goods such as carriages.⁴² In addition, there was a very substantial passenger traffic in both directions which necessitated a large cabin, further driving up vessel size. All the travelers' accounts mention the shoals and rocks of the river, and the resultant requirement for shoal draft led inexorably to greater beam.

It is clear that the design of the sloops which dominated this traffic was well adapted to their overall environment. The clear channel of the river allowed the use of large vessels, which was encouraged by both adequate returns on investment and the bulky nature of much of the cargo. The broad beam was driven by several factors: broader beam permitted both a shallower hull, always useful on a river, and a large rig to propel the vessel in the fluky airs of the valley. The broad beam was also useful for transporting deck cargo, such as livestock, hay, and lumber. Passengers have always been the most profitable cargoes of all, and the demand for passage on the river encouraged the provision of substantial cabin space. In general, although passages could be made in about twenty hours when conditions were favorable, there

was no pressing requirement for speed, and the passage from New York to Albany was more usually one of about three days. The sloops generally anchored when the tide or wind were unsuitable, and these delays were apparently used by passengers for the purpose of leisurely shore excursions.⁴³ A hull form suitable for speed was clearly not a major consideration in the sloops' design.

43. Most eighteenth-century travelers, with the exception of Charles Carroll, who was traveling on government business in wartime, mention the leisurely rate of progress and the frequent opportunities for shore excursions. See, in addition to accounts mentioned already, Andrew Burnaby, *Travels through the Middle Settlements in North-America in the Years 1759 and 1760, with Observations on the State of the Colonies* (London: T. Payne, 1775); B. Mayer, ed., *Journal of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, During His Visit to Canada in 1776. As One of the Commissioners from Congress; With a Memoir and Notes* (Baltimore, MD: Maryland Historical Society, 1876); John Drayton, *Letters Written during a Tour through the Northern and Eastern States of America* (Charleston, SC: Harrison & Bowen, 1794); Michel-Guillaume St. Jean de Crèvecoeur, *Journey into Northern Pennsylvania and the State of New York*, translated by Clarissa Spencer Bostelmann (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1964).



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42. See detailed cargo manifests in Henry J. Van Rensselaer, *Sloop Accounts Book*, Columbia County Historical Society, Kinderhook, NY, and *Sloop Accounts*, Peter Van Gaasbeck Papers, Senate House State Historic Site, Kingston, NY.

Prisoners of War vs. Internees: The Merchant Mariner Experience of World War II

CHARLES DANA GIBSON

On 19 January 1988, the United States Department of Defense granted to members of the oceangoing merchant marine who served between 7 December 1941 and 15 August 1945 access to veterans benefits as administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (USC 38).¹ In addition to recognizing time of service aboard ocean-going vessels, the approval document also stated that:

For qualifying members taken as prisoners of war while on active duty, creditable service shall extend to date of repatriation or date of death while a prisoner of war.

Following the group approval, the Department of Defense, realizing that the U.S. Coast Guard was the federal agency most knowledgeable on the subject of merchant marine personnel records, accordingly requested that the Coast Guard become the processing agency for individual applications for the new veterans' status. The Coast Guard accepted that invitation and in the spring of 1988 began issuing its military discharges to individuals for their World War II merchant seamen's service. (Only upon possession of such a discharge is a group member eligible for veterans' benefits.) In processing applications, the Coast Guard's Merchant Vessel Personnel section utilized its archival files relative to World War II sea

service, and in most cases the individual applications were processed with accuracy and without undue difficulty.

A problem developed, however, over the status of seamen who in one way or another had been detained by the enemy. This difficulty came to light with the first group of eight men who were processed. One member of that first group, a man allegedly imprisoned by the Japanese as a POW, turned out to have been an internee, having had no connection with a U.S.-flag merchant ship, and was in fact ashore without employment at the time he was taken into custody by the enemy. Although the Defense Department had been absolutely correct in the selection of the Coast Guard as the military agency best equipped to review the wartime sea service of those seamen covered by the group approvals, that confidence had been misplaced when it came to the Coast Guard's expertise in evaluating the circumstances and/or the legal status of those seamen who had been detained by the enemy. While the Coast Guard had become part of the navy during time of war and had been involved while in that integrated role as a naval combat force, only one Coast Guardsman in the entire history of the service has ever been held as a prisoner of war.² Because of this lack of background, the Coast Guard had difficulty understanding what constituted a "prisoner of war" and defining the phrase "taken as a prisoner of war while on active duty," the import of which is clear in the 19 January 1988 memoranda of group approval. The phrase also has a direct pertinence to special fiscal benefits allowed only to ex-POWs under certain of those laws administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

As one who was closely connected with drafting a substantial part of the group application material which led to the approvals of 19 January 1988, this author was soon involved in a critical discussion of how the term "prisoner of war" should be viewed in its historical perspective

1. "The American Merchant Marine in Oceangoing Service During the Period of Armed Conflict, December 7, 1941, to August 15, 1945" was the formal title of the group approved for veterans' status by the Department of Defense on 19 January 1988. The title encompassed U.S. merchant seamen employed on U.S.-flag vessels and on foreign flag vessels under the control of the U.S. War Shipping Administration. Joined at the same time with the merchant marine approvals were those civil service personnel who had been employed on U.S. Army transports. Joan McAvoy, Esq., of the law firm Proskauer, Rose, Goetz, and Mendelsohn, was the group application author for the merchant marine seamen segment; Charles Dana Gibson was the group application author for the Army Transport seamen segment. The authority under which the Department of Defense established the veterans' status for the named entities was Section 401 of Public Law 95-202, *The GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977*.

2. Telephone communication, 3 June 1993, between the author and Scott Price, associate historian, U.S. Coast Guard Historian's Office, Washington.

when related to the circumstances of the merchant marine during World War II. Initial research disclosed that 593 persons who held United States seamen's documents were detained by the enemy between December 1941 and August 1945.³ Of these, only 440 were taken captive as a direct or indirect result of their being employed in United States merchant vessels. The other 153, although holding U.S. seamen's documents, appear to have been merely residing in territory which had come under enemy occupation.⁴ Only 280 of the 440 seamen who became captive as a result of employment on U.S.-flag vessels were actually incarcerated as military prisoners of war; the remainder, or 160, were handled as civilian internees. How these people were selected for the type of incarceration they suffered, though, was not something arbitrarily arrived at by the enemy. Rather, it resulted from the way in which the laws of warfare (international law) defined the circumstances in which those who held seamen's documents found themselves at the time they came under the jurisdiction of an enemy force.

Historically, merchant marine personnel have been looked upon by belligerents as differing from other

3. Arthur R. Moore, *A Careless Word . . . A Needless Sinking* (Hallowell, ME: Granite Hill Press, 1988); *American Civilian Internees Formerly Detained by the Japanese Government: 7 December 1941 — 14 August 1945, CFN-127* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Provost Marshal General, Prisoner of War Division, 1946).

4. Following the liberation of POW and internment camps, those U.S. citizens in such camps who possessed U.S. seamen's documents were eligible for free repatriation under the "Destitute Seamen's Act," a State Department program established by law of long standing. The names of those persons who held U.S. seamen's documents and who were repatriated after liberation from enemy detention were compiled on a State Department roster which was then given to the Coast Guard. In 1950 the Coast Guard published this list of repatriated seamen as part of a list of merchant marine casualties under the title *Summary of Merchant Marine Personnel Casualties of World War II, CG-228*. The *Summary* was prepared state by state, separately enumerating "Died as a Direct Result of Enemy Action," "Died in Prison Camp," "Missing As a Direct Result of Enemy Action," and "Released Prisoners." It did not differentiate whether a "prisoner" had been held as a military prisoner or as a civilian internee, although it included individuals from both categories. The Coast Guard had apparently not realized at the time of its 1950 publication that some of the detainees listed in the *Summary* had not been active merchant seamen at the time of their incarceration by the enemy. The 1950 introduction to *CG-228* as signed by Vice Admiral Merlin O'Neil, then Commandant of the Coast Guard, states that: "The *Summary of Merchant Marine Personnel Casualties, World War II*, represents only the casualties resulting directly from enemy action while the seamen listed were serving on merchant vessels of the United States." The contents of the list did not, however, reflect Commandant O'Neil's stated purpose, since 153 of the named persons had no connection to a U.S.-flag vessel, either by their physical presence or even as signatees on shipping articles. Further, there are other persons listed on *CG-228* who, although technically connected to a U.S.-flag vessel by having been on ship's articles, did not enter captivity as a result of enemy action carried out against the vessel, e.g., seamen off the *SS President Grant* and the *SS Ruth Alexander*.

civilians. A U.S. Navy study of the 1950s touched on the origins of that difference. "With respect to the officers and crews of a captured private enemy merchant ship, the practice of belligerents prior to this century had generally been to make them prisoners of war."⁵ Under the International Convention XI held in 1907 at The Hague, a partial exception to this was arrived at by the inclusion within that Convention of Articles 5, 6, and 7, which provided that those members of the crew of an enemy merchant ship, if they happened to be citizens of a neutral state, would not be classed as prisoners of war. However, these stipulations were qualified by Article 8, which stated: "The provisions of the three preceding Articles do not apply to ships taking part in the hostilities."⁶

Robert W. Tucker, when serving as a consulting professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote his opinion as to what the draftors of Convention XI had considered to be a ship "taking part in hostilities." In Tucker's opinion, the hostile status of a merchant ship depended on whether or not the ship was controlled by a government. According to Tucker:

It seems equally clear that they [the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1907] were never designed to apply to the officers and crews of enemy merchant vessels which, though privately owned, operate under the instructions of the state and — for all practical purposes — are integrated into the military effort at sea. Certainly, they ought not to apply, and in fact have not been so interpreted as applying, to enemy merchant ships offering — or intending to offer — forcible resistance to capture. Such intent to offer forcible resistance and thus "to take part in the hostilities" may not improperly be imputed to any enemy merchant ship bearing "defensive" armament. They were not intended to apply to the personnel of publicly owned and controlled belligerent merchant vessels. . . . The expectation must be that enemy nationals making up the crews of belligerent merchantmen will be detained by the captor as prisoners of war. . . .⁷

Throughout World War II, both sides generally treated captive crews of merchant ships as prisoners of war, incarcerating them under the same conditions and in the same places of confinement as captured military and naval personnel. With but two single exceptions, this applied to

5. Robert W. Tucker, *The Law of War and Neutrality at Sea* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, International Law Studies, 1955), 112.

6. Howard S. Levie, ed., *Documents on Prisoners of War* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, International Law Studies, 1979), 85.

7. Tucker, *Law of War*, 112-114. In the case of the United States during World War II, guns were authorized on U.S.-flag merchant ships through the repeal of Section 6 of the 1939 Neutrality Act. Guns and the navy gunners to man them went aboard the first merchant ship a week prior to Pearl Harbor.



Included in the American forces that surrendered after Corregidor, shown above being marched into captivity, were a number of merchant seamen who had earlier volunteered as civilians to operate supply craft for the Army Quartermaster. These men shared the same POW status as members of the military. Photo courtesy of the Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

crews of all U.S. merchant ships from which seamen were taken as captives.⁸

MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

At the time that the Japanese occupied Manila in early January 1942, there were a number of American citizens in the city who held U.S. seamen's documents but who were not actively employed at the time as seamen. Some of these men had been left ashore in early December

8. The two exceptions involved the *SS President Harrison* and the *SS Admiral Y. S. Williams*. On the first day of the war, the *President Harrison* was off the coast of China when she was approached by a Japanese destroyer which ordered the master to hove to. The master refused and scuttled his ship by running her onto the rocks. The *Admiral Y. S. Williams* was high and dry in a graving dock at Hong Kong when war broke out. The crews of both ships were handled by the Japanese in an inconsistent fashion, some being held as POWs and some as civilian internees. In the case of *President Harrison*, the officers, who were naval reservists, were handled as POWs, while the unlicensed personnel were placed into civilian internment facilities. In the case of the *Admiral Y. S. Williams*, all of the crew were initially processed into civilian internment camps (one crewmember had earlier joined with British troops in the defense of Hong Kong so he automatically became a POW). Starting in 1943, and for unexplained reasons, a few of the *ADMIRAL Y. S. WILLIAMS*'s crew were transferred to POW facilities.

1941, when the American President Line's *SS President Grant* precipitously departed to avoid an enemy bombing attack. Others, as in the case of the crew of the freighter *SS Capillo*, were stranded as a result of the destruction of their ship by enemy air attack. Another group of seventeen seamen were ashore, having left their vessel, the *SS Ruth Alexander*, despite the master's notice denying them permission to go ashore. While they were AWOL, the ship left without them.⁹ Other persons holding United States merchant seamen's documents were merely living in Manila, either employed ashore in some capacity or living as beachcombers without a means of employment.

On Christmas Day of 1941, General Douglas MacArthur ordered that all American armed forces and military supplies be evacuated from Manila and that all territory within the city limits be subsequently declared a demilitarized zone. By 27 December, all military

9. The master of *Ruth Alexander* logged the seventeen as deserters, and they were so charged. Following the men's repatriation from internment in 1945, the charges were dropped. Whether or not the men ever intended to return to the ship is problematical. None appears to have removed his personal possessions, but in light of the bombing then going on near the docks, this would not have been much of a consideration to a person departing in haste to escape personal danger.

personnel were gone from the city. All military material had either been removed or destroyed. General MacArthur then announced that Manila had been demilitarized and was an "open city." Under the recognized law of nations, an open city is defined as "a city that is declared demilitarized during a war, thus under international law, gaining immunity from attack." The term "demilitarize" is in turn defined as "to prohibit military forces or installations in" or "to replace military control of with civilian control."¹⁰

Some of the unemployed seamen in Manila had answered the army's call for crews needed to man U.S. Army Quartermaster vessels and had left the city for duties on Bataan or Corregidor before the demilitarization of Manila was completed. Most, however, had chosen a less patriotic path, electing instead to remain in Manila awaiting the entry of the Japanese. (One or two of the men off the *Capillo* had been wounded when their ship was bombed and they were hospitalized at the time of the city's occupation.)

On 3 January — the Japanese having entered Manila — Americans, Europeans, and members of the British Commonwealth were ordered to assemble at preselected pickup points preparatory to internment. The Japanese announced the locations of these pickup points by means of newspaper and radio announcements, posted bulletins, and loudspeaker trucks cruising the streets. From the pickup points, most of the civilians, including those persons holding U.S. seamen's papers, were taken to the Santo Tomas University campus.¹¹ At Santo Tomas these civilians were processed for what was to turn into many long months of detention.

The Japanese processors at Manila had looked upon those holding seamen's documents in the reasonable context that the status of merchant seaman only applied to a person when that person was in active employment aboard a ship. If not so employed, that person was looked at in the same manner as any other civilian. Under United States legal practice dealing with seamen aboard vessels under a voyage of navigation, a merchant seaman enters into the status of being classified as a seaman only when he or she has been signed onto ship's articles. The mere possession of seaman's documents does not legally make an individual a seaman.

For the Americans who became civilian internees at Manila and elsewhere in the Far East, life would become unpleasant and difficult, but it was certainly bearable when compared to the lot of those merchant seamen being held

as prisoners of war. There were few deaths of internees while in captivity, and most of those deaths can be traced to pre-detention conditions.

JAPANESE DETENTION OF MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL AS POWS

Beginning with the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had followed the customary rules of war when dealing with enemy military personnel taken as prisoners. This policy was clearly mandated within the Japanese Army regulations of 1904-1905.

In 1929, a Convention at Geneva "Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" had been signed by most of the world's nations. The Japanese representatives to the Convention were among those signers, but the Japanese Diet failed to ratify it into treaty. Nevertheless, the Japanese government pledged at the time to abide by the provisions when relevant to the citizens of nations who were party to the Convention. This was in a sense an irrelevant assurance, though, since the Japanese had been signatory to all the 1906 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and those Conventions still bound the Japanese. The 1906 and 1907 Conventions had contained essentially the same protections regarding the treatment of prisoners as those which took form within the accords of 1929.

Starting in 1937, the Japanese began to deviate from their past policies in the handling of prisoners. This change adversely affected the Chinese. Nevertheless, the context of the 1904-1905 army regulations regarding treatment of prisoners was again articulated within the Japanese army's 1943 regulations, which stated:

Article I. A prisoner of war as defined in these regulations is any enemy combatant who has fallen into the power of the Empire or any other person who is to be accorded the treatment of a prisoner of war by virtue of international treaties and customs.¹²

The Japanese army's treatment of military prisoners varied more often than not from the regulations. Mistreatments committed against Allied personnel in POW camps became commonplace, sometimes being sanctioned by higher regional authority. For those 280 U.S. merchant seamen whose captivity by the Japanese was a direct result of active shipboard employment, and who because of that active employment had become military prisoners of war, the time spent in captivity often resulted in death from mistreatment and deprivation.

At the beginning of World War II, the Japanese had behaved properly toward the crews of American and other

10. *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1969), 351 and 920.

11. There were also at the time in Manila a number of unemployed seamen other than Americans, including British citizens and some Scandinavians.

12. Levie, *Documents on Prisoners of War*, 231.

Allied merchant ships taken captive on the high seas. On 23 March 1943, however, an order was issued by the commander of the First Submarine Force at Truk stating:

All submariners shall act together in order to concentrate their attacks against enemy convoys and shall totally destroy them. Do not stop with the sinking of enemy ships and cargoes; at the same time, you will carry out the complete destruction of the crews of the enemy's ships; if possible, seize part of the crew and endeavor to secure information about the enemy.¹³

Allied crews from the ships *Daisy Moller*, *British Chivalry*, *Tjisalak*, *Richard Hovey*, and *Jean Nicolet* were murdered in compliance with this and similar orders. Another case of atrocities committed against a merchant ship's crew involved the Japanese surface raider *Tone*, which sank the British ship *Behar* on 9 March 1944. The *Tone* later picked up *Behar*'s 115 survivors, who included crewmembers, naval gunners, military passengers, and fifteen civilian passengers. The *Tone*'s commander requested instructions by radio as to what to do with the survivors. He was told to kill the crew and military personnel but to hold the fifteen civilian passengers for later placement into a civilian internment camp.¹⁴

JAPANESE DETENTION OF CIVILIAN INTERNEES

In the cases of civilians (including those persons holding merchant seamen's documents) who were held by the Japanese as internees, the Japanese closely followed those practices as proposed at Geneva in 1929. At that Convention a series of study drafts had been prepared specifically dealing with the treatment of noncombatant civilians who in future wars might come into the custody of an enemy power. Although this study draft was not formalized into treaty at the time the rest of the Convention of 1929 was signed, the provisions of the study draft, at least as they directly affected civilian detainees, did closely match the actual practices of Japan in its treatment of occidental enemy civilians that it held under what was then considered "protective detention." The Japanese Foreign Office expressed the policy it developed toward American, European, and British Commonwealth civilian internees in a communication addressed to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo on 13 February 1942:

The Imperial Government will apply during the present war, on condition of reciprocity, the provisions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of the 27 July 1929 convention to enemy civilian internees, as far as applicable to them, and provided that labor will not be imposed upon them contrary to their free choice.

This assurance was again repeated by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on several occasions, including one last announcement on the subject made on 26 May 1943.¹⁵ The Japanese Foreign Ministry declarations to the Swiss over the handling of internees were the result of discussions previously carried out between the Foreign Ministry and the War Ministry at a time when the Japanese were concerned about their own nationals then in Allied countries. Although the Japanese War Ministry was not particularly enthusiastic about adhering to the conditions of the 1929 Convention vis-à-vis military prisoners of war, it felt quite differently over the matter of civilians. This is apparent from communications of the War Ministry sent to the Foreign Ministry in January (1942):

The 1929 Convention relating to prisoners of war has no binding power whatsoever on Japan. But this Ministry has no objection to applying the principles of the Convention to noncombatant internees within such limits as it is applicable, provided, however, that no person be subjected to labor against his will.¹⁶

The Japanese policy toward civilian internees appears to have been universally carried out whenever relating to American and British Commonwealth citizens and also for those from the Scandinavian countries. The Dutch taken in the Dutch East Indies were not nearly as lucky in this regard, perhaps because of their dismal prewar relationship with the native populations in the East Indies. Only during the last six months of the war were those American, British Commonwealth, or other allied European civilians interned in the Philippines, China, or Malay treated in a manner radically contrary to that which was expressed within the draft of the 1929 Convention. Such mistreatment which did occur and which usually involved short rations can be traced to a lack of an available food supply in the Philippines and not to a calculated neglect on the part of the Japanese. The Japanese occupation force also suffered short rations during this period.¹⁷

15. Ibid. 2: 997.

16. Ibid. 1: 423.

17. P. Scott Corbett, *Quiet Passages* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1987), chapter 10. There is some inconclusive evidence that at the time of the return of the American forces to the Philippines in 1945, certain Japanese camp commanders may have contemplated killing prisoners of war before the camps could be liberated by the advancing American forces. Certainly there was cause for concern, since Americans

13. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East, *The Tokyo Judgement*, B. V. A. Roling and C. F. Ruter, eds., 2 vols. (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: A.P.A. - University Press Amsterdam B. V., 1977), 1: 412.

14. Ibid. 1: 413.

To gain an understanding of the reasons which made internment under the Japanese so different from prisoner of war confinement, one needs only to explore the content of the draft of 1929, which with little alteration was finally put into treaty format by the postwar Fourth Convention of 1949. Article 4 of the Fourth Convention describes civilian internees as "protected persons," explaining that the term does not cover "the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the field;" or those covered by "The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces"; or those covered by "The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War."¹⁸ The Fourth Convention goes on to define the term "protected persons" as being civilians not in service with or accompanying an armed force. Those "protected persons" who were to be subject to detention under conditions of internment were those civilians which an enemy considered it necessary to detain in the interest of that enemy's own security.

In general, the practices in the civilian internment camps in the Philippines as carried out by the Japanese during World War II followed closely the draft of 1929 as articulated within the Fourth Convention. For example, under the terms of the Fourth Convention, internees (unlike POWs) could not be deported from an enemy-occupied territory to the territory of the occupying power. No internees of the Japanese during World War II appear to have been transported to Japan. The only internees who were transported out of the Philippines were individuals sent to Shanghai, and then only at their own request to await repatriation on a Swedish exchange ship. The Fourth Convention further stipulated that if internees were compelled to work, they were to do so under the accepted local conditions and to be paid the prevailing wage relevant to the internee's individual experience and skill. During World War II, the Japanese in the Philippines did not compel the Santo Tomas or Los Banos civilian internees to work on other than the internees' own self-improvement projects, such as housing, camp vegetable gardens, and other tasks.

at one POW camp had earlier been executed by the Japanese following an American air attack on a nearby Japanese military facility. The news of these executions had reached MacArthur's headquarters through the reports of Filipino guerrillas. The emergency rescue of the detainees at the Los Banos Civilian Internment Camp by an American military force was an action predicated upon the presumption that the Japanese might execute the civilian internees as well.

18. Howard L. Levie, *The Code of International Armed Conflict*, 2 vols. (London and New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1985). Pertinent sections of the Fourth Convention of 1949 as discussed are quoted from pages 454-507, "Civilian Internees in the Territory of the Enemy."

Under the Fourth Convention, internees were to be accommodated and administered separately from prisoners of war and were to be kept separate from persons who, for whatever other reason, had been deprived of liberty as in the case of those under penal confinement. Some question has occasionally been raised over this particular prohibition. The confusion occurred because the American army nurses taken captive at Corregidor were not handled as POWs but instead were detained as internees at Santo Tomas, the civilian internment camp in Manila. Later on some of these same nurses were transferred to the civilian internment camp at Los Banos. There was sound rationale for this. In compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1906, medical and religious personnel of an armed force were never to be considered as prisoners of war. This same provision was carried over to the 1929 Convention. Although the Japanese did not adhere to the handling of captive male military medical personnel as protected persons, they certainly did so in the case of females, which is why the Japanese sent the army nurses to Santo Tomas. (See Geneva Convention, 6 July 1906, Article 9, and Geneva Convention, 27 July 1929, Article 9.)

The internees were to be allowed canteens as well as educational opportunities. In the Philippines, these privileges were allowed the internees although the quality of such privileges sometimes fell short of what could have been reasonably expected by western standards.¹⁹ The Fourth Convention also included a provision (Article 127) which prohibited the marching of internees unless under extraordinary circumstances, and even then special provisions had to be arranged. In almost all cases, when moving civilian internees from place to place in the Philippines, the Japanese followed this prohibition, transporting internees either by truck or rail. There were no death marches such as those under which POWs suffered and died.

GERMAN DETENTION OF MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL

There were very few American seamen taken prisoner by the Germans during World War II. These few were held at Marlag und Milag Nord, a prison facility located near Bremen. That camp had been created specifically for naval and merchant marine personnel, and there was no physical segregation between the two groups. In one respect, merchant seamen were given preferential treatment in that some British merchant mariners were

19. Ibid., Fourth Convention of 1949 at Geneva, Articles 80, 82, 84, 94, 102.

exchanged but naval personnel were not. According to a 1946 U.S. Military Intelligence report on Marlag und Milag Nord, at no time were more than seventy-one Americans in that camp.²⁰ The treatment of the prisoners at Marlag und Milag Nord was as humane as the resources in Germany allowed at the time.

SUMMARY

The belligerents of World War II — including the Japanese — generally handled merchant mariners as military prisoners of war provided that the mariners were in a seagoing status when taken captive. Those persons who held seamen's documents but who were not actively employed as seamen at the time they were taken captive were handled in a fashion identical to all other civilians; that is, they were detained as civilian internees.

During the war, 440 merchant seamen were held captive by the enemy as a direct or indirect result of employment on United States flag vessels. Of this number, 64 per cent were held as military prisoners of war while 36 per cent were held as civilian internees.

Japan's practices toward military prisoners of war from 1941 through 1945 departed rather widely from international law and even from its own army regulations.

20. "American Prisoners of War in Germany," (Washington, D.C.: Military Intelligence Service, War Department, 1 November 1945), 4-page report on Marlag und Milag Nord.

Japanese treatment of POWs was universally bad. In the case of persons held as civilian internees, however, the Japanese attempted a fairly close adherence to humane standards as outlined for "protected persons" within the document drafted at Geneva in 1929.²¹

21. It has not been the U.S. Coast Guard's policy, concerning its practices in dealing with Section 401, PL 95-202 matters, to disclose its administrative actions. Because of the Privacy Act, neither is it possible for someone in the private sector to ask for an examination of the individual files of those seamen awarded military discharges by the Coast Guard under the PL 95-202 program. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain whether or not steps have been taken by the Coast Guard to correct its prior actions relative to the award of creditable equivalent military service time to those whose detention by the enemy during World War II was served within civilian internment facilities.



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The Fate of the *Washington*, 1775-1776: A Precedent for Future British Conduct

PHILIP RANLET

In May of 1781, the *New Jersey Gazette* revealed to its readers that hundreds of American sailors had been forced to join the British navy to escape the prison ships in New York harbor. "Such is the unexampled barbarity of the piratical nation against which we have to contend!," the journal thundered. "They revere neither the laws of God nor of nations."¹

By any standard, British prison ships were hellholes, certain to instill terror into the heart of any sailor.² What is not generally realized, however, is that the British decision to force American prisoners to serve in its navy in lieu of imprisonment came during the early months of the Revolution when the war was still centered in New England. Moreover, it was the seizure of a New England vessel, the *Washington*, that started the development of British policy toward American prisoners of war that led directly to the deadly British prison ships in New York.

The Royal Navy had never been an attractive source of employment for sailors. During the colonial period British naval officers resorted to impressment, which led to rioting in Boston in 1747. After the battles of Lexington and Concord in April 1775, British naval forces in Boston were short of men and were forced to recruit them from undermanned army transports, literally a case of one hand stealing from the other. When supply ships arrived in the city, some members of their unlucky crews were impressed to serve on warships.³

The author wishes to thank Naomi Miller and James Baughman for reading an earlier version of this essay.

1. *New Jersey Gazette*, 9 May 1781.

2. Jack Coggins, *Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution* (Harrisburg, PA, 1969), 83.

3. "Extract of a letter from North America, 13th January 1776," in G. R. Barnes and J. H. Owen, eds., *The Private Papers of John, Earl of Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1771-1782*, 4 vols. (London, Navy Records Society, 1932, hereafter *Sandwich Papers*), 1: 107-108; William Howe to Earl of Dartmouth, 27 November 1775, *American Archives*, 4th ser., vol. 3, 1679-1680. For colonial conditions, see John Lax and William Pencak, "The Knowles Riot and the Crisis of the 1740s in Massachusetts," *Perspectives in American History* 10 (1976): 163-214.

As fighting continued, the British captured American prisoners. Nothing happened to them, although General Thomas Gage darkly hinted that, legally, the Americans deserved to be hanged. But the capture of the *Washington* changed matters and convinced John Hancock that its crew would be murdered by the vengeful enemy.⁴

The British certainly had been harassed by the rebels. Isolated in Boston, British forces depended upon water-borne provisions to satisfy practically every need. The unarmed supply ships were easy targets for American privateers, who preyed on them unmercifully. The Royal Navy had a daunting task of defense against these pesky privateers. It had to blockade not only ports such as Marblehead but also innumerable small anchorages that could harbor a privateer. The British squadron was too small to lessen significantly the privateer swarm.⁵

To worsen the British provisioning problem, George Washington commissioned his own vessels, dubbed "George Washington's Navy" by William B. Clark, to join in with the privateers. Any cargoes denied the enemy helped to feed the patriot besiegers. Washington's fleet was instructed not to fight with warships that could put up a decent struggle. Supplies were the goal, not heroics. Still, one of Washington's ships, the *Harrison*, displayed tremendous bravado. In front of the British fleet, the *Harrison* almost succeeded in capturing some supply vessels in November 1775. This "daring spirit" impressed even General William Howe, the British commander in chief. All told, Washington's navy seized thirty-five enemy ships.⁶

4. Thomas Gage to George Washington, 13 August 1775, in Philander D. Chase, ed., *The Papers of George Washington: Revolutionary War Series*, 4 vols. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1985), 1: 301-302; John Hancock to Washington, 6-21 January 1776, *ibid.* 3: 43.

5. Howe to Dartmouth, 13 December 1775, *American Archives*, 4th ser., vol. 4, 256-257; Molyneux Shuldham to Sandwich, 13 January 1776, *Sandwich Papers* 1: 104.

6. Dudley W. Knox, *The Naval Genius of George Washington* (Boston: Riverside Press, 1932), 9-11; William B. Clark, *George Washington's Navy: Being an Account of His Excellency's Fleet in New*

One of the *Harrison's* sister ships was the *Washington*, captained by Simon Martindale. Its crew came from Rhode Island units of the Continental Army. In spite of Martindale's maritime experience, the *Washington* was troubled from the beginning. The captain seemed too interested in making a heroic name for himself. By equipping his vessel with ten four- and six-pounders plus ten swivel guns, Martindale appeared to be preparing to face similarly armed enemy ships, which was not part of his mission. The *Washington* eventually captured a prize when a badly damaged British ship had to sail into the *Washington's* anchorage, hardly an exploit that gained any renown for the American captain. To make matters worse, Martindale's crew mutinied, declaring that it had "Inlisted to Serve in the Army and not as Marines." If Martindale could not hold a crew together, General Washington complained, the vessel had to be given to someone else. The *Washington* had too many guns to sit idly by a dock with so many tempting targets afloat.⁷

The mutiny was ended by the simple expedient of issuing the sailors winter clothes. Given that the incident occurred during November 1775, Martindale must have been hopelessly inept not to have realized that his men might be cold. With the hands of her crew warm again, the *Washington* sailed out of port and straight to her destiny. On 5 December 1775 HMS *Fowey*, a British warship with superior firepower, seized *Washington*, making her the first patriot warship to be captured by the enemy. The capture was a shock to the Americans, and General Washington had to remind the Continental Congress that "We Cannot expect to be allways Successfull." Martindale and his men were now prisoners.⁸

The *Boston News-Letter*, which was then nothing but a propaganda organ of the British, referred to the *Washington* as "a Piratical Brig." Calling rebel privateers pirates suggested that they would suffer the fate of pirates — death at the end of a noose, as General Gage had

advised. At this time the rebellious Americans were still considered traitors, not belligerents. The fate of the *Washington's* crew was up in the air.⁹

General Howe soon made his decision, and he explained in a private letter to Lord Dartmouth why he had decided to send Martindale and his men to the mother country. "I was led to advise this Measure," the general declared, "on a Supposition that it would spread great Terror among the sea-faring People in this Country." American mariners, ignorant of what had happened to the *Washington's* crew, would be frightened at the prospect of being punished by British justice. This psychological warfare, Howe explained, was important because the rebel privateers could harm the British far more "than any thing they can do by Land" while the British retained Boston. Unable to stop the privateers, the next best thing was to terrorize their crews in order to lessen their numbers. Howe realized that American sailors were, in Benjamin Rush's words, "the nerves of a navy." If the nerves were destroyed, American naval resistance would be destroyed as well.¹⁰

Admiral Samuel Graves, who commanded the British navy at Boston, followed a similar tack. In what was sheer bluster, he insisted that the rebel crewmen would have been tried for treason except that no one in the city had the proper commission to conduct the trial. At the same time, he expected that the Americans would eventually be treated as other prisoners of war had been treated in earlier conflicts. Such expectations were kept within the chain of command, however. When General Washington learned that Martindale and his shipmates had been captured, he promptly requested of General Howe that a prisoner exchange take place. Washington's discovery that the men had been sent to England was accompanied by a stony silence from Howe about swapping captives. What to do with the *Washington's* crew would be decided by the British government.¹¹

On 6 January 1776, HMS *Tartar*, the British warship transporting Martindale and his men, arrived in England. Luckily for the Americans, the voyage took only three weeks. Otherwise, they might not have survived, "as all of

England Waters (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), 82; Instructions to Capt. Nicholson Broughton, 2 September 1775, in Chase, *Washington Papers* 1: 398-399; Howe to Dartmouth, 27 November 1775, *American Archives*, 4th ser., vol. 3, 1679.

7. General Greene's Orders, 10 October 1775, in Richard K. Showman, ed., *The Papers of Nathanael Greene*, vol. 1 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1976), 133; Greene to Samuel Ward, Sr., 16 October 1775, *ibid.*, 136; Stephen Moylan to William Watson, 6 November 1775, in William Bell Clark and William James Morgan, eds., *Naval Documents of the American Revolution* (Washington, D.C., 1964 -), 2: 902; Watson to Washington, 29 November 1775, in Chase, *Washington Papers* 2: 458; Moylan to Watson, 1 December 1775, *ibid.*, 458n-459n; Clark, *Washington's Navy*, 18, 67, 83-84; Coggins, *Ships and Seamen*, 206.

8. Clark, *Washington's Navy*, 85-87; Washington to Hancock, 14 December 1775, in Chase, *Washington Papers* 2: 547-548; Richard Dodge to Washington, 16 December 1775, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 122-123.

9. Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 96-97; Catherine M. Prelinger, "Benjamin Franklin and the American Prisoners of War in England during the American Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., no. 32 (1975): 264.

10. Howe to Dartmouth, 14 December 1775, CO 5/93/f.14-15, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO); Benjamin Rush to Editor of *The Pennsylvania Journal*, [4 July 1782], in Lyman H. Butterfield, ed., *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1951), 1: 274-275.

11. Samuel Graves to Philip Stephens, 15 December 1775, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 112; Washington to Hancock, 14 and 31 December 1775, in Chase, ed., *Washington Papers* 2: 47-548, 624; Clark, *Washington's Navy*, 88-89.

them were bare of Cloaths and some of them almost naked," not a good situation to be in during a bitter English winter. Still more serious, some of the prisoners had smallpox as well as other diseases. After the crew (but not the officers) stated that they were ready to join the Royal Navy, the situation began to change for them. Potential recruits had to be given at least the basics needed for survival. Furthermore, illnesses endured by American prisoners in Boston had spread to British sailors there, and the Royal Navy wanted to prevent a similar spread of epidemics throughout its vessels. All except the *Washington's* officers were cleaned up and given cheap clothing to replace their garb that was "thrown overboard to prevent Infection, being full of Vermin." The cleaning had nothing to do with kindness; the officers remained in their rags.¹²

But did the *Washington's* crew really volunteer for the Royal Navy? By 1779 John Walkar, one of these supposedly willing recruits, had escaped from the British. He then complained to Benjamin Franklin that "our Captain patitand [petitioned] to the Cort that his men ware willing to serve . . . voluntirily which was falce and by that he was Sent home to amarica again." Certainly, having an entire complement of sailors willing to join the enemy is very unusual. Take, for example, the case of the crew of the vessel *Charles Herbert* served on. When captured by the British, these men split according to place of nativity. Those born in the British Isles tended to be willing to enlist; those born in the thirteen colonies usually resisted temptation. Of the seventy sailors of the *Washington*, only ten were born in England or Ireland. Four were from Germany, Portugal, and Canada. Yet, allegedly, not only these fourteen but the fifty-six native-born patriots volunteered. It stretches credibility that there were not at least a few holdouts.¹³

Was Martindale the sort of man who would be willing to sell out his crew to safeguard himself? The answer seems to be yes. When taken by the British, Martindale told them everything they wanted to know, including details about the *Harrison*. While he was being held by the Royal Navy, his own fate probably weighed on his mind. Most important, the British only accepted the idea

of an exchange of the *Washington's* officers after its crew had been volunteered. To be fair to the cowardly captain, he was undoubtedly also concerned about the welfare of his smallpox-ridden men, who were being kept on a guardship (or prison ship). They were only brought to a hospital after the Royal Navy could officially recruit them. Perhaps hospital care for the sailors was something Martindale had been promised by Sir James Douglas, the naval officer commanding the Portsmouth station, who sought to have the men brought into the hospital.¹⁴

Indeed, the eventual fate of the American sailors had to be decided at the highest levels. Immediately after their arrival on 6 January, the Admiralty sought the opinion of George III himself about what should be done about them "as well as others that may be taken." Without a doubt, their disposal would be a precedent. The Admiralty quickly involved Lord George Germain, who had taken over American affairs from Dartmouth. A letter written by Germain in August 1776 suggests that he felt strongly that Americans who engaged in "piracy" — that is, privateering — had to realize that they would be punished when captured. Otherwise, there would be nothing to counter the lure of "great probable gain." Germain surely advised the king along those lines, and the sovereign ordered that the American sailors remain imprisoned on the prison ship.¹⁵

But the mysterious mass volunteering of the *Washington's* crew caused a quick about-face on 17 January at the Admiralty. One letter of that date states that the men were to stay aboard a prison ship and not be sent to a hospital. Two other letters reflect news that the Americans were now potential recruits for the man-hungry Royal Navy. The most important letter was to Germain, informing him of the sudden development and again asking for George III's ruling. Two days later, the king, through Germain, gave his permission for "those deluded Persons to return to their Allegiance" and serve in his navy. The monarch expressed his satisfaction with "the humane and prudent Treatment" of the new recruits.¹⁶

12. "Extract of a Letter from Portsmouth," 6 January 1776, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 483; Commissioners of Admiralty to Lord George Germain, 15 January 1776, *ibid.*, 507-509; Sir James Douglas to Stephens, 16 January 1776, *ibid.*, 511; Germain to Howe, 1 February 1776, in K. G. Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution, Colonial Office Series, 1770-1783*, 21 vols. (Shannon, Ireland: Irish University Press, 1972-1981), 7: 54.

13. John Walkar to Benjamin Franklin, 19 February 1779, in Leonard W. Labaree, et al., eds., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, 30 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959-), 28: 575-576; Charles Herbert, *A Relic of the Revolution* (Boston: C. H. Pierce, 1847; reprint New York, 1968), 155; Douglas to Stephens, 16 January 1776, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 511.

14. Clark, *Washington's Navy*, 87, 89-90; Commissioners of Admiralty to Germain, 30 January 1776, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents*, 3: 542; Germain to Howe, 1 February 1776, Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution* 12: 56.

15. Hugh Palliser to Sandwich, 6 January 1776, *Sandwich Papers* 1: 96; [Germain] to Lord Mansfield, 6 August 1776, in Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution* 12: 177; Germain to Commissioners of Admiralty, 6 January 1776, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 482; Commissioners of Admiralty to Germain, 6 January 1776, *ibid.*, 483.

16. Commissioners of Admiralty to Germain, 17 January 1776, in Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 3: 513; George Jackson to Douglas, 17 January 1776, *ibid.*, 513-514; Jackson to Commissioners for Sick and Hurt, 17 January 1776, *ibid.*, 514; Germain to Commissioners of Admiralty, 19 January 1776, *ibid.*, 516.

The precedent had been created. American naval prisoners of war could now become members of the Royal Navy because of the king's decision about the *Washington's* crew. If the Americans were exposed to life-threatening conditions or potentially fatal illnesses, so much the better — it could only encourage them to volunteer. That was the infamous part of the *Washington* precedent. And the infamy would display itself in many places. In Halifax in 1777, for example, Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot expressed distress at “the obstinacy of the prisoners” there. As many as ten each day died “by the gaol distemper and the smallpox,” which had hit the *Washington's* men too. In spite of the Halifax captives being “surrounded as they are by distress, they are deaf to every solicitude of taking the oath of allegiance” and joining the British. But it was in New York that the infamy was the most pronounced. By 1782, 25 percent of British sailors were Americans who had enlisted to avoid death on the prison ships. Thousands who refused to join the enemy died on the foul vessels.¹⁷

What was in store for Americans who accepted the British offer? For those in North America, joining the enemy meant service in a British ship, for the Royal Navy was as desperate as ever for sailors. But those captured and enlisted near Europe had more varied destinies. Franklin and other American diplomats in Europe reported that American sailors had to perform “hard labor” at British posts in western Africa. No evidence exists to confirm this, although it is not impossible.¹⁸

Americans made another charge about the disposition of prisoners. During April 1777 the Continental Congress was abuzz with news that Britain's East India Company was taking possession of captured patriots at Gibraltar. Both James Lovell of Massachusetts and Oliver Wolcott of Connecticut expressed their indignation over the charge. In October 1777 John Adams learned that American prisoners seized on privateers were being taken to Gibraltar. Edmund Pendleton of Virginia asserted in 1778 that Americans held in the mother country were “threatened with death or banishment to the East Indies.”¹⁹

17. Mariot Arbuthnot to Sandwich, 13 September 1777, *Sandwich Papers* 1: 296; Philip Ranlet, *The New York Loyalists* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 109, 111.

18. American Commissioners to Lord North, 6 June 1778, in Labaree, ed., *Franklin Papers* 26: 593.

19. James Lovell to James Bowdoin, 16 April 1777, in Paul H. Smith, ed., *Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789*, 21 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1976-92), 6: 596; Oliver Wolcott to George Wyllis, 17 April 1777, *ibid.*, 609; William MacCreery to John Adams, 10 October 1777, in Robert J. Taylor, ed., *Papers of John Adams*, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977-89), 5: 309; Edmund Pendleton to William Woodford, 4 February 1778, in David John Mays, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734-1803*, 2 vols. (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1967), 1: 249.

Some records confirm that what the Americans feared was true. In 1776 a German officer in the British service reported that enlisted American prisoners captured during the New York campaign were being sent to Gibraltar, presumably for the East India Company. Official confirmation exists as well. On 6 August 1776 Germain commented upon a captured American privateer, the *Yankee*. Writing to Lord Mansfield, he declared: “With regard to the common men, I feel little or no difficulty in suffering them to be removed aboard one of His Majesty's ships intended to proceed immediately on the East India state.” That opinion seems to follow the *Washington* precedent. A few months later, on 9 October 1776, the East India Company resolved to take American captives. The pickup point was to be Gibraltar. A copy of the resolution rests in the files of the Colonial Office. If Germain did not originate this policy, he surely became its ardent advocate.²⁰

General Howe's advice about using terror against American mariners was surely taken to heart. American captives could not even be sure in what part of the world they might end up. Nonetheless, even General Howe would have been surprised at the length of the prisoners' separation from their families. Late in 1785, some years after the Revolution had concluded, John Adams, the American minister to the Court of St. James, finally got the British to release Americans who had been turned over to the East India Company.²¹

But what of the *Washington's* men? Martindale and two lieutenants managed to escape in 1776 from their imprisonment at Halifax; they had been sent there after the British had decided to permit their exchange. The ship's master was exchanged in 1777. Crew member John Walkar served on British ships until he escaped. Making his way to France, he enlisted in the French army because he needed money. In 1779 he begged Franklin for help: “if your honner will try and git me of frome hear and Send me home to my family again I will Sware a Legan to be faithfull and sarve the Congress untill the Day of my Deth.” His eventual fate is unknown. Two more sailors, Nathaniel Greenwood and Israel Potter, returned to America. Potter wrote about his adventures, but the others have disappeared without a trace.²²

20. Bernhard A. Uhlendorf, ed., *Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 77; [Germain] to Lord Mansfield, 6 August 1776, in Davies, *Documents of the American Revolution* 12: 176; East India Company Resolution, 9 October 1776, entry 2202i, *ibid.* 10: 388.

21. Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, 13 January 1786, Julian Boyd, et al., eds., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 25 vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 9: 173; Jefferson to Jean Nicolas D meunier, 26 June 1786, *ibid.*, 10: 62.

22. Washington to President of Congress, 7 September 1776, in

The work of historian John Shy has suggested that the British army's high command rejected terrorist methods of combat. When royalist William Tryon led a raid against Connecticut towns during July 1779, he injected terror into the war by burning Norwalk and Fairfield. Although Sir Henry Clinton, the British commander-in-chief, repudiated Tryon's actions, Lord George Germain approved of them, a stance consistent with his ideas about treatment of naval prisoners.²³

However, there had been more agreement among the British in the early days of the war regarding American prisoners. In December 1775, General Howe had urged that American army and naval prisoners be treated differently, which suited his needs in Boston. Circumstances of war did permit the British government to make a choice about treatment of land and maritime prisoners. During November 1775 Ethan Allen and thirty-two patriot soldiers captured in Canada were shipped to the mother country because Canadian authorities lacked a facility in which to hold them. Allen and his comrades were jailed for a time in England, but apparently no attempt was made to enlist them. On 5 January 1776, they were sent back to America. The next day, the *Washington's* captive crew arrived in England and set off a very different chain of events.²⁴

John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington*, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931-1944), 6: 26-27; Clark and Morgan, *Naval Documents* 9: 933-934; Walkar to Franklin, 19 February 1779, in Labaree, ed., *Franklin Papers*, 28: 576-577; Clark, *Washington's Navy*, 220-221. For Potter's memoirs, see Israel R. Potter, *Life and Remarkable Adventures of Israel R. Potter* (Providence, RI: J. Howard, 1824; reprint New York: Corinth Books, 1962).

23. John Shy, *A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 188-189, 191-192; Paul David Nelson, *William Tryon and the Course of Empire: A Life in British Imperial Service* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 169-172.

24. Howe to Dartmouth, 14 December 1775, PRO CO 5/93/f.14-15; Peter Wilson Coldham, "Genealogical Gleanings in England: Some Early Revolutionary War Prisoners," *National Genealogical Society Quarterly* 79 (1991), 138-139; Robert McConnell Hatch, *Thrust For Canada: The American Attempt on Quebec in 1775-1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 57-58.

Why did the British treat American naval prisoners so harshly? Benjamin Rush answered that question. Near the end of the American Revolution, he felt obliged to comment upon British treatment of American sailors. "Look at the conduct of Britain through every state of the war," he demanded. "Why has she wreaked her jealousy chiefly upon our sailors?" he asked. "Why has she confined them in loathsome jails and prison ships in each of her American ports, and thereby destroyed the lives of many thousands of them?" The answer, to Dr. Rush, was a simple one: the British did these things to destroy the American naval effort because without a navy the United States could never be independent.²⁵ Even terror was not too horrible a weapon to use to prevent the independence of the thirteen colonies.

25. Rush to Editor of *The Pennsylvania Journal*, [4 July 1782], in Butterfield, ed., *Rush Letters* 1: 274-275.



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The Periagua: A Traditional Workboat of the New York/New Jersey Area

KEVIN K. OLSEN

The greater New York region is one of the world's great seaports and the home of several unique types of working boats. Several boat types indigenous to the New Jersey/New York metropolitan area continue to enjoy popularity. From the New Jersey coast came the Sea Bright Skiff, Barnegat Sneak Box, and Garvey. Although not as well known, the Delaware Ducker is still being built. New York Harbor is also the birthplace of the Whitehall Pulling boat. This graceful boat was originally a water taxi between Whitehall Street and ships anchored in the harbor. It remains a favorite of oarsmen and all who love elegant wooden boats.

Like these other vessels, the periagua was an important working boat, but it did not survive much past the mid-1800s. The periagua is known for three distinct features: a flat-bottomed hull with a generous cargo capacity, a modified schooner rig, and two egg-shaped leeboards for lateral resistance when tacking.

Periaguas make frequent appearances in old newspapers, traveler's accounts, and local histories. As none are known to survive and descriptions are few, not much is known about them. Most sources mention them as market boats, ferries, or less frequently, lighters or pleasure boats. Periaguas served in both the British and American navies, and at least one was a large yacht.

The periagua was a useful and versatile boat type that today can only be glimpsed intermittently through fog. In order to reconstruct the vessels appearance and history, it is necessary to draw from disparate sources. Not all of these are in complete agreement, and some appear to be completely contradictory. The problem is further complicated by the overlap of related boat types, especially the cat and scow schooners. There is also disagreement over the spelling and pronunciation of the name. It is common to hear "perigua," "periauger," or "piragua," pronounced "perry-auger." Alternatively "pettiaugre" and "petty-auger" are sometimes used. These spellings have suggested to some that the name was originally French for "little messenger" (*petit-augre*).¹

1. "The Periauger," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society* 3 (1918): 48.

The Oxford English Dictionary gives the spelling as "piragua" but also gives more than nine variations. The OED states that the name was taken from a Spanish word for a type of dugout canoe common in the Caribbean. Howard Chapelle, America's foremost naval historians, also believes that the name was taken from the dugout canoe. Chapelle wrote in *American Small Sailing Craft* that the rig was originally used on large West Indian dugouts and was later employed on a variety of hull types, scows, ferries, and shallops. Chapelle also argued that by the end of the 1700s, the "name seems to have been particularly used to indicate some kind of large West Indian dugout, perhaps a log-hull with plank raising strakes. . . ."²

Local tradition has long credited the Dutch with introducing the periagua. There are a number of fanciful explanations of how the name "periagua" is derived from their language. However, the simplest is that it simply is a Dutch spelling of pirogue.³ Pirogue is a word still in use to describe dugouts and related craft. It has also been used to describe periaguas in New York and New Jersey. Henry Carlton Beck writes that railroaders called their harbor craft "pirogues."⁴ This would be a very appropriate spelling, although it is unlikely that nineteenth-century railroaders were concerned about etymology. In this paper the author uses "periagua" because that is the spelling used in Chapelle's classics *American Small Sailing Craft* and *History of the American Sailing Navy*.

The whole issue of the name raises the question of whether periagua hulls were originally constructed plank on frame or built up from dugouts. There are two means by which a boat builder can make a flat-bottomed boat from a round log canoe. The builder can cut the canoe lengthwise and use the two halves to form the sides of an enlarged boat by setting planks between the two halves until they reach the desired beam. In the other technique,

2. Howard I. Chapelle, *American Small Sailing Craft* (New York: Norton Books, 1951), 18-19.

3. S. Bayard Dod, *The Evolution of the Ferry Boat* (Leonora, NJ: The Railroadians of America, 1967).

4. Henry C. Beck, *Tales and Towns of Northern New Jersey* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 298-299.

Table 1
Periagua Dimensions*

Name	Year	Tonnage	Length	Beam	Depth of Hold
<i>Madison</i>	1815	25	51' 6"	12' 4"	4' 6"
<i>Speedy</i>	1819	32	51'	17'	4' 6"
<i>Cophorion</i>	1835	64	75' 3"	18' 4"	5' 2"

*From Robert G. Albion, *The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970).

the builder bolts together rough-hewn logs and then obtains the final shape by more cutting and carving.

These techniques were available to early builders but it is not known if they were used. It is known, however, that most periaguas were built between the 1780s and the 1850s.⁵ The vessel was largely out of favor by the Civil War.⁶ One of the earliest references to a periagua is a newspaper item from January 1765.⁷ There are several references in Revolutionary War accounts that make it obvious that they were a readily recognized type in the latter half of the 1700s.

While tradition has long attributed the periagua to the Dutch, there is little evidence to support this view except for the use of leeboards. The New York region had been under English rule for over fifty years before the name began to appear. A Dutch origin is possible, however, since the region was a well-established ethnic enclave.

The records of the Port of New York show that a total of 174 periaguas were enrolled between 1780 and 1867. Most of these were built on Manhattan Island with Staten Island and Tappan, New York as the second and third most common building sites, respectively. New Jersey periaguas were launched at numerous places from Bull's Ferry to Shrewsbury. Others were launched in the Hudson Valley, Long Island, and Connecticut. The last periagua to be enrolled at the port was the forty-three-ton *Thomas H. Faile*, built at Newark in 1852.⁸

A flat-bottomed hull gave periaguas their generous cargo capacity and their ability to operate in shallow water. They generally ranged from twenty to forty-five tons, although some were as large as seventy-one tons.⁹ Periagua hulls were somewhat shallow. The sixty-four-ton,

fifty-five-foot-long *Cophorion*, for example, had an eighteen-foot beam but a hold only five feet, two inches deep. Her smaller sisters, the twenty-five-ton, fifty-one-foot *Madison* and the thirty-two-ton, fifty-one-foot *Speedy* both had holds only four and one-half feet deep.¹⁰ Some periaguas were smaller. In 1788, J. D. Schoepf wrote a description of a periagua ferryboat that was about thirty feet long and five to ten tons.¹¹

Some authors have said that periaguas were built with scow-shaped hulls while others, notably Robert Albion, have asserted that the hull was sharp ended. Others have suggested that the hull descended from bateaux and possibly resembled the gundalow *Philadelphia*.¹² The periagua rig, as Chapelle pointed out, was adapted to a number of hull types, and variations certainly existed.

Accounts differ as to the deck arrangement. Some say that the vessel had a full deck or a full deck protected by a handrail all the way around; others suggest that it was half decked, and some say that it had no deck. It may or may not have had a cabin. Most likely, deck arrangements differed with builder and intended use.

To a seaman's eye the periagua's most unique feature was its two-masted modified schooner rig. The foremast was stepped near the bow and raked forward so that its top extended out beyond the stem. The mainmast was stepped amidships and raked aft. Two sails were bent to short gaffs. The foresail was loose footed and overlapped the mainsail. The mainsail was on a boom. The opposing mast rakes created a large open space aloft in which a staysail could be used.¹³ No headsails were used.

Despite its appearance, the rig was handy and weatherly. The foresail functioned as a jib, and mounting it on a solid mast instead of a shroud improved

5. Norman Brouwer, Curator of the South Street Seaport Museum, New York, personal communication with the author, 1990 (hereafter Brouwer, personal communication).

6. Howard I. Chapelle, *The History of the American Sailing Navy* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1959), 220-223.

7. "The Periauger," 48.

8. Brouwer, personal communication.

9. Ibid.

10. Robert G. Albion, *The Rise of New York Port 1815-1860* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 409.

11. Wheaton Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), 64-65.

12. Edward G. Brownlee, personal communication to the author, 7 June 1993.

13. Chapelle, *American Small Sailing Craft*, 18-19.



In this drawing by Thomas Fitzpatrick, a small periagua sails on New Jersey's Hackensack River, c. 1770s.

its aerodynamics. The absence of a bowsprit was another advantage, especially when the vessel maneuvered in crowded waters.¹⁴

John Cox Stevens, who was later instrumental in building the *America*, owned the fifty-six-foot periagua yacht named *Trouble*. She was said to be a comfortable and seaworthy boat.¹⁵ By all accounts, *Trouble* was a fast sailer, and Stevens enjoyed racing her against her commercial sisters.¹⁶ Stevens later experimented with a catamaran named *Double Trouble*.

When the navy constructed periaguas for harbor defense, the rig offended the sensibilities of several captains, who rerigged their boats as conventional schooners.¹⁷ The periagua rig closely resembled that of a conventional cat schooner, in which both masts are either

14. Ibid.

15. W. Dodgson Bowman, *Yachting and Yachtsmen* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1927), 186.

16. 1980 America's Cup Race Program (New York: New York Yacht Club, 1980).

17. Chapelle, *History of the American Sailing Navy*, 220-223.

raked aft or have no rake at all. A cat schooner may or may not have a loose-footed foresail. Confusion results from combinations of schooner and periagua rigs. A periagua rig could be mounted on a deep hull or the schooner rig on a periagua hull. Some scow schooners had leeboards, a bowsprit, and headsails. It would be easy to identify cat schooners as periaguas and vice versa. The cat schooner certainly shared some of the periagua's advantages, the ability to maneuver in crowded areas chief among them.

The only accurate drawing of the periagua rig to survive is the sail plan of the navy gunboats from 1806.¹⁸ A model in the Marine Museum of the City of New York shows a flat-bottomed, scow-shaped vessel with a schooner rig. The foresail is mounted on a boom, and the mainsail appears to be a spritsail. Neither mast is raked. The model is believed to depict a periagua from the time of the American Revolution. A 1784 sepia wash drawing of the Lower Mills on the Hudson River shows a

18. Ibid.

two-masted, flat-bottomed, blunt-bowed schooner unloading along the riverbank. The masts are not raked, but the foremast is clearly stepped very close to the bow. This drawing is on display at Philipsburg Manor, Tarrytown, New York. In an article on ferryboats, S. Bayard Dod identifies an illustration of a cat schooner as a periagua.¹⁹

If the periagua rig struck seamen as unusual, then the leeboards impressed the passengers. Most travelers' accounts make mention of them. Periaguas were usually fitted with two egg-shaped boards, one on each side of the vessel.²⁰ As the name implies, the leeboards are large flat boards hung over the vessel's side. The board to windward is raised clear of the water. When lowered, the board extends below the vessel's bottom so as to provide lateral resistance when sailing. When the vessel operated in shallow water, the leeboards could be pulled up so as to reduce the draft. Without such appendages, the flat-bottom periagua would scud across the water completely at the wind's mercy. An 1837 account describes the leeboards in use: "When one side of the vessel leaned toward the water under a strong wind, the board on that side would spread like a wing into the water, and substitute for a keel."²¹

The advantages of the periagua design caused one Lake Erie naval architect to experiment with it. The fifty-three-ton, seventy-foot-long schooner *Red Jacket* was built at Black Rock in 1820. She had a seventeen-foot beam and a four-foot, eleven-inch depth of hold. The *Red Jacket* was so shallow that a bulwark had to be constructed around her open deck to keep the seas from breaking over her. Her master, Captain Walker, said of the leeboards: "[They] were necessarily elevated on entering port, where they extended several feet above the main rail, giving the ship a novel and somewhat ungainly appearance."²² Great Lakes shipbuilders came to prefer drop keels and centerboards, and leeboards never became popular there. Nonetheless, leeboards are well suited to working sailboats. The centerboard trunk would have to pierce the keel and possibly weaken the hull structure. Even if this problem could be minimized, the trunk and associated raising tackle would take up valuable space.

The periagua design is best suited for harbor craft. Any flat-bottomed sailing vessel is vulnerable to sudden capsize at certain angles of heel. In large waves, a flat bottom is subject to pounding. Venturing offshore in all but ideal conditions would have been a dangerous proposition for a periagua. But the periagua was well suited for a ferryboat, and most travelers' accounts come from

experiences aboard sailing ferries. S. Bayard Dod states that periaguas used in ferry service had masts set on the centerline. Cargo and passengers were loaded over the sides instead of the ends. Since vehicles had to be hoisted over the railing, they were seldom carried.²³

Other sailing ferries had their masts set on one side to maximize deck space and permit vehicles to roll on and off the ends. In a painting by an unknown artist, a ferry of this type is identified as a periagua. She has a single mast and a gaff-rigged mainsail bent to a boom. There is also a single jib. The boat is steered by a tiller.²⁴

Still other ferries had different arrangements. A nineteenth-century drawing shows a double-ended sailing scow with two sets of leeboards and a movable steering oar. There are two masts, both mounted amidships but one on each gunwale. They lean inboard and are joined at the top. This arrangement permitted a wagon to drive on and off without being encumbered by the masts. The single gaff-rigged sail is set on the leeward mast and could be shifted around when the boat reversed direction. Depending on the sailing direction, the leeboard after the mast could be lowered and the one before the mast raised.²⁵

Whatever their configuration, sailing ferries were not always safe or reliable. It took Benjamin Franklin thirty hours to cross New York Harbor in such a vessel in 1732. His stage boat could not enter the Kill Van Kull and was blown backwards to Long Island.

The Sneed family, who operated the boat at Bull's Ferry for many years, owned several periaguas. John Sneed took over the ferry about 1759, but it is possible that his wife Mollie actually sailed the boat. A bill for smith's work included such items as "2 king Boaltes for the ferry boat, spikes and boaltes 2-9-2." The bill is made out to Mrs. Sneed. Mollie lived to be 101 years old and is now buried in Palisades Cemetery. The Sneedens had two sons, John and Dennis. By the time of the Revolution, Dennis was ferry master. Although he had transported American troops across the ferry, his real loyalty was to the crown, as were the loyalties of most of the family.

When British warships moved up the Hudson on a reconnaissance in the summer of 1776, Dennis is believed to have sailed his periagua out to the ships. The periagua served as the tender for the ocean-going ships while they lay in the Tappan Zee. The New York Convention wrote to General Washington requesting that whaleboats be sent out to capture the periagua. As patriotic sentiment made life uncomfortable for Dennis, he sailed the periagua to New York with four other Tories aboard. He was not heard from again.

19. Dod, *Evolution of the Ferry Boat*.

20. Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse*, 64-65.

21. "The Periauger," 48.

22. Harlan Hatcher, *Lake Erie* (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1945), 140-141.

23. Dod, *Evolution of the Ferry Boat*.

24. Raymond Baxter, *Railroad Ferries of the Hudson* (Woodcliff Lake, NJ: Lind Publications, 1987), 10.

25. Beck, *Tales and Towns of Northern New Jersey*, 298-299.

The Sneeden family resumed the ferry after the war. John Sneeden Jr. ran the second-hand periagua *Tappan Packet* in the first years of the 1800s. The *Tappan Packet* was fifty-five feet long and thirty-five tons. She was replaced, or perhaps joined, by the fifty-foot *Friendship* in 1821. The *Friendship* was built in Piermont at a cost of \$1,250. The periaguas were later replaced by smaller cat boats, the last of which was still sailing in 1903.²⁶

An account of the Hudson River ferries is beyond the scope of this paper. Very little information is available about the boats and boatmen beyond scattered anecdotes. An example of the type is the story of the ferryman remembered only as Old Si, a man notable for his abundant store of humorous and racy stories. Old Si's dog was supposedly smarter than the ferry passengers, who would board the rowboat on windy days and the sail boat on calm days. The dog knew better.²⁷ Kennaday suggested that periaguas were generally managed by Dutchmen from New Jersey, who were very venturesome and often met with the most serious disasters.²⁸

In 1804 Joseph Lyons took over the Communipaw Ferry, which was located between York and Grand Streets. Lyons had two periaguas and each had two oarsmen. Lyons also equipped the boats with extra oars so that passengers could help. The scheduled time for a crossing was half an hour.²⁹ The trip could be much longer, however, when weather and tides were adverse. One indignant passenger wrote to the *Daily Advertiser* on 13 January 1804 about a particularly uncomfortable crossing:

On Wednesday morning I had occasion to cross from Powles Hook Ferry Stairs, New York to the Jersey side. On my arrival at the boat I found the wind to blow quite fresh upon which I asked the ferry master if the boatman had not better take in a reef in their sails. He answered me, No; and the mulatto captain also replied that there was no danger; he would carry us safely across. Through these answers, I did not feel myself free from apprehension of danger, I agreed with the rest to take my passage, with the promise to myself, that if there should be an increase of wind I would endeavor to persuade the captain to take in sail. I soon found my fears were not unfounded, as at every flaw the periagua went gunnel under. I then expressed a wish that they would either reef their sails or take in one. This was also answered by a cry on the part of our captain, "There is no danger." Soon after another

flaw took us, and one or two afterwards so severe that it is not a miracle of miracles, we were not all sent into eternity. Independent of this, Mr. Editor, there was a person on board, with a horse and chair, who miraculously escaped having his leg broken by the carriage tumbling about, and jamming his leg against the side of the boat. This person lost several articles, of his traveling apparatus overboard. He appeared much enraged, and after his arrival at the other side applied to the ferry-master for his property to be replaced. The only satisfaction he got from the ferry--man was this, that he was a d---d liar and that the ferry-mans' lives were in as much danger as the passengers. . . .³⁰

This account contradicts Dod's assertion that periagua ferries did not carry vehicles. It is entirely possible, however, that different boats had different cargo capacities. Some authors refer to all sailing ferries as periaguas and vice versa, but it would be a mistake to suppose that periaguas were only used in this service.

A newspaper advertisement from 1774 lists a perigua for sale that could carry up to five cords of wood. Firewood was an important cargo from New Jersey to New York, and perhaps this boat was employed in that trade.³¹ Other authors describe periaguas as market boats.³² Some periaguas were used as sailing lighters until at least the time of the Civil War. Sailing lighters seldom had decks, and the large open hull made them ideal for this purpose. Apparently a lighter that could carry one hundred bales of cotton was considered large. Cargo handling was by a hand-operated purchase, and any load of a ton or more had to be lowered by taking a turn around the mast.³³

Periaguas in lighterage service were generally replaced by specialized sailing vessels. These were larger, deeper, and had both a hold and a deck. Some were employed as short-haul cargo carriers between such points as Perth Amboy and New York. A few survived into the early 1900s.³⁴ Sailing lighters with other types of rigs have been identified as periaguas, and this may lead to some confusion. The development of lighterage and the evolution of the craft is an area that deserves further study.³⁵

30. Ibid.

31. *Dunlop's Pennsylvania Packet*, 1764.

32. Albion, *Rise of New York Port 1815-1860*, 409; Daniel Van Winkle, *Old Bergen, History and Reminiscences* (Jersey City, NJ: John W. Harrison Company, 1921), 121; Adrian C. Leiby, *The Revolutionary War in the Hackensack Valley* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1962), 304.

33. "Harbor Lighterage and Transportation," *Proceedings of the New York Railroad Club* (1901): 108.

34. Ibid.

35. "Lighterage; Its Advantages and Disadvantages to the Port of New York," *Proceedings of the New York Railroad Club* (1904): 103.

26. "The Town That Was Robbed," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society* 81 (1963): 163-179.

27. Dod, *Evolution of the Ferry Boat*.

28. "The Periauger," 48.

29. "The Communipaw Ferry in The Good Old Days," *Proceedings of the New Jersey Historical Society* 59 (1941): 37.

During the early 1800s, the United States could not afford a large deep-water navy and chose to concentrate on small coastal defense vessels. Known as the gunboat navy, this fleet was soon obsolete as the demands of overseas trade pressed the new nation. While it existed, however, two series of gunboats were built on the periagua design. In 1806 contracts were let in New York State for nine vessels. Several were built with plans suggested by the navy. After some discussion one of the contractors, Christian Bergh, was asked to submit plans to the secretary of the navy. Because builders wanted these gunboats to defend New York, they proposed a design particularly suited to local conditions. This fact alone would have made the periaguas unique in the naval program.

As built, the hull was somewhat blunt bowed and had almost a flat bottom. The vessel was forty-eight feet long with an eighteen-foot beam. The bilges were rounded and the hold was five and one-half feet deep. Armament consisted of a single amidships cannon which was mounted on a pivot. There was a small cabin aft for the crew. Unlike other gunboats of the period, this design stressed sailing rather than rowing qualities. A total of twelve were constructed and served in the New York area. As already mentioned, some were re-rigged as conventional schooners. Later some of the gunboats were sold into the merchant service.³⁶

Eventually most boat types are adapted for use as pleasure craft. Aside from John Cox Steven's *Trouble*, there is little mention of periagua-type yachts. One

36. Chapelle, *History of the American Sailing Navy*, 220-223.

account mentions a boathouse on the Passaic River that sheltered a periagua and implies that such vessels were used locally as pleasure boats.³⁷ But her flat bottom denied the periagua a continued existence as a recreational vessel. The significance of the periagua is its place in the history of smaller working vessels under sail.

37. William W. Scott, *History of Passaic and Its Environs* (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1922).



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The John William Stark Shipping Papers

VICTOR A. LEWINSON

John William Stark (1788-1836) was supercargo during 1810-25 on four voyages from Salem or Boston to Calcutta and one to Canton. The papers in the Stark Collection at the Peabody Essex Museum are mostly documents related to cargo or port expenses from these voyages and other shipping activities.

Stark was the eldest child of Major Caleb Stark (1759-1838) and Sarah McKinstry Stark (1767-1839). Caleb, in turn, was the eldest child of General John Stark (1728-1822) and Elizabeth Page Stark, called "Molly" (1737-1814). General John Stark was an officer in the French and Indian Wars of the 1750s and joined the U.S.

troops as soon as the Revolution started in 1775. To his surprise, young Caleb followed him within a few days. Both fought at Bunker Hill and through the Revolution, and General John was instrumental in the victory at Bennington (1777). Caleb attained the rank of major. After the war he became a merchant, but in 1812 he closed his merchant firm and started a textile factory.

The collection tells us little about John Stark's personal life. Although it contains some letter books, their content is almost entirely business. After 1825, he became a prosperous Boston merchant. He died unmarried, leaving an estate of about \$100,000; the estate was administered

by Augustine Heard (1785-1868), a famous sea captain and merchant. Stark was respected for his honesty and business acumen. Like Stark, Henry Lee (1782-1867), of the well-known shipping family, was in Calcutta for most of the War of 1812; his letters¹ tell a bit of life there and occasionally mention Stark.

THE COLLECTION

The supercargo's function was to sail out with the ship and cargo, convert the outbound cargo into local money, and buy homebound goods according to instructions from the shipping merchants. The largest part of the Stark Papers therefore concerns his cargo-related activities as supercargo and merchant's agent. There are bills of lading, invoices, merchant's instructions, letter and account books — a detailed and extensive picture of the outbound and homebound cargoes and of the merchants' ideas for the supercargo or agent to invest profitably the proceeds of the exports.

A modern student, in this age of instantaneous communication, is struck by how different it was in 1810-25. The merchant's instructions gave guidelines, some fairly narrow, to the supercargo as to what to buy, but almost every one has a sentence or two leaving him nearly total discretion. Even if the merchant had a good grasp of the market (in the U.S. or for reexport) when he wrote these letters, he had to forecast the market a year or so into the future, and his data on prices and quality in Calcutta or Canton were at least three to six months old. The supercargo faced similar uncertainty as to what market prices would be when his purchases would be sold in the U.S.²

The papers contain complete examples of profit or loss except for one large gap: the U.S. selling price. If a researcher could interpret the many phrases describing identity and quality of homebound cargoes, especially piece goods, records of "price current" in Boston would complete the calculations. It is also unclear how large was the markup of the banyan (the native agent in Calcutta) on the goods he bought or sold for the supercargo. In addition, knowledge of cargo qualities would permit a comparison of the actual purchases with the merchants' instructions; at present only a rough estimate of this is possible.

1. See Henry Wiggins Porter, *The Jacksons and the Lees* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937) and Frances Rollins Morse, *Henry and Mary Lee: Letters and Journals 1802-1860* (Boston: privately printed, 1926).

2. There is a similar thought in T. F. Waters, *Augustine Heard and His Friends* (Salem, MA: Newcomb and Gauss, 1916).

THE PAPERS

The Stark Papers occupy about 1.5 cubic feet and are arranged in three series: Voyage Papers, Shipping Papers, and Miscellaneous. The Voyage Papers deal with specific voyages made by Stark, which are described briefly in Table 1 on page 207. This series contains eight account or letter books plus loose documents for many shipments.

For the brig *Reaper* (1810-11), the collection has an outbound freight list and notarized declarations of citizenship. The latter do not appear for any other Stark voyage.

The schooner *Alligator* (1812-13) was seized and condemned in India, so there was no homebound voyage. The collection includes a letter book with merchant's instructions and letters to Pickering Dodge (the owner) and others, extending to 1815, the end of Stark's Calcutta stay. While there, Stark bought homebound cargoes, to be shipped in the ships *Favorite* and *Hope* and the brig *Indus* for some U.S. merchants; the collection includes various instructions, letters, and invoices.

Stark went to Canton in the brig *America* (1818-19). A curiosity is a letter of instructions from Consequa, an important Canton merchant, concerning sale of his shipment to the U.S. and purchase of return cargo.

The voyage of brig *Acasta* (1821-2) is described in a book of letters and invoices and the usual loose documents. There are also receipts for payments to customs and bills for *Acasta's* port expenses.

The most completely documented is the ship *Bengal* (1824-25). Besides the usual documents, the collection includes customs and loading receipts and bills for *Bengal's* port costs.

The Shipping Papers (Series 2) contain data for imports from India: prices current in Calcutta in letters and printed leaflets, and eleven large sheets with catalogs of goods for sale at auction in the United States. Many of the other papers relate to the business of Stark and McKinstry (Stark's father and uncle, partners around 1807-12).

Series 3 (Miscellaneous) has no apparent connection with the Stark family. There are two curiosities, an unsigned and undated exercise book and the Minute Book of the Columbia Manufacturing Society, which was a textile factory in Hudson, New York in 1809-24. Major Caleb Stark was in that business (ca. 1812-30), but there is no reference to him or any other name that appears in the collection.

PROVENANCE

The Phillips Library of the Peabody Essex Museum has two collections of Stark's papers. One (Accession #23,867) was purchased from a New Hampshire dealer

Israel Thorndike.

13

Qty	Number	No. of	No. of	Names of Goods	Length & Breadth	Price			
N ^o	of	in	in						
	Boxes	each	each						
1 @ 2	2	80	160	Burthorn Gurnahy	35 to 36 by 2 1/8 to 2 1/4	05/-	520	"	"
3	1	100	100	Fin. Mow-Sannahy	22 to 23 by 1 1/2	42/-	210	"	"
4	1	200	200	Musporu Shunta	9 to 11 " 1 7/8 to 2	14/-	140	"	"
5	1	100	100	Bahadur Gungy Saun	38 to 39 " 1 3/4 to 1 7/8	69/-	345	"	"
6 @ 7	2	150	300	Chucky	14 " 14 1/2 " 1 1/2 " 1 7/8	24/-	360	"	"
8	1	125	125	Mow-junnahy	22 " 23 " 1 7/8 " 1 1/2	26/8	165	10	"
9	1	100	100	Lucknow Baplah	24 " 25 " 1 5/16 " 2	48/-	240	"	"
10 @ 11	2	100	200	Phillabilly Do	Do Do	58/-	580	"	"
12 @ 13	2	100	200	Murgungy Mamood	38 to 39 by 1 7/16 to 1 3/4	55/-	550	"	"
14 @ 15	2	125	250	Blue Gilla Htkys	10 in Pucc	29/-	362	8	"
16	1	100	100	Alhabad Choudgerry	41 @ 43 " 1 7/16 @ 2	94/-	470	"	"
17	1	100	100	Fin. Tunda Saun	40 @ 42 " 2 1/4	110/-	550	"	"
18	1	100	100	Salafon Saun	40 @ 42 " 2 1/4	94/8	472	8	"
19 @ 20	2	100	200	Saunlaty Saun	30 @ 37 " 1 7/16 @ 2	72/-	720	"	"
21 @ 22	2	100	200	Blue Mamood	35 @ 38 " 1 7/8 @ 1 3/4	61/-	610	"	"
23	1	170	170	Madras Pat. Htkys	8 in apiece	34/8	293	4	"
24 @ 25	2	80	160	Burthorn Gurnahy	35 @ 36 by 2 1/16 @ 2 1/4	05/-	520	"	"
26	1	180	180	Shundley Saun	19 @ 20 " 2 3/8 @ 2 1/4	55/-	495	"	"
27	1	100	100	Company's Bundannahy	13 1/2 @ 14 " 1 7/8 @ 2	130/-	550	"	"
28	1	150	150	Blue Mow-Sannahy	25 @ 26 " 1 1/4 @ 1 3/8	31/12	238	2	"
29	1 @	104	104	Chopped Romally	7 in apiece	132 1/4 -	687	11	3
							9179	11	3
Charges.									
Packing, Seaming & Shipping 27 Bags @ 4/5 = 121.8.0									
Packing Do Do 2 Boxes @ 5/- = 10.0.0									
Proportion of House Rent & Carriage Boxes = 20.8.0 152 " "									
Ticca Rupuz = 9331.11.3									

Israel Thorndike's page in the invoices of the *Reaper* (homebound) is typical of the documents found in the Peabody Essex Museum's Stark Papers.

in 1986. The other (Accession #25,020) came in 1987 from a generous donor in Colorado who had acquired it in the 1950s from the estate of Rees H. Bowen, a professor of sociology at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. The Museum cannot trace either back to the Stark family.

This author has rearranged and combined the collections and made a Finding Aid for the Library. A brief Finding Aid had previously been prepared for Accession #23,867 by Roberta L. Kovitz on an internship with Simmons College Graduate School of Library and Information Science.

Table 1
Important Voyages in the John William Stark Collections
(Dates are approximate. Sld=sailed; Arr=arrived)

<i>Reaper</i> , brig	Owners: Andrew & Sebastian Cabot & ? Built: 1808 by Thatcher Magoun ¹ Sld MA July 1810; Arr Calcutta Dec. 1810 Sld Calcutta Mar. 1811; Arr MA June 1811 Master: Nathaniel Spooner Jr. Supercargo: JWS* Asst. (?): S. Cabot
<i>Alligator</i> , schooner	Owner or agent: Pickering Dodge Built: 1810 in Newbury MA ² Sld MA 1 Dec. 1812 ³ ; Arr Calcutta Aug. 1813 (seized, condemned) Master: Thomas Moriarty Supercargo: JWS Asst.: Ozias Goodwin Jr.
<i>Favorite</i> , ship	Owner: Pickering Dodge ² Built: 1812 in Salisbury MA ² Sld MA 11 Apr. 1815; ³ Arr Calcutta ca. 1 Aug. 1815 ⁴ Sld Calcutta 20 Oct. 1815; ⁴ Arr USA ? 1815 Master: Josiah Orne
<i>Hope</i> ,** ship	Owner: Israel Thorndike ² Built: 1811 in Newbury MA ² Sld MA ? 1815; Arr Calcutta ? 1815 Sld Calcutta 8 Oct 1815; ⁴ Arr Salem MA 3 May 1816 (via Sumatra ³) Master: Jonathan Batchelder
<i>Indus</i> ,** brig or brigantine ²	Owner: Pickering Dodge ² Built: 1814, Newbury MA ² Sld MA ?, first to leave in 1815; Arr Calcutta ? 1815 Sld Calcutta ? Sept. 1815; Arr Salem MA 23 Jan. 1816 ³ Master: Thomas Dennis Supercargo: Geo. Richardson

<i>America</i> , brig	Owner: Robert Roberts Sld Boston? Nov. 1818 ?; Arr Canton ? 1819 Sld Canton ? Aug. 1819; Arr USA ? 1819 ? Master: Geo. Richardson Supercargo: JWS
<i>Acasta</i> , brig	Owners: Humphrey & James Devereux; Henry Pickering Built: Salem MA 1821 Sld Salem 18 May 1821; ³ Arr Calcutta ? Sept. 1821 Sld Calcutta ? Mar. 1822; Arr MA ? July 1822 Master: Thomas Cloutman Supercargo: JWS Asst.: Burrell D. Barker
<i>Bengal</i> , ship	Owner: Pickering Dodge Built: 1816 in Salem MA Sld Salem 12 June 1824; ³ Arr Calcutta 25? Oct. 1824 Sld Calcutta ? Feb. 1825; Arr MA 16 July 1825 ³ Master: Samuel Gale Supercargo: JWS

References

1. William A. Fairburn, *Merchant Sail*, 6 vols. (Center Lovell, ME, 1945-55), 5: 2899.
2. *Ship Registers of the District of Salem & Beverly MA, 1789-1900*, compiled by A. F. Hitchings (Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 1906).
3. "The Amount of Duties Paid into the Salem Custom House from Aug. 15, 1789 to April 7, 1851," compiled by A. F. Hitchings, Special Duties Collector, Book #1 (Accession #12,171), Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Stephen Phillips Library, Peabody Essex Museum.
4. Log of *Favorite*, 1815-16, Peabody Essex Museum. Otherwise, documents in the Stark Papers.



Victor A. Lewinson is a volunteer in Maritime History at the Peabody Essex Museum. He is a retired consultant in maritime freight transport.

*John William Stark

**Stark may have returned in one and Ozias Goodwin in the other.

The Circumnavigation of Old Ironsides

The USS Constitution Museum has opened a new gallery space in a renovated building, with a special exhibition on the ship's 1844-1846 cruise around the world. The exhibition focuses largely on life aboard ship and in the various ports-of-call at the time of the voyage 150 years ago. The vessel called at 18 ports before returning to Boston, including Rio de Janeiro, Madagascar, Zanzibar, Sumatra, Singapore, Borneo, Vietnam, Canton and Manilla. Artifacts from these ports, journals of the voyage, and a close-up look at Captain "Mad Jack" Percival are used to investigate themes of the voyage as a promoter of America's global trade, the Captain as Diplomat, and the different perspectives on the voyage by the various crew members.

Ship Models at Phillips Academy

After a long hiatus, the Addison Gallery of American Art at Phillips Academy, Andover, MA is once again exhibiting its excellent collection of 1/4" scale American sailing ship models. The 24 models are complemented by seascape paintings, drawings, and prints by artists such as Winslow Homer. The models, mostly constructed in the 1920s, are a mainstay of the museum collection and are being returned to exhibit "by popular demand" through January 15, 1995. A catalogue accompanies the exhibition.

Steamship Posters

Part of a collection of 300 early steamship posters compiled by the late Stephen Barrett Chase, owned by the Steamship Historical Society of America, will be on exhibit at the Ellis Island Immigration Museum through January 29, 1995.

Journey of the *Frolic*

The ill-fated Baltimore clipper *Frolic*, which wrecked off the coast of Mendocino, California, in 1850, is the subject of three contemporary exhibitions at the Kelley House Museum of Mendocino, the Mendocino County Museum in Willits, and the Grace Hudson Museum in Ukiah through December 1994. Artifacts recovered from the wreck tell the pre-1850 story of the ship as an opium carrier in the County Museum's exhibit "From Canton to California." "The Wake of Change" at the Grace Hudson Museum picks up the story of the region from the time of the wreck and into the later 19th century. The exhibition at Kelley House is entitled "Shipwreck! The Impact of the *Frolic*."

James Buttersworth at Peabody Essex Museum

A major retrospective exhibition of the marine paintings of James Edward Buttersworth opened in Salem at the Peabody Essex Museum on September 14 and runs

through December 5, 1994. The show was organized by and opened at the South Street Seaport Museum in New York with a catalog by curator Richard Grassby. The selection of 59 paintings and prints displays some of the artist's best work, much of which is on loan from private collections.

Caird Fellowship at Greenwich

The trustees of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, offer the Caird Senior Fellowship to support research into some aspect of the museum's subjects and collections. The applicant should hold a doctorate or equivalent research experience. The fellow will be supported to carry out research of his/her choice at the museum. Subjects of particular interest to the committee this year include 17th century Dutch and Flemish marine paintings, coins and commemorative medals, and 18th century prints. The deadline for applications is November 30. Additional information can be obtained from the museum's Head of Research, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London SE10 9NF.

Scrimshaw Exhibition

"Etched in Idle Hours," a special exhibition at the Cold Spring Harbor Whaling Museum, will run from September 18, 1994 to February 26, 1995. The exhibit includes both decorative and utilitarian pieces from a prominent Long Island collection, and includes many items from the famous Barbara Johnson collection.

Medeterranee, Mer Ouverte

A three-day round-table conference organized by the Mediterranean section of the Commission Française d'Histoire Maritime will be held 21 to 23 September, 1995, in Marseilles. Papers will focus on the following topics: international relations, wars of the past and present, interests at stake, the transferral of maritime technologies, cultural exchanges, and migrations. For information on participation, contact: Maître H. Poilroux-Deleuze, 18, rue Neuve Sainte Catherine, F 13007 Marseilles, France.

John Carter Brown Fellowships

The John Carter Brown Library will award approximately fifteen short- and long-term research fellowships for the year June 1, 1995 - May 31, 1996. Short-term fellowships are available for periods of two to four months and carry a stipend of \$1,000 per month. Long-term fellowships, funded by the NEH, are for six months and carry a stipend of approximately \$2,600 per month. The library's holdings are concentrated on the history of the Western hemisphere during the colonial period (ca. 1492 to 1825), emphasizing the European discovery, exploration, settlement, and development of the



Old Salts, ca. 1877, colored engraving by J. Eggleton after Robert William Buss (1804-1875). One in a collection of old prints, paintings, scrimshaw, ceramics, and illustrated journals exhibited in "Salty Dogs: High Seas Humor Then and Now" at the Peabody Essex Museum.

Americas, the indigenous response to the European conquest, and all aspects of European relations with the New World, including the impact of the New World on the Old. Several short-term fellowships have thematic restrictions, such as the history of cartography, comparative history of the colonial Americas, early maritime history, the history of women in the Americas, and the Jewish experience in the Americas. The application deadline for fellowships during the 1995-96 year is January 15, 1995. For further information, call (401) 863-2725.



SOME RESULTS OF THE NEPTUNE SUBSCRIBER SURVEY

Earlier this year, we sent a single page questionnaire to every *Neptune* subscriber, in hopes of getting a better understanding of who our readers are, and how we might better serve them. To our astonishment and delight, over 60% of all subscribers responded. Not only were the forms filled in, but individually added comments (some as long as three and four pages) gave us added food for thought — some of which we will still need to take advantage of.

Our first work-over of the results show:

- **We are a mature lot:** Some 85% of our respondents are in the 40-70 year old age group, 45% from 50 through 69. (Full age range is from 26 to 92, 93% male, 7% female.) Eight percent finished high school, 32% went on to the bachelors level, 30% to the master's level, and 30% to the doctoral. Nine percent are professors, the largest single career field we found.
- **As to work:** 52% work full time, 10% part time, 3% volunteer, and 35% are fully retired.

- **Interests and hobbies:** There is an extraordinary range, from reading to pleasure sailing to tending goats. Other popular interests include modeling and/or naval activities.
- **Changes in *The Neptune*:** Although 59% of our readers favor some changes (unspecified), only 4% favor extensive change; a solid 37% want no changes at all.
- **Membership:** Some 40% of our subscribers are Peabody Essex Museum members; 80% live over 100 miles from Salem.
- **Women readers** differ little from men, reflecting the same trends in age, education, hobbies, preferences, etc.
- ***Neptune* readers** vary in the amount they read: 24% read all of the journal, 50% read most of it, 24% read some; only 2% read little of it.
- **Popularity of various topics:** Book reviews are most popular (69%), naval history (67%), merchant marine history (53%), archaeology (51%), maritime arts (49%), technology (46%), life at sea (44%), and news (34%).
- **Our readers** are omnivorous, sharing interests in a large variety of magazines and journals. Of the several dozens of titles, the most popular are *Sea History* (48%); *Log of the Mystic Seaport* (39%); *Wooden Boat* (36%); *Mariner's Mirror* (34%); *Nautical Research Journal* (27%); and *Model Shipbuilder* (23%).



Book Reviews

ROBERT M. BROWNING, JR., *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron During the Civil War* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1993). Hardcover, 6¼" x 9½", xiv + 472 pages, 8 maps, 14 illustrations, 5 tables, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-817306-79-X. \$44.95.

Books on the naval aspects of the Civil War are few and far between, and when one of such fine quality as Robert M. Browning's *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear* appears, it is time for rejoicing. Too often the role of the United States Navy is limited to brief snatches of history, usually centered around some particular action like Admiral Farragut's damning the torpedoes at Mobile Bay. This book provides a complete study of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, whose activities proved instrumental to the North's ultimate victory.

The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, created in September 1861, operated along the coast and on the inland waters of Virginia and North Carolina. Its primary task was enforcing the blockade between Cape Charles, Virginia and the North Carolina-South Carolina border. The squadron also protected Washington D.C., watched enemy ironclads, supported the army in operations along the coast and rivers, attacked enemy positions, fought guerrillas, intercepted smugglers, assisted loyalists, and freed slaves. Besides these missions, the squadron had to deal with logistical, maintenance, and manpower problems.

The author divides the book into fourteen chapters. Chapter One sets the scene by describing the difficulties faced by the North in its attempt to blockade the southern coast. As Browning points out: "One of the greatest impediments (and one that would not change during the war) was the geography of the Southern coast." With its numerous inlets, sounds, and rivers, which varied in depth, the waterways along the Virginia and North Carolina shoreline were as much an obstacle to naval operations as enemy forts and vessels. To work efficiently throughout this region, the Union navy had to use a wide variety of vessels capable of operating on both the ocean and in narrow creeks and streams.

Each region presented its own unique problems. Off the Virginia shore the navy had to watch over Hampton Roads, the all-important entrance to Norfolk and

Richmond. Vessels also had to patrol the James and York Rivers, guard Suffolk, and watch the Potomac River. South of Hampton Roads the coast of North Carolina presented a dual problem. Low-lying sand bars and barrier islands enclosed a vast inland sea divided into large, broad sounds. Feeding into these sounds was a system of rivers that stretched into North Carolina and Virginia. Operations in this area required a special type of vessel, while a completely different ship was needed to watch the ports of Beaufort and Wilmington.

To tell his story, Browning creates chapters that relate to a particular operational sector. Because of the geographical conditions, the squadron found itself divided — often fighting in theaters that were nearly independent of each other. Chapter One sets the scene and covers the seizure of Hatteras Inlet. The subsequent chapters relate the capture of eastern North Carolina, including Roanoke Island, New Berne, Elizabeth City, and Beaufort; the operations with McClellan's peninsula campaign and the battles along the waterways near Norfolk, Richmond, and Suffolk; and the final struggle against the Confederates in North Carolina's rivers and sounds. The author records all actions, no matter how small, and he gives special emphasis to the experiences of the officers and men who had to adapt themselves and their vessels to meet tremendous demands of service in ever changing conditions.

One theme woven throughout the work is the poor coordination between the army and the navy. For coastal operations, the army was dependent on the navy for its communications, transportation, and supplies. The army also counted on the navy for protection and fire support. Browning rightfully casts a scornful eye on the army, which never properly exploited the potential for combined operations.

Readers who desire greater information on naval logistics will be particularly pleased with the chapters that deal with the acquiring and maintaining of vessels, the system of supply and coaling systems used by the squadron, and the recruitment of sailors. These chapters, along with the chapters on the coastal blockade and blockade running, set Browning's book apart from any other naval work. He addresses the myriad of problems faced by the squadron's officers as they tried to maintain their operations. It was a daunting task with tremendous obstacles that the officers had to overcome in order to accomplish

their missions. Of special interest is the overview of the pedantic Rear Admiral Samuel Phillips Lee, who has never received proper credit for establishing and maintaining the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

The final portion of the book covers the blockading and capture of Wilmington. Here Browning discusses the squadron's attempt to suppress blockade running. Though the navy was unable to impede a flow of supplies that sustained the Confederate war effort, Browning correctly emphasizes that the blockade did stop important goods such as heavy equipment, machinery, railroad supplies, and other necessities needed to keep up the South's infrastructure. By stopping these items, the squadron was vital to the South's eventual collapse.

Browning's work is anchored in well-documented research that centers on a vast amount of primary sources used to complete an admirable account that correctly defines the all important role of the North Atlantic Squadron. The squadron battled the ironclads *Virginia* and *Albemarle*. It captured forts and coastal cities, blockaded the coast, and supported the army. Browning's conclusions on steam vessels, naval logistics, the importance of the blockade, and the lack of coordinated combined operations between the army and the navy will make his work a standard in naval Civil War history.

STEPHEN R. WISE

Beaufort, South Carolina

K. R. ANDREWS, *Ships, Money and Politics. Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). ix + 240 pages. ISBN 0-521401-16-X.

Prior to this study of English maritime history in the reign of Charles I, neglect and undue pessimism had afflicted the subject. In a series of informative studies in the chapters of this book, Andrews attempts to redress these balances. The severe political crises of the period, both at home and overseas, linked closely with maritime affairs, produced a pessimistic impression of the development of mercantile and naval shipping. The apparent success and stability of the Elizabethan navy add further weight to this conventional wisdom.

The Caroline government and navy was faced with the problem of reacting to the rapid growth of British overseas trade at a time of conflict in Europe and the exercise of extensive power and influence by Spain and France. Andrews argues that England met the challenge in a number of important ways. He shows that the period

witnessed a rapid growth in the size of the mercantile marine and in its diversity of deployment, and he dismisses the perceived low profitability of merchant shipping as being in conflict with the sustained high levels of investment in the industry. Evidence of increasingly widespread investment in shipping among many individuals connected with maritime activities, especially masters and merchants, reinforce these views. However, Andrews probably underestimates the level of risk in shipping investment by suggesting that, once a vessel sailed, the only liability was the wage bill. Damaged cargoes and wayward masters are but two examples of other possible and uncertain liabilities. Andrews also describes the so-called "new merchants" whose successful rise to prominence without either the backing of wealth or patrimony provided much of the dynamism for the growth of trade and shipping. As elsewhere in the book, he reinforces his arguments with a wealth of literary evidence, although attempts at quantification of such trends are limited.

Positive revisionism is less evident in Andrews's discussion of seamen. While unrest often resulted from economic pressures connected with trading expansion and the demand for maritime labor, naval mutinies are viewed as "a recurrent symptom of naval, administrative, financial and ultimately political failure" (p. 68). The author deals with the vexed issue of ship money in a stimulating fashion in a chapter which shows that the problem had already begun to surface in the 1590s and that this highly unpopular tax, while of dire foreboding for Charles I, provided the revenue for "a significant step in the direction of a state navy" (p. 152). It would have been interesting to have read in more detail about this step, apparently mostly associated with improvements in the quality of the fleet and its support services rather than expansion in its size. A further chapter on the navy looks at the impact of parliamentary control in the 1640s and concludes that it continued to be run mostly along traditional lines and was not remodelled until 1649. However, the notable influence of maritime entrepreneurs within the parliamentary ranks led to greater private enterprise involvement in the navy and widespread corruption based upon favors and generous payments to particular shipping firms.

The book effectively blends the micro approach with the macro by the inclusion of three further chapters which focus on specific events or individuals. One looks at the experience of an individual seafarer, Thomas Anthony, and the other two look, respectively, at the English privateering expedition of Kenelm Digby and a naval response to the Sallee rovers. In particular, the latter two studies are indicative of the nexus between mercantile enterprise and naval warfare that is an important feature of this period and a key to understanding both the challenge and response of Caroline maritime developments.

Taken as a whole, these chapters provide much useful evidence and analysis of Caroline maritime history; there is new material here and the revisionism is mostly justified. As the author freely admits, this is not intended as a comprehensive study of the period. However, it does address key themes and provides, in conjunction with other studies such as those of Ralph Davis, a guide and starting point for maritime historians who wish to research particular topics more deeply.

SIMON VILLE

Australian National University

JAN GLETE, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies and State Building in Europe and America, 1500-1860*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993). ISBN 9-122015-65-5.

Jan Glete succinctly sums up his own work as "a study of the quantitative aspects of the rise of the state navies as instruments for monopolizing the use of violence at sea and as instruments of policy, with special emphasis on the interest groups behind these policies" (p. 88). The key word in Glete's synopsis is "quantitative," for these two volumes show that important substantive arguments can be deduced virtually from numbers alone. So vast is the amount of data offered on ship construction that the naval historian will desire these volumes for the tables and appendices alone. Glete's is the first study of the rise of European navies to cover thoroughly the entire European continent, and the languages represented in the bibliography testify to the extent of the comparative effort. The work is remarkable for the breadth of coverage, for the amount of detail presented, and for the attention to local distinctions. For example, the initial overview of naval warfare from 1500 to 1650 eschews the usual focus on the clash of 1588 for a thoughtful survey of the disparate conditions of naval warfare in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Baltic, and the Atlantic seaboard, and in the West Indies and South Atlantic. This is comparative history as it should be done, not a superficial search for similarities but an investigation of informative differences.

The structure of the two volumes aims successfully at both clarity and readability. Part One is an essay in which Glete describes his theoretical model, introduces some important general observations about the sailing ships and naval guns, and describes the historiographical context of the work. Part Two shifts from theory to a narrative based largely on numbers and clearly supported with tabular evidence. The two appendices provide further statistical material about Mediterranean galley navies and European sailing navies, respectively.

The focus of Glete's argument is the notion of "interest aggregation." States came to build navies when interest groups decided that the cost of state naval building was less than the benefits in protection. Thus, "the number and size and the warships in an early modern navy might be considered as a *direct function of the interest aggregation behind the navy*," and such contributing factors as improved administration, technological change, and naval doctrine are treated as themselves dependent on "interest aggregation" (p. 158). One important conclusion is that, because interest groups looked only to immediate profit, naval strategies had to be immediately cost-effective rather than theoretically optimal for the long-term interests of the state (p. 123).

This important discussion of the role of interest groups in the creations of navies and, in the process, of European states, is, however, disappointingly one-sided. Ships numbers are used to demonstrate that individual states did or did not have the necessary interest aggregation to support naval building, but the nature of these interests and the reasons why other interests opposed navies and failed to be "aggregated" receives very cursory attention. A rare examination of the nature of contributing interests occurs in the discussion of British naval building program immediately after the Civil War. Asking who would have benefited from the new program, Glete concludes that "It is rather obvious that two types of interests were involved; the revolutionary interest of strengthening and stabilizing the new regime on the international scene and the mercantile interest of increasing the British share of maritime trade" (p. 180). Similarly, he uses the notion of "aggravation of interests" to explain why Louis XVI's France built a battle fleet for which it could not pay but offers no discussion of what the recalcitrant interests were.

Glete's effort to explain the rise of the modern navy theoretically rather than merely to describe it is admirable, but his chosen economic model may leave one wondering whether the laws of supply and demand, in this case for efficiency, power projection, and technological innovation, tell the entire story. Many historical examples belie Glete's characterization of the naval officer as the informed consumer who demands dependable *matériel* from a naval administration that labors willingly and competently to provide it (p. 18).

Sandwiched between the tables are many useful bits of analysis. For example, a discussion of the manning of naval fleets notes that the use of professional sailors in wartime was possible only at the cost of very slow mobilization because the desired men would be away at sea. Elsewhere, Glete argues, perhaps less persuasively, that it was the employment of non-professional sailors in navies, not technical problems, that discouraged

technologically feasible developments in naval gunnery such as the use of shells and of heated shot.

For a book that is half tables and focuses on such unlovely concepts as "interest aggregation," *Navies and Nations* is admirably readable. The reader should not be put off at the beginning by the unfortunate "politological" (p. 6) nor by the work's dry arrangement into numbered parts, chapters, sections, and subsections reminiscent of a calculus textbook. Actually, such normally unappealing divisions work rather well in a book that necessarily shifts gears regularly as the author moves from place to place, time to time, and theory or technological analysis to narrative. The fairly small subdivisions also mitigate the absence of an index.

Since Michael Roberts introduced the notion of the Military Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, military historians have liked to claim an immense and immeasurable impact of military developments on the institutions of the modern centralized state. Thanks to Glete's contribution to the debate, one can argue that the role of navies in the process is no longer immeasurable but calculable in tons displacement and potentially amenable to analysis more subtle than has previously been possible. Glete's own wish that his work "may open new paths for investigation" (p. 4) is likely to be granted.

JENNIE KIESLING

University of Alabama

EDWIN L. DUNBAUGH, *Night Boat to New England* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). Cloth, 6½" x 9¾", 370 pages, 85 black-and-white illustrations, 2 maps, appendix, bibliographical essay, index. ISBN 0-313277-33-8.

If you want to know what steamer sailed from which port on Long Island Sound or the Maine coast on a particular night between 1815 and 1900, this is your book. Professor Dunbaugh has quarried it out of a mountain of advertisements, time tables, newspaper articles and related studies, year by year and month by month.

In the course of this chronicle, a number of significant characters and important political, economic, and technical details come to the surface. For instance, in 1807 the State of New York granted Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston a monopoly to run steamers on New York waters. It granted a franchise to Aaron Ogden to run a ferry between New York and New Jersey. In 1824 Thomas Gibbons hired young Cornelius Vanderbilt to run a ferry in competition, claiming New York did not have the right to grant

such a monopoly. Gibbons employed Daniel Webster to take the case to the Supreme Court. The court declared in favor of Gibbons, establishing the principle that the federal government controls interstate commerce, one of the bases of the nation's economic life. Furthermore, it threw the steamboat business wide open to unlimited competition.

Subsequently, Vanderbilt not only built and operated steamers but bought up railroad lines, leading to the establishment of steamboat lines from New York to Hartford, Norwich, New London, Stonington, Providence, and Fall River, from whence passengers could get quickly to Boston by rail. Dunbaugh describes some of the financial and political infighting involved.

The increase in the elegance of steamers over the years is impressive. On the earliest boats, meals were served at long tables running fore and aft in the middle of a dormitory with bunks along each wall. How different is Dunbaugh's lyric description of a New Yorker's overnight voyage to Boston in the 1890s:

A businessman could work a full day in New York . . . and board one of the big steamers bound for Fall River, Providence, Stonington, or New London, a steamer as elegantly appointed . . . as any hotel in New York or Boston. After refreshing himself in his private stateroom, . . . the traveler could turn below for an excellent full-course dinner, served by white-jacketed waiters in the steamer's dining room. . . . After a night's rest, . . . the traveler would rise early in the morning, take a brisk walk on deck as his steamer paddled serenely into some harbor in New England, and then enjoy a good breakfast in the dining saloon. . . . He would disembark and, right at the wharf, board a train that would bring him into Boston before 8:00 in the morning, ready to start a business day.

Every trip was not this serene. Some terrible disasters occurred, for this route lay through New York Harbor and Long Island Sound, waters crowded with shipping. Collisions were frequent. On a rough, rainy night in August 1872, the steamer *Metis* collided with a schooner off Watch Hill, Rhode Island. A quick inspection showed no damage, and Captain Burton continued on his course. Soon, however, water burst through the bulkhead forward of the engine room, put out the fires, and stopped the pumps. *Metis* was sinking fast. Captain Hull, a passenger who had supervised *Metis*'s recent reconstruction, urged people to the top deck, which was not fastened to the hull. When *Metis* sank, the top deck floated clear, awash, with over fifty passengers. Eighty-five others were lost.

In the early days, boiler explosions and fires were a constant peril. On a frigid January night in 1840 the

steamer *Lexington's* cargo of cotton caught fire. Lifeboats were swamped, and the one hundred passengers had a choice between burning aboard the steamer or freezing in the water. Five men abandoned ship on floating cotton bales. Two died of exposure in the night. Two others and one more who clung to wreckage were picked up in the morning. The other man rode his cotton bale for forty-three hours and finally drifted ashore on Long Island. These four were the only survivors.

Among the colorful characters we meet in the book is Jim Fisk, who built the fast and elegant steamers *Bristol* and *Providence* for his Narragansett Line, captured the Newport Line, and established the steamer terminus at Fall River, where steamers connected with the Old Colony railroad to Boston. In 1869 the flamboyant Fisk, dressed in a resplendent uniform, accompanied President Ulysses S. Grant on his voyage to the Boston Peace Jubilee aboard *Providence* and acquired the title "Jubilee Jim." He was later murdered by his ex-mistress's lover. Probably the ultimate example of business acumen was J. P. Morgan, who in the 1890s manipulated stock in railroad and steamer lines to control practically all public transportation between New York and Boston by land and by sea.

Colorful and influential characters like Fisk, Morgan, Vanderbilt, "Live Oak" Laws, Jay Gould, and Daniel Drew march through the book. Steamers evolve from the primitive 134-foot *Fulton* to the 440-foot *Priscilla*, a four-story luxury hotel afloat with an 8,500-horsepower engine driving her at over twenty knots. Business barons develop and control steamship and rail lines ashore while seamen deal with fire, collision, boiler explosions, and shipwreck afloat. It is all here in *Night Boat to New England*, embedded in a thorough, scholarly, year-by-year record supplemented by photographs of almost every steamer mentioned.

If the book has a weakness it is in the treatment of the lines east of Boston. There can be no question of Dunbaugh's scholarship, but his enthusiasm for detail and his depiction of Maine geography, personalities, and economics is somewhat less than what we find to the westward. The reader interested in the mechanical evolution of steamboats will have to look elsewhere to find a description of the walking beam engine, the cross-head engine, and double and triple expansion engines. Finally, the reader would be helped by more detailed maps on a larger scale.

The proceeding remarks, however, should not dim the lustre of what is a thorough, scholarly, and interesting contribution to historical literature.

ROGER F. DUNCAN

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EDWARD C. MEYERS, *Thunder in the Morning Calm* (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 1992). Cloth, x + 248 pages, map and photographs. \$21.50. ISBN 0-920277-71-3.

This slim volume constitutes a unique and important contribution to the modest body of literature on Royal Canadian Navy operations in the Korean War. It is unique in the sense that it is the only account of those operations written by a member of the lower deck. Like so many other naval historiographies, RCN historiography is top down, and even the top is modest if one is looking for accounts by senior naval officers. Instead, most of the historical analyses of RCN operations have been written by historians. For the most part, the lower deck has remained mute. Thus, Meyers's recollections, written with a blend of passion and simplicity, provide us with important insights into a far-off war as seen through the eyes of the men, without whom Canadian warships would never have put to sea.

Between 1950 and 1955, eight Canadian Tribal-class destroyers and 3,621 officers and men saw service in the Korean theater. The RCN has long prided itself on being the first of the Canadian services to respond to the United Nation's call, despatching the three ships *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*, and *Sioux* within days to the Far East. The Tribals were wonderful ships. They looked the part. Their rakish bows, balanced proportions, and clearly defined ordnance gave them an air of lethality. They were clearly vessels intended for war. Meyers spent two years in one of them, HMCS *Cayuga*, and much of *Thunder in the Morning Calm* is based on his experiences in that ship. In many ways *Thunder* consists of salty dips fitted deftly into an existing historical framework. It does not shed a great deal of new light on the strategic or tactical situations in Korean waters, but it does provide that sense of humanity and involvement missing from so many other analyses. Indeed, central to his account is that intangible bond between man and ship. "Only those who have sailed in such a ship," Myers writes (referring to his time in *Cayuga*), "can understand [the] feeling, but none can fully explain it" (p. 79).

The Korean War occurred at an awkward moment in RCN history. Mutinies (steadfastly referred to as "incidents" in deference to legal niceties) had occurred in a number of ships of the RCN in 1949. These events owed their origin in large part to the schizophrenia affecting Canadian naval culture. Long a product of Royal Navy traditions, the RCN had mushroomed in size during World War II. The result was that the tiny cadre of pre-war RCN officers, who embodied the RN *mentalité*, found themselves overwhelmed by a vast number of Canadian volunteer reserve officers for whom the RN meant

relatively little. The same thing happened — though to a lesser degree — in the lower deck. Thus, following exponential wartime growth and an equally precipitous postwar decline, the RCN found itself struggling to establish its real identity. Compounding the problem was the fact that the RCN had begun to drift out of the RN's gravitational field and into that of the United States Navy.

Service in the Korean War gave the RCN a new sense of purpose, a new sense of being a Canadian naval service. But the coalition nature of UN operations in Korea brought back disturbing memories of the past. The RCN has always been a niche navy, finding its place in larger naval forces and paying its way with its expertise in gunnery or antisubmarine warfare. However, service in Korean waters meant being subordinated on occasion to RN command, and Meyers is muscular in his comments on the patronizing and condescending nature of RN control. He is equally scathing about the U.S. Navy, belittling its alarmist reporting, lack of professionalism, and logistical excesses. It was the USS *Marsh*, Meyers contends, that was primarily responsible for the deaths that occurred on board HMCS *Iroquois*. Apparently, the *Marsh* failed to provide appropriate cover for the *Iroquois* when the latter stood towards the east coast of the Korean peninsula to bombard Chinese shore positions. When Chinese batteries returned fire, the *Iroquois*' B-gun turret was hit and three crewmen were killed.

The Korean War was a gunner's war for the destroyers that made up the UN naval force. When *Cayuga*'s twin four-inch guns opened fire on the docks at Yosu on 15 August 1950, it was the first time Canadian ships had fired in anger since 1945. All told, Canadian destroyers fired 130,000 rounds during the war; their most unusual accomplishments centered around trainbusting. While the west or Yellow Sea coast of Korea was a bewildering labyrinth of islets, the east coast was steep too, and the train lines were clearly visible as they snaked along the shore. HMCS *Crusader* (for which, regrettably, there is no picture included) was the leading trainbuster in the UN naval forces, opening fire on one occasion at 13,000 yards with its main armament to destroy a North Korean engine racing between two tunnels.

Probably the most powerful and moving descriptions of Canadian naval operations contained in this account relate to the advance on Chinnampo, the port at the mouth of the Taedong River which leads away past Pyongyang, the North Korean capital. *Cayuga* was part of a force sent to destroy the docklands at Chinnampo, thereby denying them to the Chinese armed forces. Meyers describes how the ships picked their way cautiously through the mud banks, shoals, and minefields towards the port. It was dark and the sky was full of freezing sleet. Lieutenant Andrew Collier, the navigating officer on *Cayuga*, was awarded a

Distinguished Service Cross for his masterful pilotage on that occasion. The denouement was suitably Wagnerian as the railway yards, warehouses, and wharves were reduced to a flaming shambles, the victims of pointblank naval bombardment.

Thunder is full of entertaining, touching, and informative anecdotes. Following shore operations on the west coast, South Korean marines brought a wounded three-year-old girl on board HMCS *Athabaskan*. The crew named this unknown child "little honoured girl," and her embarkation was recorded in the ship's log. She died shortly thereafter, and with the quartermaster piping the still, her tiny body was committed to the deep. Not all was seriousness, however. Some of the more enterprising Canadian sailors became involved in black market operations and in running a brothel. Two of them sold a ship's cutter which was recovered sometime later as a stinking garbage scow. One rating almost killed himself in a game of "chicken," where the object was to see whether rickshaws, dragged pellmell by their hapless owners, could stop at the last minute before they shot over the end of the jetty. We visit the sailors for sick parade where Aphrodite's revenge, venereal disease, was a common complaint, learn of the abject failure of the RCN to provide a proper mail service (with Christmas parcels arriving in March 1951), and hear the Roman Catholic padre railing against the evils of Suntory whisky and butterfly girls.

There is a certain valedictory quality about *Thunder*. Clearly, Meyers is moved by recollections of what appears to have been a simpler, more robust era at sea. His account is a lament for the past buttressed by a parting broadside against Hellyer's folly, the unification of the Canadian armed forces in the 1960s. But that said, Meyers acknowledges that the past is gone, and he concludes his sterling little book on that note. "Only the memories remain," he writes (p. 211). "As it is with most memories, the good times . . . are the ones recalled. The hard times, the dangerous times, the bad times are forgotten, and that is the way it should be."

J. A. BOUTILIER

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A. J. R. RUSSELL-WOOD, *A World on the Move: The Portuguese in Africa, Asia, and America, 1415-1808* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). xv + 290 pages. ISBN 0-856359-94-7. \$39.95.

This book by a distinguished scholar of Brazil and its connections with Portugal and Portuguese outposts in Africa presents a sweeping survey of the thin web of sea routes and settlements which the Portuguese spread most

of the way around the globe in early modern times. It presents a striking amount of detail on the intricacies of routes and ship types and on the movement of people, commodities, plants, animals, and ideas along those routes.

There are two important difficulties with this approach. First, the focus on movement keeps out of focus many aspects of relative immobility, especially settlers in one place or another and the local societies and institutions they built. Second, although Russell-Wood explicitly recognizes that "the Portuguese acted in concert with, and not isolated from, those peoples with whom they came into contact" (p. 7), in fact his focus is on the Portuguese and their ships on the move and pays very little coherent attention to Africans and Asians, either moving or sedentary. Any book will center on some themes and marginalize others, but in view of Russell-Wood's own awareness of African and Asian interactive contributions to the Portuguese empire, and the current trend of the scholarship on these topics, the reader has a right to expect more guidance toward themes that remain in the background than is given here.

There are difficulties even with Russell-Wood's treatment of his own theme of movement. Exposition is uneven; there are quite a few shifts of topic in mid-paragraph that seem to follow largely from the author writing about one subject and being reminded of another, with a rather loose analytic framework or none at all. The chapter on the "ebb and flow of commodities" contains almost no attempt at even generalized quantification or causal explanation of commercial change. The chapter on sailing routes provides an immense number of place names; fewer names better keyed to maps would have been more useful for the reader. The illustrations are fascinating but not well linked to the text.

Among Russell-Wood's topical themes, his approach yields relatively good results on Portuguese imperial career patterns spanning two or three continents, including examples of soldiers, diplomats, priests, and artisans. The information on accidental and deliberate movements of plants and animals from one continent to another, especially to Brazil, is intriguing and fits well with recent interest in the biogeographic consequences of the intercontinental links of early modern times. On the other hand, Russell-Wood seems least at home with the Jesuit missions and the ways in which missionaries adapted to, and had their ideas shaped by, the new worlds and new cultures they encountered. It is surprising to find an eminent Brazilianist making nothing of the Jesuit Antonio Vieira's visionary responses to the new world of the Amazon basin.

There are too many gaps in citations of the literature. Among obvious items not cited are Geoffrey Parker and Carlo Cipolla on guns and ships, Donald Lach on European knowledge of Asia, Bogt on Elmina, Thornton on the

Congo, Alpers on Moçambique, Alison on the Jesuits in Japan, and several works by K. N. Chaudhuri. There is no reference to the works of Sanjay Subrahmanyam, the most productive and interesting scholar now working on the Portuguese in Asia. Important items were missed for Teotonio de Souza and even for Philip Curtin, Michael Pearson, and Bailey Diffie.

JOHN E. WILLS, JR.

University of Southern California

NANCY FOGELSON, *Arctic Exploration and International Relations 1900-1932* (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 1992). Paper, xiv + 221 pages, 6" x 9", black-and-white photographs, maps, appendices, index. ISBN 0-912006-61-7. \$15.00.

It is hard to realize that, at the beginning of this century, islands to the north of Canada, Russia, and Europe were not necessarily internationally accepted as parts of states as they are now. Often they were still subject to diplomatic conflict between countries like Canada, Russia, the United States (through Alaska), Denmark (through Greenland), and Norway. Historian Nancy Fogelson has made these conflicts, which were based on numerous expeditions, the subject of her book. The interest in Arctic islands such as Wrangel, Ellesmere, Spitsbergen, and possible lands not yet discovered, changed during the period under discussion. Romance and adventure as motivations for expeditions gave way to scientific research. Moreover, the possibility for military use of the Arctic became increasingly important as aviation, with both airplanes and airships, developed.

After an excellent introduction dealing with the history of nineteenth-century Arctic exploration, Fogelson discusses American Arctic exploration in the period 1866-1922. A chapter on Canadian Arctic exploration in more or less the same period and a chapter on aviation in the Arctic in 1920-1921 follow. The next chapters are devoted to the Canadian response to foreign expansion through the Eastern Arctic, international transarctic flights, and Aeroarctic. The latter was an international organization of Arctic explorers, chaired by Fridtjof Nansen and aimed at promoting scientific research in the area. The three appendices also deal with this organization. The book concludes with a useful essay on sources and an index. It can be said that international politics was the ultimate consequence of Arctic exploration. *Arctic Exploration* ties up exploration with those politics, and will mainly be of interest to historians of politics and diplomacy.

Although the book is well produced, the choice of illustrations is somewhat meager. It would have been

interesting to see photographs of the faces of such fascinating personalities as R. A. Logan, V. Stefansson, D. B. MacMillan, W. Mitchell, R. E. Byrd, and G. H. Wilkins, who played decisive roles. One cannot imagine that portraits of such men were not available. The selection of maps is also inadequate. The general map of the Arctic on the title page by no means includes all the geographical names in the book. One will search in vain for names like Point Barrow, Nome, and Grant Land, which will probably not be so obvious for historians of politics. Detail maps such as those on pages 21 and 82 should have been more frequently used. Finally, the status of the index is unclear. Although it contains geographical names, one will not find the above mentioned ones, and others, such as that of Benito Mussolini, are not included. Notwithstanding these criticisms, Fogelson has produced an important contribution to the history of the Arctic.

WILLEM F. J. MÖRZER BRUYNIS

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PHILIP F. REHBOCK, *At Sea with the Scientifics: The Challenger Letters of Joseph Matkin* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 415 pages. ISBN 0-824814-24-X.

Historians are constantly complaining of the difficulty of developing history from the bottom. This was true of the 1872-1876 round-the-world oceanographic voyage of HMS *Challenger*. There are the memoirs, diaries/chronicles, and books of "important" people on board the expedition, such as Lord George Campbell, William J. J. Spry, Charles Whyville Thomson, etc., and there are numerous shelf-feet of formal reports and journal articles by the scientists who took part. All of these records make the *Challenger* voyage one of the most well-documented expeditions up to the beginning of the twentieth century, but nothing of consequence had been published from the common sailors, whose tedious, hard, and dangerous work made the three-year expedition possible.

There was one very literate and observant resident of the foc'sle, however, who kept a detailed journal. The prolific correspondence of Joseph Matkin became available recently through one of his descendants, Philip F. Rehbock, who has had the enviable opportunity of immersing himself in Ship's Steward's Assistant Matkin's letters, producing *At Sea with the Scientifics: The Challenger Letters of Joseph Matkin*.

Challenger's circumnavigation of the earth ranks with the voyage of HMS *Beagle* and the 1839-1842 Wilkes Expedition in importance to nineteenth-century science.

The expedition, from 7 December 1872 to 27 May 1876, conducted soundings, dredgings, and trawlings at 362 different locations in all the world's oceans. These efforts at raising samples from the ocean floor were not always successful. Nonetheless, numerous preserved samples and a few live samples of animal and plant life were collected and sent to England. Many of these life forms were not known to exist until they were discovered during the expedition. At the same time, the expedition visited numerous ports at Pacific and Atlantic islands, South America, Africa, Australia, and Asia.

There is no record of what the other of *Challenger's* bluejackets thought of the cruise. The tedium and drudgery of long days of sailing and dredging may have worked a mind-numbing boredom into them. At the same time, Matkin's position as Steward's Assistant placed him well below decks for long hours. Extra effort was required of him to learn of the activities of the scientific staff, whose work spaces were on the main deck. Yet Matkin, neither a member of the scientific team nor educated in marine sciences, proved to be a keen observer of the purpose, activities, and result of the expedition: "On Tuesday the Trawl net was hove overboard & allowed to drag along the bottom for some distance before being hauled up; it took 1 hour going down & 3 hours hauling up, the depth being 2000 fathoms, & it contained some very rare species of Fish. The scientifics have given them a name (only 29 letters) & stowed them away in the Museum" (p. 43).

The sixty-nine letters to his family provide detailed observations of the work of the "scientifics," Matkin's partially satirical name for the professionals on board. The letters also provide detailed, albeit Anglo-chauvinistic, observations of the people and communities visited by *Challenger*. These considerations are probably more important considering the existence of the formal expedition reports. His often racist observations can prove abrasive to the sensitivities of twentieth-century readers: "These native [Australian aborigines] here are the ugliest race of people there are almost; I saw a few of them when I was out before (where I worked in the vineyard); the women were smoking & asked me for tobacco. There are few more degraded or inferior races than the natives of this country" (p. 152). However, the details of his observations of people can be very interesting if readers can accept those statements as private commentary made to one's close relatives, which are actually less vile than other opinions of Matkin's time.

In many ways Matkin is a far more exciting teller of *Challenger's* tale than those in a superior station in life. Campbell, Swire, and Spry provide quite detailed and creditable descriptions of *Challenger's* three-and-one-half-year cruise. However, it is Matkin who manages to provide the better feel of events such as port visits, the

passage of special days such as Christmas, the sadness of the death of someone well thought of (thirteen people died as a result of accident or suicide), as well as great personal loss (Matkin's father died over a year and a half before the return of *Challenger* to England). Consider his description of the explosive reaction of the crew upon going on long awaited liberty at St. Michael: "The wine here is very strong, and the effects very injurious if partaken too freely. The men called for pints, and soon got to fighting. Several of them were fighting in the principal square & the soldiers had to be called out. . . . A good many of the Portuguese soldiers were hurt, & several civilians who interfered" (p. 86).

Matkin entertained thoughts of copying his journals to make them available to at least his immediate family. Having read the letters, one is encouraged to go on to read the journals. It is still quite enjoyable having only Matkin's formal Victorian letters to read. Those letters prove to be a very easy read. Rehbock's arrangements and interpretations of the letters are very helpful to the reader. What Rehbock has produced is an engrossing book that is at once excellent source material for the social historian, an insight into life on a long naval cruise for those who have never had that experience, or a sharp bittersweet reminder for those who have.

ROBERT G. HANCOCK, JR.

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DAVID F. LONG, *"Mad Jack": The Biography of Captain John Percival, USN, 1779-1862* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). xxv + 261 pages, maps, illustrations, bibliographical essay, index. ISBN 0-313285-67-5. \$55.00.

David F. Long is the master biographer of nineteenth-century American naval officers. Over the past quarter-century he has published book-length studies of David Porter (1970), William Bainbridge (1981), and James Biddle (1983), plus *Gold Braid and Foreign Relations: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798-1883* (1988). Percival is less well known than Long's previous subjects, but he was certainly as colorful. None of the others would have introduced himself with an adjective such as "Mad," "Crazy," or "Roaring," as Percival did.

Percival was clearly an eccentric. His greatest accomplishments, the search for the mutineers and rescue of survivors of the *Globe* (1825) and command of the *Constitution* on its round-the-world voyage (1844-1846), were overshadowed by his disputes with American missionaries in Hawaii over prostitution (1826) and his

armed intervention in Vietnam (1845). Long guides the reader through these and other episodes in Percival's thirty-seven-year naval career, then closes with a chapter assessing Percival's physical appearance, character, personality, and place in naval history. He concludes that "Percival's negative personal characteristics appear to have emanated from his inferiority complex" (p. 223). His equals and superiors may have disliked him, but not the men who served under him. They loved him because he was a good seaman; because he took pains to see they had clean, quality clothing, healthy food, and plenty of grog; and because he was fair in matters of discipline.

Long's analysis of Percival is not very flattering. For example, he judges Percival guilty of theft in appropriating for himself money due four sailors from an insurance company. Nor does he believe Percival was an officer of the first rank in accomplishments or influence. Yet Long considers the four years devoted to his biography well spent. Though probably of interest to a smaller audience than Long's earlier books, *"Mad Jack"* clearly bears the hallmarks of his earlier works: thorough research, lucid analysis, and interesting narration.

JAMES C. BRADFORD

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KARL HEINZ MARQUARDT, *Eighteenth-Century Rigs and Rigging* (Cedarburg, WI: Phoenix Publications, Inc., 1992). Cloth, 12" x 10", 330 pages, appendices, tables, line drawings, bibliography. ISBN 1-881093-00-X.

Karl Marquardt points out in his foreword to *Eighteenth-century Rigs & Rigging* that during his many years spent as a modeller and restorer he often felt the need for a handbook which would accurately describe the masting and rigging of the eighteenth-century sailing vessel, a subject often considered to be of secondary importance to hull design and construction. This English version, according to Marquardt, follows closely the revised second German edition published in 1986. Using David Steel's 1794 *The Elements and Practice of Rigging and Seaman-ship* as a base, Marquardt compares and contrasts both French and other continental masting and rigging practices with English techniques. Although the majority of these sources deal with naval masting and rigging practices, Marquardt also highlights practices of the merchant service when these practices differ with their naval counterparts.

The handbook itself is divided into sixteen chapters plus an appendix and bibliography. Chapter One deals

with the varying dimensions and construction techniques for spars of both full-rigged ships and smaller vessels. It concludes with ten pages of tables giving mast and yard diameters and lengths for naval vessels ranging from a British ship of one hundred guns to a two-hundred-ton naval cutter. In addition, there are tables giving the mast and spar dimensions of British merchant vessels and French men-of-war ranging from 128 to twenty guns. Chapter Two investigates the rigging of spars in the English manner beginning with the bowsprit and progressing eventually to the topgallant and royal yards. Chapters Three through Eight deal with variant northern European ship rigs, rigs for two- and single-masted vessels, and finally foreign and exotic rigs, including such types as the Red Sea sambuk, the Malayan prao, and the Japanese junk. Chapters Nine through Sixteen deal with the manufacture of sails, their cut and shape, the running of rigging to sails, belaying plans, blocks and tackles, and cordage, hitches, and knots. Finally, in his appendix Marquardt reproduces tables from Steel, Sutherland, and Davis showing the proportional lengths of starclimbing and running rigging and the size and type of blocks used.

Marquardt has successfully managed to bring together in one volume both period and contemporary works relative to rigs and rigging of the eighteenth century. His work affords not only the modeler but also the maritime historian and archaeologist the luxury of a well-organized illustrated text which carefully weaves together his own knowledge and experience with both English and continental writers of the period. Two additional features make this even more valuable. Although his handbook is based on English texts, Marquardt presents all rig and rigging terms in both French and German. Second, he refers his readers to period paintings which illustrate and date a specific rig or rigging configuration.

Only two minor problems seem to exist in the production and organization of the volume. The illustrations, which appear in great detail, are often too small to be fully appreciated, especially for those of us whose sight is not what it once was. Second, the illustrations often appear several pages after the portion of the text to which they refer. This forces the reader to leaf back and forth from text to illustration, a situation which can be disconcerting in a work as technical as this. These two problems aside, Marquardt's *Eighteenth-century Rigs & Rigging* would be a welcome addition to any library of any modeler, historian, or archaeologist whose endeavors carry him or her into the realm of eighteenth-century maritime technology.

FRED HOPKINS

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THOMAS C. GILLMER *Old Ironsides: The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of the USS Constitution* (Camden, ME: International Marine Publishing, 1993). xiii + 239 pages, color and black-and-white illustrations, appendices, index. ISBN 0-877423-46-6. \$24. 95.

Thomas C. Gillmer's own statement: "It may seem presumptuous for one whose experience is centered in engineering science rather than history to write about a subject so prominent in American history," best sums up *Old Ironsides: The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of the USS Constitution*. His words prove an accurate assessment, not only of his presumptuousness, but also his position toward his topic. While he borrows heavily from Tyrone G. Martin's, *A Most Fortunate Ship*, he fails to discern that in addition to Martin's construction, repair, and operational biography of *Constitution*, that book has a thesis, something *Old Ironsides* lacks. In fact, Gillmer so closely follows Martin that when the latter errs in *A Most Fortunate Ship* on page 173: "There [Gibraltar], she found *Columbus* (74), wearing the broad pendant of Commodore Charles Stewart," Gillmer repeats, "It was here [Gibraltar] that she also met with a new 74-gun ship-of-the-line, USS *Columbus*, under the command of Commodore Charles Stewart" (p. 90). Charles Stewart never commanded *Columbus* and had, in fact, left the Mediterranean in *Franklin* during March 1820, more than a year earlier. At the time (May 1821) he was at home on leave.

The errors in *Old Ironsides* average out to about one per page. A mere sampling follows: HMS *Victory* was launched in 1765, not 1783 (p. 3); Doughty's drafts copied Humphreys' originals (p. 5); the 1794 naval act called for four 44-gun ships, not three (p. 9); the War Department first designated *Chesapeake* frigate D, a 44, not a 36 (p. 9); Josiah Fox was a Royal Navy draftsman, not a naval architect (p. 9); he came to America on 9 October 1793 not 1787 (p. 9); Doughty was not "a skilled and upwardly mobile master ship's draftsman," he was a Treasury clerk seconded to the War Department (p. 14); "John Harper" was Robert Goodloe Harper (p. 28); Hartt Brothers received the building contract in 1794, not 1795 (p. 30); *Constitution's* first attempted launch was in September, not October, 1797 (p. 32); students of her history know that she hung up on two depressions in her way — it was not a mystery (p. 33); she went to sea on 22 July 1798, not "late summer" (p. 35); her first cruise was off the American coast, not the West Indies; in addition to *Santa Margareta* she also outsailed *Boston*, but *United States* sailed her hull down in six hours in early 1799; she was laid up in Boston, not New York (p. 36); Tripoli declared war on 14 May 1801, not 1802 (p. 39); Figure 2-6 shows *President*, not *Constitution*; in Figure 2-8,

Monday was hammock scrubbing day, not Thursday; Figure 2-12, *Constitution* received her waist bulwarks at Syracuse in 1804, not before she sailed in 1803; Michele Felice Corné's 1803 painting provides a graphic record of *Constitution* during this era (p. 51); the date of the Tripoli peace treaty was 3 June, 1805 (p. 59); in Figure 2-16, the model suffered recoil damage, not fire damage; *President* shot up the *Lille Belt* not the *Little Belt* (p. 64); Congress declared war on 18 June 1812 (p. 65); Hull thought Rodgers waited at New York (p. 66); *Shannon* was rated 38-guns just like *Guerriere*, *Java*, and *Macedonian* (p. 67); *Constitution's* chase lasted fifty-seven hours, not "more than sixty" (p. 68); Dacres was found *innocent*, not *guilty*, and given command of HMS *Tiber* (p. 72); the "British merchant ship" was HM sloop-of-war *Bonne Citoyenne* with \$1.6 million in specie on board; *Constitution* did not pass under *Java's* stern at this point (p. 73); Captain, not Rear Admiral, T. M. Hardy commanded *Ramilles* (p. 78); *Constitution* fired first on *Cyane* and *Levant*; Congress ratified the peace treaty on 17 February 1815; the battle of New Orleans happened several weeks earlier, not afterward; the treaty allowed a twelve-day grace period, not thirty (p. 79); and Perry did not have a victory on Lake Champlain, Thomas Macdonough did (p. 81).

This litany of errata advances us to the "List of American Navy Ships — June 27, 1812" (pp. 82-83): Commodore, not Captain, Stephen Decatur (Decatur commanded the Southern Squadron, Rodgers the Northern one. When they joined company, Decatur hauled down his blue broad pendant and hoisted a red one as the junior commodore.); Moses Smith was a larboard foretopman and the sponger on gun no. 1 on board *Constitution*, not the captain of the *Congress*; Augustus Ludlow was the purser of the *Chesapeake*, not the captain of the *John Adams*; the commanders of the sloops-of-war, brigs, and schooners were all given first names at birth. Thomas Jefferson must have been frustrated to learn that his surviving 170 gunboats, lying from New Orleans to Eastport, Maine, mounted only twenty guns among them.

William Bainbridge was the Commandant of Charlestown Navy Yard, not Isaac Hull (p. 85); of the three 74-gun ships launched in 1820, *Delaware* was the last, not the first (*Ohio*, 31 May; *North Carolina* 7 September; *Delaware*, 21 October) (p. 89); *Pennsylvania*, after her maiden voyage, was always a receiving ship, never a coastal defense ship; the navy's first drydock was at Norfolk, not Charlestown (p. 93); the "someone" who beheaded the Jackson figurehead was merchant skipper Samuel Washington Dewey, a forebear of the admiral (p. 97); Paixhans, as he admitted himself, modeled his cannon on Lieutenant Colonel George Bomford's famous columbiads; the ones on board *Constitution* were not

experimental, but remained on board throughout her world cruise (pp. 98-99); the ship did not visit Muscat nor ever place Marines ashore in support of a sultan (p. 99); Gillmer should familiarize himself with world ocean sailing routes — *Constitution* went with, not against, the prevailing winds (p. 100); additionally, one would expect someone who spent his career teaching at the Naval Academy to know that it opened its portals in 1845, not 1849 (p. 106). The preceding encompasses only half the total pages of *Old Ironsides*, but allowable space prohibits further errata.

The point arises why a section of a book devoted to *Constitution* delves into the *Constellation* question? Further, if the author addresses that infamous issue, why doesn't he familiarize himself with its current literature? What do Gillmer's several homey anecdotes about his own service on board the *Raleigh* in the twentieth century lend to his *Constitution* narrative? His textual strategy in doing so is not clear, and they are distracting. The "state of the surviving frigate" can hardly be described as fully-rigged (p. 123). The author's use of "Resurrection" in his title illustrates a misunderstanding of the chain of operational and fiscal responsibility behind the ship, a remarkable oversight in a veteran civil servant. He apparently does not understand that the ship has a support group, first established in 1976, that works on routine maintenance five days a week. He hedges concerning the ship "as built" relative to Humphreys' drafts: "Research also proves that these plans were correctly executed" (p. 128). "That said, in the building of a complex structure like *Constitution*, we may well ask whether the plans really were followed in every detail" (p. 129). Well, were they? For the answer see my article, "The Frigate *Constellation* Clearly Was No More, Or Was She?," *The American Neptune* 53 (Spring 1993): 77-99. None of the first frigates were built to Humphreys' exact drafts, including *United States*, the ship he built himself. Furthermore, while Gillmer may be a "uniquely qualified" (dustjacket notes) naval architect, his knowledge of Napoleonic-era practice leaves considerable gaps. His discussion of Humphreys' diagonal riders misses their point. The riders as described in *American State Papers* were only a part of a larger system of structural reinforcement, one later considered and modified by Sir Robert Seppings. Gillmer appears unable to reach a conclusion as to whether *Constitution* originally received diagonal riders — the answer is that she did. The documentation exists in the Josiah Fox Papers at the Peabody Essex Museum and in the Truxtun Papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Of the five frigates built to Humphreys' drafts (*Chesapeake* as-built was a Fox design), only *Constellation* came without diagonal riders.

Perhaps a more worthy investment for International Marine Publishing would have been to underwrite a long-

overdue, revised and updated version of Commander Martin's *A Most Fortunate Ship*, the true "bible" of the United States frigate *Constitution*.

W. M. P. DUNNE

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ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR. WITH DAVID CHANOFF, *The Line of Fire, From Washington to the Gulf: The Politics of the New Military* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). 376 pages, illustrations, index. ISBN 0-671727-03-6.

The Bill Crowe you read is the Bill Crowe you get; a sailor cut from the same cloth as Admirals Stephen B. Luce and Bradley Fisk, who writes with common sense, political acumen, integrity, humor, and no mean intelligence. You also get an unreconstructed and unrepentant "Okie," an Oklahoman proud of his roots.

In an address entitled "Author to Reader," an introduction, an epilogue, acknowledgements, and eighteen chapters, Crowe outlines his sailor's life in both chronological and topical fashions. The first two chapters recount Crowe's days at Annapolis through his command of the submarine USS *Trout*. His path took him from Depression days in Oklahoma City to a national debating championship at the city's Classen High, the presidency of his freshman class at the University of Oklahoma, and the Naval Academy. At the Academy he helped win another national debating championship and managed to graduate with high standing in a class that included such men as James Earl Carter, James Stockdale, and Stansfield Turner.

An acolyte of that blue-green world where Neptune is God, Alfred Thayer Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the One True Church, Crowe is nonetheless an iconoclast. He took an M.A. at Stanford, went to Princeton for a Ph.D., was roundly condemned for it, and was refused selection into the nuclear submarine program by the irascible Hyman Rickover. His mentors at Princeton, Harold Sprout, James Billington, Harry Eckstein, and Marion Levy, made him analytical and tolerant and allowed him to recognize the navy's old-line anti-intellectual biases. They also equipped him to be a professor of geopolitics at the University of Oklahoma after his retirement from the navy.

The Oklahoman's naval career spanned the Cold War, which he fought with all means from bullets to patience to

the highest level of diplomacy. He writes as if he did not have to battle his own ego. He explains how he learned along the way and admits to having made mistakes.

He recounts, in three chapters, the positions that prepared him for the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One was an assistant to Commander Edward L. "Ned" Beach, who was Naval Aide to President Eisenhower. In that job, Crowe got his first taste of Washington. There, and in subsequent Potomac positions, the Oklahoman learned to understand that the large peacetime decisions are made in dialogue, debate, and argument.

As Chief of the East Asian Desk in the navy's OP61, Crowe was again involved in plans and policies and the USS *Pueblo* affair. As an advisor to the Vietnamese "Brown Water Navy," Crowe acquired combat experience and insights into a very different culture. He added to those insights by serving with Hayden Williams in the negotiations for the independence of the Micronesian Trust Territories and then performed what he considers his greatest service to the nation: saving the American naval base at Bahrain through negotiations when he commanded the Middle East Force (p. 175).

Crowe then became Deputy CNO for Plans, Policies, and Operations, NATO's Commander-in-Chief for Southern Europe, and Commander in Chief Pacific (CinCPac). After an unusual career as diplomat, planner, and negotiator, and in a promotion which defied logic but not common sense, Crowe was appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October of 1985.

The next twelve chapters recount the admiral's two terms as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Crowe discusses his involvement in the *Achille Lauro* terrorist incident, the bombing of Tripoli, saving the Bahrain base, reflagging Kuwaiti tankers, and the Ernest Will Convoys of the Iraq-Iran War. Crowe also explains the origins of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that established jointness in the military and strengthened the powers of the chairman.

Here the admiral also treats "sensitive issues": dealing with the media — with all due candor; dealing with Congress — recognizing that Congressmen have different perspectives and pressures on defense issues than the defense establishments; war-gaming the unthinkable — nuclear war and the development of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). From his writing, it is evident that Crowe appreciates people, does not suffer fools gladly, and admires those with strong intellects. He highlights all of this in his chapter simply entitled "Russians," in which he discusses his relationship with Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the considerable achievements of the two men in reducing Cold War tensions.

In his seventeenth chapter, on "Defense and the Administration," Crowe gives insights into the Iran-Contra Affair, SDI, the START treaty, and budget battles. Here, as throughout his book, Crowe appraises the people with whom he dealt: Presidents Reagan and Bush, Secretaries of Defense Weinberger and Carlucci, and a host of others. He recounts some of his differences of opinions and objectives with these people but is neither carping nor vindictive.

In his last chapter, "Wing Walking," Crowe discusses the Cold War, war by proxy in different regions, the Gulf War, and the reconfiguration of the American military, which he says will take twenty years. "The essential lesson," he says, "is that we need good people."

Crowe's epilogue discusses his pride in the navy, his reasons for endorsing Bill Clinton for the presidency, and his association with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. While his acknowledgements tell of the individuals who helped him write his book, they also reveals the roots of the man's character and emotions.

This autobiography is good reading and, although written with David Chanoff, is genuine Bill Crowe. When laid against the numerous biographical sketches of the man, it stands up well. The chairman causes scholars grief, however, by not furnishing a bibliography, by using very few footnotes, and by not providing a chronology. Nonetheless, the book offers an exemplar for serving officers, a reference for naval historians, a tool for political scientists, an aid for the assessment of the Reagan defense build-up, and a valuable resource for those who will analyze American defense policy in the coming decades.

LAWRENCE CARROLL ALLIN

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SPENCER C. TUCKER, *The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). xiii + 265 pages. ISBN 0-872498-49-2.

The Jeffersonian Republicans were suspicious of a navy, not only on grounds of cost but also because they felt it would embroil the nation in unnecessary wars. After the election of 1800, they repudiated the policies of John Adams' Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, who had been the principal architect of the naval mobilization against France in 1798-1799. Stoddert had recommended the creation of a conventional naval force composed primarily of ships of the line and frigates. The new Republican administration chose the cheaper and less provocative strategy of building 172 gunboats.

In addition to defending the coast, gunboats seemed suited to the task of opening the Mississippi to navigation

and pressuring Spain into ceding Florida. Nor were gunboats inconsistent with the administration's eventual determination to meet the aggressions of the Barbary pirates with force. Hired gunboats had demonstrated their usefulness in the first attack on Tripoli, and eight of the first ten built in America made a spring crossing of the Atlantic in 1805. Though none saw action, their presence could be seen as helping to bring hostilities to a timely conclusion. The apparent versatility of gunboats in their first years of operation led the Republican Congress to persevere with the program.

The principal advantage of gunboats, aside from low cost and the speed with which they could be constructed, lay in their mobility and adaptability to local circumstances. Mounting thirty-two-pounders, they could be deployed in flotillas to concentrate imposing firepower. Tucker reviews the many designs that were used by the numerous eager builders to whom contracts were let throughout the nation. He also provides an appendix where the reader can find a brief history of each gunboat's career. But Tucker's larger purpose is to assess the effectiveness of Republican gunboat defenses when the adversary became a major European naval power operating in the western Atlantic.

Gunboats were first deployed to deny British ships of war access to American ports after the *Chesapeake* incident in 1807. Subsequently they were used to put teeth into the embargo of 1808 (by then the gunboat-building program was complete) but they proved ineffective. With the abandonment of the embargo, many of the gunboats were placed in ordinary. Since they could be mothballed with greater ease than capital ships, they again seemed to have the advantage over a traditional navy. Those remaining in service were deployed against pirates in the New Orleans area and against the Spanish in northern Florida.

Not all the gunboats returned to active service with the declaration of war in 1812. Some had shown themselves to be defective in design and some had met with misadventure. Several additional considerations also affected their deployment. For one thing, the navy experienced continuing difficulty in manning them. A quick glance at Tucker's appendix will show why crews had reasons to regard them as unseaworthy. They were also much less likely to take prizes than traditional warships, and their crews in the southern coastal waters were more vulnerable to disease. Desertion was rife for all these reasons and a good deal harder to prevent than in a capital ship on the high seas. Manpower remained a chronic problem for the entire navy throughout the war, forcing local commanders in charge of specific areas of the coast to ration resources carefully. Many felt that barges or block ships were more suited to local conditions, and they could not afford the luxury of manning gunboats as well.

Tucker refuses to draw his conclusions about the effectiveness of the gunboats from the behavior of naval commanders, though. Instead he looks carefully at their operational record, noting the things they managed to accomplish as well as their failures. Not surprisingly, gunboats proved reasonably effective in shallow, coastal waters against British tenders. On occasion they even performed the kind of strategic service that had originally been envisioned for them. This was most notably the case in the Battle of Lake Borgne, where they succeeded in delaying the British advance on New Orleans and indirectly in shaping the final British attack which ended in disaster. They also proved reasonably versatile and effective in convoying transports and in transporting troops in coastal areas. And given special situations like that of New York or Norfolk, flotillas of gunboats supplemented by other harbor defenses could deny entry to enemy ships, though they proved less suited to dispersing a blockading squadron stationed off a harbor's entrance.

War, however, forced those responsible for the nation's defenses to rethink the utility of gunboats in a conflict with a country capable of projecting substantial naval forces into the western Atlantic. At the beginning of the War of 1812 the British had five ships of the line and nineteen frigates, in addition to numerous smaller vessels, stationed in North American waters. Reliance on gunboats gave the initiative to the enemy and allowed the British to close down the nation's overseas commerce whenever and wherever they chose to impose a blockade. Gunboats also proved unable to defend the coast against enemy raids; consequently, they failed to give the local population a sense that they were being protected. Their less-than-perfect service record during the War of 1812 had convinced Secretary of the Navy William Jones by 1814 that a traditional navy offered a better prospect for cost-effective defense.

At the conclusion of hostilities most of the gunboats were sold, rather than being put in ordinary, even though at the time there was good reason to assume that the peace with Britain would be a temporary one. The new naval establishment that took shape after 1815 embodied the principles outlined by Stoddert at the beginning of the century. Though a few of the gunboats remained in commission after the war and saw action, first against the Creeks and runaway slaves in northern Florida during 1816 and subsequently in the navy's campaign against Caribbean piracy between 1812-1826, never again were they seen as providing the principal bulwark of the Republic's defense.

RICHARD BUEL, JR.

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NIGEL TATTERSFIELD, *The Forgotten Trade: Comprising the Log of the Daniel and Henry of 1700 and Accounts of the Slave Trade from the Minor Ports of England, 1698-1725* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1991). xx + 460 pages. ISBN 0-224029-15-0.

As the subtitle indicates, this is actually two books. The first is organized around an account of a slaving voyage made by the *Daniel and Henry* of Exeter in 1700. The second examines slave trading ventures originating in various minor ports during the opening decades of the eighteenth century. The survey of ports begins with Berwick-upon-Tweed, runs southward to Deal, then west toward Weymouth, Topsham, Exeter, Dartmouth, and Plymouth to Falmouth in Cornwall, and concludes by moving along the coast of the Irish Sea to Whitehaven.

Walter Prideaux, the supercargo of the *Daniel and Henry*, kept the journal that forms the heart of the opening section of the work. The original manuscript disappeared some seventy years ago, and the document from which the book was written is described only as a "virtually complete version [derived] from a fair copy written out — with great prescience — in 1857" (p. xiv). Beyond that information, little is included on either the provenance of the journal or the editorial method. The criteria for selecting material for inclusion in the book is never explained, nor are there any clues to the length of the manuscript or the approximate number of entries excluded from the published work. Although readers are assured that Prideaux's manuscript is unique in its scope and detail, this is not borne out by the passages interspersed within the narrative. It appears that the bulk of his journal, like the journals of most mariners, consists largely of compass headings, notes on wind direction, landfalls, and similar nautical data. As the supervisor of the ship's commercial activity, Prideaux was required to keep accounts for the investors. His business records are inserted amid the seafaring minutia and include cargo lists, prices paid, slaves purchased, etc. The glossary of terms at the end of the book provides ample evidence of the Guinea trade's complexity. Its six pages include the names of more than fifty types of fabric and over a dozen varieties of beads.

Given the paucity of data in Prideaux's record, author Tattersfield necessarily broadens the opening segment of the book to include more than the voyage of the *Daniel and Henry*. The result is a swiftly moving narrative of economic life in England, slave trading, shipboard operations, the middle passage, and much more. The book is written for the general reader, but it contains a useful bibliography and numerous appendices likely to be of value to specialists on slave trading. Although damning the traders and the trade with the usual accounts of ghastly conditions and gratuitous cruelty, Tattersfield merits

commendation for expanding the distribution of opprobrium beyond covetous Europeans and emergent capitalism. The Atlantic crossing, he points out, was only one section of a journey that often began far from the coast with the capture of Africans by other Africans who were as brutal and bent on self-aggrandizement as were the English. Over the years, the importance of the slave trade was to assume such proportions that the economic and political life of West Africa centered on creating a steady supply of slaves, he explains, adding that wretched and often lethal shipboard conditions were endured not only by captive Africans but also by crewmen aboard slave ships and by indentured servants, prisoners of war, and criminals sent from England to the colonies.

Like other researchers, Tattersfield finds that commerce in slaves was not a lucrative business, but he understands where the profits accrued. Fortunes were made at either end of the trade rather than in the middle. Black caboceers who provided human cargos and white plantation owners in the West Indies and in North America gained wealth and power; slave traders, whether factors, merchants, or ship captains, were often fortunate if they recovered the costs of their voyages. There were many like those involved with the *Daniel and Henry* who abandoned the Guinea trade after a single venture. In general, the results of slave trading expeditions from minor ports were similar to those originating in London or operating under the aegis of the Royal African Company. Almost all the descriptions follow an established pattern: John Harris of Exeter "once bitten, was twice shy; he never attempted to trade with Africa again" (p. 288). "Neither John Parminter [of Bideford] nor his brother Richard ever speculated again in the slave trade" (p. 307). Whitehaven merchants Robert Biglands and Nathaniel Walker were also made wiser by their experiences trading on the Guinea coast. "Neither . . . having satisfied themselves as to the profitability (or otherwise) of the slave trade, felt sufficiently keen to repeat the experience" (p. 342). Their fellow Whitehaven townsman, Thomas Rumball, learned the same lesson. A 1719 voyage to Africa "proved to be [his] last essay in the slave trade, a curiously sudden and inexplicable end to what looked like a promising career" (p. 343).

Slave trading ventures did not often originate from minor English ports. With so few voyages and little surviving information on most of them, the second half of the volume concentrates on the history of individual towns. Lyme Regis receives particular attention. The volume includes discussions of harbor facilities and the products shipped from the port, a genealogy of the locally prominent Burridge family and a discussion of its commercial activities, and descriptions of the town's role in Monmouth's Rebellion and the Glorious Revolution.

The title of the book is appropriate. Slaving from England's minor ports is *The Forgotten Trade*, but in fact there is little to remember. Still, author Tattersfield presents a remarkable chronicle of an obscure aspect of English commerce in the closing years of the seventeenth century and the early decades of the eighteenth century. Reading his work is an absorbing albeit terrifying armchair excursion through one of the darker chapters in history.

B. R. BURG

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VALERIE I. J. FLINT, *The Imaginative Landscape of Christopher Columbus* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). xx + 214 pages, appendix, bibliography, index, 15 maps. ISBN 0-691056-81-1.

JEANNINE COOK, ED., *Columbus and the Land of Ayllon: The Exploration and Settlement of the Southeast* (Darien, GA: Lower Altamaha Historical Society, 1992). xiv + 142 pages, 25 illustrations and maps. ISBN 0-963287-60-5. \$8.50.

Sometimes the legions of polemical, revisionist books about Columbus springing up everywhere since 1992 seem like the armed warriors Jason had to subdue before he could escape with the golden fleece; every time one has been dealt with, another attacks. In this context it is a pleasure to discover two sound and sane volumes to join the ranks of those books that cannot be politicized, like Fernandez-Armesto's *Columbus* or William and Carla Phillips' *The Worlds of Christopher Columbus*. Valerie Flint's exploration of the medieval intellectual context for Columbus's Enterprise of the Indies is a major contribution to the harvest of 1992, and the small volume edited by Jeannine Cook examines the consequences of 1492 in one sector of the Spanish New World.

In a substantive introduction Flint states her goal concisely: "I shall attempt . . . to reconstruct, and understand, not the New World Columbus found, but the Old World which he carried with him in his head" (p. xi). She argues that the mix of "fact" and "fancy" cannot be separated into distinct elements in the Old World and that "fantasy of a certain sort becomes proper, indeed vital, to the complete understanding of fact itself" (p. xii). While recognizing the inadequacy of broad descriptive terms, Flint characterizes Columbus's "mental world" as "medieval, or late medieval at least" (p. xii), noting particularly his belief in providence, his search for authority in biblical parallels, and his unquenchable optimism. His mental world was built from "practical experience, as

are all mental worlds; but personal devotion fired by private reflection, reading, and above all perhaps, dramatic storytelling, sacred and secular, contributed more to its makeup than has always been recognized" (p. xii). Flint notes especially the influence of those who served and used Christianity in their endeavors, particularly seafarers and pilgrims. Columbus believed that the gold he sought was necessary for recapturing, securing, and extending Christian lands. Within his graphic imagination, his expectations colored his observations deeply: "Scenes preenacted, as it were, behind his eyes, were reenacted before them, and were then reported to the admiral's sovereigns with all the imaginative and emotional intensity which drives the visionary" (p. xiii). "It is arguable, indeed," she continues, "that certain of the most apparently fantastic of Columbus's ideas were precisely the ones which allowed him to make the most important of his real discoveries" (p. xiv).

After this introductory statement of themes and conclusions, the book documents them meticulously in two parts — the first on the medieval background and the second on Columbus's use of it. Each chapter stakes out new and exciting territory. Flint begins with a study of "mappemondes," the possible map sources for Columbus — globes, cathedral maps, maps illustrating chronicles, and so on, moving on to the books known to have been read and annotated by Columbus. Flint "trudges" (her word) through the passages of a wide assortment of works ranging from Polo to Pliny to Plutarch, detailing and interpreting Columbus's comments. Sea stories, too, played a role, whether of classical argonauts or medieval monks. The significance of all this study becomes clear in the later chapters which explore the role of Columbus's inner, mental landscape in determining his reactions to what he found. Through four voyages, his observations seemed to confirm what his medieval cosmology led him to expect. Such analysis "may render the discrepancies between Columbus's perceptions and our own hindsight a little more comprehensible than it can sometimes be; and secondly, and most importantly, it may help to show how very well founded in medieval 'fact' were many of the most apparently fantastic of the admiral's tenacious beliefs" (p. 117). It is hard, in fact, to disagree with Flint's important conclusion after reviewing her evidence: "It is well to keep constantly in mind how appallingly varied and confusing were the possibilities with which his maps confronted Columbus, for only by doing so can we appreciate a most important fact; namely, that some of his errors of identification were, in reality, deductions of a deeply impressive order from the most complex of evidence" (p. 127).

Clearly, this is an important book to which Columbus scholars will refer for many years. Flint has a case to

make which she keeps in focus as she surveys diverse materials, but she is judicious in assessing what those materials render probable. The book is concise, dense with information, loaded with documentation in explanatory footnotes conveniently located at the bottom of the page and extremely readable. As a bonus, the volume is physically attractive in design, typography, and quality of paper and has superior map pages, some of them in color.

Columbus and the Land of Ayllon, also attractively produced, is a bit of a misnomer since it has only a few tangential connections with Columbus. This slim but interesting volume, consisting of six scholarly papers, grew out of a conference on Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon's attempt to establish a colony on the Georgia coast in 1526. The first, by Louis De Vorsey, Jr., surveys early mapping on the east coast of North America prior to Ayllon's expedition, a study which of necessity notes the persistence of Columbus's mistaken notion that he had found previously unknown parts of the coast of Asia and the confusion this conviction caused mapmakers and explorers alike. One result is that modern scholars are not exactly certain where Ayllon's landing took place, though Vorsey offers his own explanation.

In the second essay, Paul Hoffman summarizes Ayllon's biography and the context for mounting the expedition to establish the first short-lived (six weeks at the most) European colony in North America since the Viking settlements. In Hoffman's view, the motive was to find Indian slaves to sell and to work Ayllon's landholdings in Hispaniola. The effect of the expedition, however, was more substantial than it might appear, for the growth of legends around it and the suppositions of Verrazzano and others "explain why the French, Spaniards, and finally the English settled where they did on the coast of North America, until 1590" (p. 42). In the third paper, David Thomas surveys the missionary effort in La Florida, a territory including Florida, the Georgia coast, and the southeastern coast of South Carolina by the time St. Augustine was founded in 1565. Next Eugene Lyon documents a dispute between the friars and military governors of the same region by examining the failure of the Guale and Orista mission from 1572 to 1575. A fifth paper by Jane Landers describes the role of Africans in the exploration and settlement of the Southeast. Some free Africans went on the early voyages of exploration, and slaves accompanied the settlers, who depended on them for labor more and more as the pace of Indian depopulation increased and their enslavement became more difficult. The final paper, by Marvin T. Smith, assesses archaeological evidence related to the Ayllon expedition. Unfortunately, there would be little material evidence for an existence of only six weeks other than sites for buildings and wells, and perhaps distinctive period forms of

olive oil jars, table and glassware, metal fasteners for clothing, coins, glass beads or brass bells for Indian trading, swords, tools, farm implements, or horseshoes. If the site turns up, Smith concludes, it is probably to be found near the remains of Indian villages, which the colonists were seeking, and perhaps a graveyard in the distinctive Spanish pattern.

ROBERT FOULKE

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ROBERT F. JONES, ED., *Astorian Adventure: The Journal of Alfred Seton, 1811-1815* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993). Cloth, 221 pages. ISBN 0-8231-1503-2. \$25.00

In 1811, at the tender age of eighteen, Alfred Seton, son of a prominent New York family and a Columbia College dropout, joined John Jacob Astor's Pacific Fur Company. His destination was the mouth of the Columbia River, and his means of getting there was a voyage around Cape Horn in the company's ship *Beaver*. Seton, a clerk in the company, was answerable to the field general of Astor's operations, Wilson Price Hunt, and he became one of his right-hand workers. Young Seton had a haughty disposition. He was very well educated and kept a clear and concise journal. Much of it recounts what he saw and did, but other portions of it provide accounts of what transpired in the turbulent affairs of the firm. For example, he provides an account (from sources that are not entirely clear) of the loss of the pioneering company ship *Tonquin*. This edition provides no new clues about the *Tonquin*'s watery grave, and was not intended to be such an inquiry. What is particularly significant about this text, now happily in print and thus available to a wide readership, is that it is a saga about American enterprise in the Pacific west — focusing on the Columbia and Willamette river valleys, but also embracing Russian-held Sitka, Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, and Spanish-controlled California at a uniquely important time in international commercial and political relations in the eastern Pacific.

Seton's tale recounts the *Beaver*'s voyage to the Columbia, and it was not a happy passage — a gloomy, stormy Christmas Day saw him confined to cabin. The crew lived in fear of being captured by a British man-of-war. At the Hawaiian Islands news greeted them of the loss of the *Tonquin*. Almost to a man the men of the Pacific Fur Company were Scots, and Seton thought them "much prejudiced against us Yankees." On the Columbia's shores the natives proved troublesome. Here food was

scarce and the Astorians ate their dogs and horses. Overlanders they met advised them that a British warship was destined to arrive to capture the post. The Astorians quickly sold their enterprise to the North West Company, based on Montreal, and this Canadian acquisition thus brought Seton into the employ of his previous rivals. Seton went to the Willamette, where he traded under William Henry for a time. Everywhere the local natives were difficult, and Seton recounts important details about native thefts and trader responses. Eventually it was time to leave the country. Seton sailed for Sitka in the brig *Pedler* of Boston. At Sitka he met the illustrious Baranof, and he provides a useful account of Russian trade and drinking habits. Seton returned by sunny California and by sea to Darien, but by the time he reached Cartegena, on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, he was utterly destitute, and a British naval captain, Bentham, took pity on him and delivered him safely to Jamaica, from where he made his way to New York. There he reported to Astor on the further unfortunate proceedings of the corporation. Seton later became vice-president of Sun Life Mutual Insurance Company and published three brief accounts of his adventures in Oregon and Alaska.

Until the text of this book was discovered in Washington Irving's old house in Tarrytown, New York, in 1947, the documentation upon which the great writer had based his *Astoria or, Anecdotes of an Enterprise Beyond the Rocky Mountains* (1839) was not entirely known. It now seems that Irving, an assiduous researcher, stayed conveniently close to the documentation, including Seton's account. Other sources are now available upon which to reconstruct a comprehensive history of the affairs at the mouth of the Columbia, 1811-1814, including partner Duncan McDougall's narrative and the journal of Alexander Henry the Younger, the latter published in 1992 by the Champlain Society of Toronto, under this reviewer's editorship.

Professor Jones has edited Seton's account with care and discretion, and he provides many useful hints for future students of the subject. Editing such texts presents unique challenges, and readers can be assured that they will find here the notes of value in unravelling the complexities of the developments that Seton recounts. Illustrations, a bibliography, and an index supplement the text, and three of Seton's previously published articles are wisely included as well. Seton's narrative is a foundation document in American commercial and maritime history, and is a welcome addition to the literature of the proceedings and perils of American enterprise in the Pacific west.

BARRY GOUGH

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DENIS AND PEGGY WARNER WITH SADA O SENO, *Disaster in the Pacific: New Light on the Battle of Savo Island* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992). Cloth, 9" x 6¼", 298 pages, 29 illustrations, six maps, end notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-863732-73-X. \$26.95.

On the morning of 8 August 1942, a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Hudson bomber, piloted by Sergeant William J. Stutt, spotted a Japanese force of five heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and one destroyer, standing toward the Solomon Islands. Deeming the sighting of sufficient importance, Stutt immediately broke radio silence and reported his find. Soon thereafter, a second Hudson saw the Japanese ships, too.

Subsequently, a little less than two hours into the mid-watch on 9 August 1942, those same ships under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa slipped unchallenged into the waters between Guadalcanal and Savo islands and mercilessly dispatched two virtually leaderless task groups centered upon five Allied heavy cruisers (four American and one Australian) in the pre-dawn darkness. Within mere minutes, Japanese shellfire and torpedoes reduced three of the American cruisers and the one Australian warship to blazing wrecks and damaged the fourth American heavy cruiser. Two American destroyers suffered shell damage. In the years since that action, those attempting to explain the disaster of the Battle of Savo Island often blamed a large part of the debacle on the belief that Allied commanders had not received timely information of Mikawa's approach, particularly vilifying the pilot of the first RAAF Hudson who purportedly not only failed to file a prompt contact report but even went so far as to have tea before a debriefing.

Disaster in the Pacific, the first major work that deals specifically with Savo Island since Richard Newcomb's 1961 volume on the battle, reveals the truth about the Hudson missions of 8 August and the tragic misinterpretation of the important information that Sergeant Stutt had indeed transmitted promptly. Buttressed by extensive evidence from Australian and Japanese sources, including interviews with the surviving members of the Hudson crews, the authors demonstrate that the often erroneously maligned airmen had done everything expected of them, and that Stutt's contact report had been intercepted by friend and foe alike.

The Warners, whose previous military history collaborations have dealt with the Russo-Japanese War and with kamikazes, tell the story in compelling fashion. Once the battle is joined, the authors take it ship by ship. Yet *Disaster in the Pacific* reflects the difficulty inherent in attempting to describe events occurring simultaneously in several different places. Nonetheless, the use of Japanese

material is a significant "plus" in this section, particularly in describing the damage inflicted on the Japanese ships by those few shells the American heavy cruisers were able to put on target because of the early disruption of their fire control systems.

While well written, however, *Disaster in the Pacific* betrays a certain unfamiliarity with naval nomenclature and technology — something that careful editing should have caught. In the matter of ship types, the World War I emergency program flush-deck destroyers converted to carry troops are referred to as "former destroyer transports" instead of the proper "high speed transports"; similarly, a "destroyer minesweeper" should be a "high speed minesweeper." The *Barnett* is referred to as an "attack transport" when she was not redesignated as such until February 1943; the transport *McCawley* is said to have been "converted" into a "command ship" when the U.S. Navy did not have designated "command ships" until the classification of that type in 1943. The authors use nicknames for Japanese aircraft, although such nicknames were not introduced until three months after the action described in this book takes place. "Aboard," instead of the more proper (for a work of naval or nautical history) "on board" is used throughout the work. Enlisted ratings are rendered inconsistently.

When the authors stay on course to describe the Battle of Savo Island, their narrative proceeds well. On some occasions, though, when they digress to establish background, they strand the reader on the shoals of insufficient or erroneous information. Their handling of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the expeditionary force commander, is a good case in point. In describing Fletcher's background, the Warners state that early in the war Fletcher had failed in his task of "thwarting" the second Japanese attempt to take Wake Island in December 1941, when in fact his orders were to reinforce Wake, not "thwart" an invasion. Similarly, we are told that during the Battle of Midway his flagship, the aircraft carrier *Yorktown*, was "sunk out from under him" when in fact the smoke from the bomb damage that the ship had received on 4 June compelled him to transfer his flag. When the *Yorktown* ultimately succumbed to her mortal wounds on 7 June, Fletcher was in the heavy cruiser *Astoria*. Although Fletcher's conduct during the first few days of the Guadalcanal operation is mentioned, there is nothing new in the Warners' interpretation. Had their research taken them a bit further along the documentary trail, they perhaps would have seen, as historian John Lundstrom noted, that "Frank Jack Fletcher Got a Bum Rap" (*Naval History* 6, no. 3 [Fall 1992], 22-28).

The intriguing and little-known story of the Hudson crews (which first came to light thanks to the indefatigable efforts of the widow of the leader of the flight of Hudsons

on 8 August) is the strongest part of the book. The Warners' conclusion that Savo Island should be remembered as a battle lost "because of a grave underestimation of Japanese capacity and training and the most unfortunate rejection of intelligence" certainly seems valid in the light of the evidence they provide. Exhaustion and poor Allied communications, they charge, cannot alter the fact that the amphibious force commander, Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, and the screen commander, Rear Admiral Victor A. C. Crutchley, Royal Navy, had received "detailed and timely information about Japanese concentration and movement." While the information provided may have "erred in details" (no attempt is made to explain the problem of aerial identification that would vex the combatants on both sides in the Pacific War), it complemented the radio traffic analysis intelligence being read in Melbourne and Pearl Harbor.

"Disaster," write the Warners, "lay in the failure to read the signals right, and in the failure to appreciate the Japanese capacity for surprise." Essentially, the authors appear to believe that the blame for defeat rested with those who *received and interpreted* the intelligence information, not with those who reported it. Had Allied commanders correctly evaluated the data they received from the intrepid Australian airmen, the story of Savo Island might have had a different denouement. All in all, *Disaster in the Pacific* is a good "read." Yet it is a book that would have been even better had the authors paid greater attention to detail in matters that support the telling of the story.

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A. B. FEUER, ED., *Coast Watching in the Solomon Islands: The Bougainville Reports, December 1941 - July 1943* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992). 165 pages, 31 black-and-white illustrations, 10 maps, foreword by Walter Lord. ISBN 0-274-94203-1.

Coast Watching in the Solomon Islands consists of the edited reports of the coast watchers who operated on Bougainville and Buka Islands during the first eighteen months of World War II in the Pacific. These accounts are primarily from the coastwatchers themselves, but there is also a short narrative by a missionary sister of her rescue from Bougainville by the USS *Nautilus* in 1943.

Nicely produced and well illustrated, the book is a remarkable insight into demanding and dangerous work which was key to the successful conclusion of the Guadalcanal campaign. The handful of coastwatchers, with the

essential support of many Solomon Islanders, succeeded in creating a tactical information system which provided vital warning of Japanese air raids and shipping movements during the long struggle for control of Henderson Field and domination of local waters. The network was kept in being despite appalling conditions and constant harassment by Japanese forces on the ground. The coastwatchers were not career military but generally district officers, planters, or other personnel with the local knowledge and reputation which were vital to do the job and retain the support of the islands' people.

The coastwatching organization was an Australian creation. In the editor's words it was "a defensive measure to protect the long, and virtually unprotected coastline of Australia." Because of the Solomons Islands' inclusion in the Australia Station for the purposes of naval defense, the Australian organization was extended into the British possessions, with local personnel collectively code named "Ferdinand." This designation honored the "fictional bull who preferred flowers to the arena." The irony behind this whimsical designation was the recognition that the coastwatchers functioned most effectively when they could avoid local enemy forces. Their priority was information, not aggressive action behind the lines.

The reports have been shrewdly edited to produce a composite which gives the reader a compelling insight into the achievements of the group — and of the islanders who helped them. This is perhaps the most significant subtext to the work, since the continuation of the relationship between islanders and representatives of the colonial powers derived very much from the consistent Japanese failure to conciliate the peoples of the Co-Prosperity Sphere which they "liberated."

As they stand, the reports are valuable primary evidence of the campaign in the Solomons and should provide much assistance to operational historians attempting to piece together the complicated contributions of intelligence to the war in the Pacific. Perhaps more than anyone else, the coastwatchers were conscious that they contributed only a few pieces, however vital, to a vast mosaic. That task of integration is one which has yet to be done in a historiographic sense, since the early official histories had to be too circumspect about intelligence methods, while most more recent works have tended to overemphasize the role of signals intelligence in particular.

This reviewer's only disappointment lies in the oversimplified charts, which indicate nothing of the hydrographic or topographic complexities of the area and still less of the vegetation or human infrastructure. The almost impenetrable nature of much of the terrain was both the coastwatchers' greatest enemy and best ally, since it imposed enormous constraints on the pursuing Japanese. Any pilgrim to the Solomons is immediately struck by the

challenges of the environment and the way in which the density of jungle reduces effective visibility to a few feet in any direction.

In sum, this book is recommended for both specialist historians of the period and for those with an interest in the Pacific war and in the operation of intelligence in war. A. B. Feuer is to be congratulated on a small but significant contribution to the history of the Second World War, but the real credit — as Feuer himself would be the first to admit — goes to the coastwatchers who tell their own “remarkable story” in this work.

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JOHN HAYWOOD, *Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Seafaring Activity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). xii + 232 pages, 5 maps, 11 illustrations, glossary, notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 0-415063-74-4. \$45.00.

This small but important book is both more and less than its title implies. More than just a reassessment, it is in reality the first comprehensive overview of early Germanic naval history ever written. Less than a study of seafaring activity, it strictly confines its scope to military activity and overseas migrations, paying scant attention to maritime trade. This approach has undoubtedly resulted in some distortions in the naval history of a period in which piracy played a major role, but it has the merit of facilitating a well-organized, lucid treatment of the subject.

Haywood's study begins with the earliest recorded event in Germanic naval history, a Roman victory over the Bructeri on the Ems river in 12 B.C., and continues in a chronological sequence to the end of the Carolingian period. The most prominent of the early Germanic seafarers were the Chauci, who lived in the Weser-Elbe coastal area. Their piratical raiding, of a limited range and importance in the first century of our era, became sufficiently substantial and wide ranging in the later second century to induce the Romans to create a coastal defence system in the Channel area. Germanic piracy became far more serious and wide ranging in the middle of the third century as a result of the rise of tribal confederations, Roman civil strife, and a marine transgression in the Low Countries and along the North Sea coast of Germany that caused a Roman withdrawal from the area. The Roman response to extensive Frankish and Saxon pirate raids in the later third and fourth centuries was a major expansion

of the trans-Channel coastal defense system that became known as the *Litus Saxonicum*. Haywood theorizes that the Frankish warships of this period may have been similar to contemporaneous warships developed by the Romans and their Germanic allies for use on the Rhine, like those recently discovered at Mainz.

Haywood makes a persuasive case based on literary, linguistic, and comparative ethnographical evidence that seafaring Germans were already familiar with the sail before the arrival of the Romans and that they had militarily effective sailing craft by the second century. He ends and compromises an otherwise sound argument by offering as further supporting evidence the representation of a ship with sail carved on a small stone found in an undatable context at Karlby in Jutland. He says that the ship is clearly of the same type as the Nydam ship of the fourth century and thus shows that Nydam-type ships could have carried sails in the fourth century or even earlier. Unfortunately, one could just as convincingly argue that the Karlby ship, which carries what looks like a Viking-period weather vane at the top of its mast, is considerably later in date (and thus an unfortunate choice to grace the cover of the book). To make matters worse, Haywood uncritically accepts Akerlund's reconstruction of a hogging truss for the Nydam ship, arguing that the truss system would have afforded the compensation for the Nydam ship's weak keel structure necessary for the vessel to carry a sail. In reality, there is no evidence to associate with the hull's structure the wooden elements found in the ship and incorporated into Akerlund's truss reconstruction; they are more likely elements of independent structures, such as tents or the like.

The establishment of Saxon pirate bases in England early in the fifth century was followed by a massive migration of Anglo-Saxons to England during the second half of the century. Haywood discusses the likely role of sailing ships in this migration and points out the many similarities between it and the later Viking migration. He concludes from the historical record that the ships of the Anglo-Saxons could not have been significantly inferior to those of the Vikings. If the archaeological record does not fully support this conclusion, he says, it is because it is so extremely limited, and he rightly warns us not to conclude too much on the basis of just a few individual ship finds. Despite this, he remains too much under the influence of the school of thought that, before the discovery of the oceangoing *knarr* at Skuldelev, had Vikings sailing to Greenland and America in Gokstad ships and still persists in imagining the Anglo-Saxons migrating to England in Nydam and Sutton Hoo ships. Both types were ill suited for such purposes but were well designed, respectively, for short-range coastal raiding and personal transport on inland waters and tidal estuaries.

Frankish piracy disappears in the later part of the fourth century, as we do not hear much about Frankish naval activities until the late Merovingian period. Charlemagne displayed a profound grasp of the strategic and tactical potential of naval power and made an extensive use of troop transports and pontoon bridges in his campaigns against the Slavs, Saxons, and Avars. A particularly clear indicator of the great importance he placed on the military use of inland waterways was his failed but monumental effort to link the Rhine and Danube rivers by canal. Contrary to the conventional view, Charlemagne's naval efforts in both the Adriatic and northwestern Mediterranean were quite successful, as was his coastal defence system against Viking and Moslem pirate raids, a system that closely paralleled that of the earlier Romans. The ultimate failure of Carolingian naval efforts, says Haywood, was not due to a lack of understanding of naval power or a lack of adequate warships, but rather to the absence of a strong royal authority, particularly after the death of Louis the Pious. In his discussion of Carolingian warships, Haywood wrongly characterizes the Utrecht boat, an eleventh-century, log-based river transport, as a Carolingian-period trader and potentially swift sailer, apparently unaware of Vlek's 1987 restudy of this vessel.

The book remains a historical study of the first order. It is required reading for our seminar on medieval seafaring at Texas A&M University and essential reading for anyone interested in the subject.

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JOHN D. HARBRON, *The Longest Battle: The Royal Canadian Navy in the Atlantic, 1939-1945* (St. Catharines, Ontario: Vanwell Publishing Ltd., 1993). ix + 132 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 1-55125-002-0. Can\$29.95.

The Royal Canadian Navy, as Canada's navy was known between its founding in 1910 and its reconstitution as the Sea Element of the Canadian Forces in 1968, offers a surprisingly rich historiographical legacy. (See Marc Milner's article in the U.S. Naval War College's forthcoming book *The State of Naval and Maritime History*, John B. Hattendorf and Mark Russell Schulman, eds.) Now known as the Maritime Command, the Canadian navy has been the subject of increasing numbers of both scholarly and popular books and articles. This is at first particularly surprising when one considers that Canada has really never been a seapower and that its relatively small naval forces have invariably operated in or been predicated

upon coalition warfare, either as a colonial navy under the aegis of Britain's Royal Navy or as a clearly identifiable component of NATO or United Nations forces. The Royal Canadian Navy really came of age during the Battle of the Atlantic. The country's naval force had struggled out of the debilitating years of the Depression, then grew into an independent service and carved out for itself a distinct Canadian identity. In creating a major oceanic fleet, the navy and its reserves expanded from some thirteen warships and 3,000 personnel in 1939 to some 365 warships and 100,000 personnel at the end of the war in 1945. During this time Canada's navy served in virtually all the major theaters of war. It was arguably the fourth largest navy among the Allies and conducted almost half of all convoys across the Atlantic. This was not only a major achievement of seafaring and sea-fighting but also of shipbuilding and war production. For this reason the Battle of the Atlantic has come to be regarded as a rite of passage not only for the naval service itself, but for the generations who served. For Canada and the navy, the Battle of the Atlantic is the same kind of crucial defining moment as the Battle of Vimy Ridge (1916) was for the Canadian Army. Small wonder, then, that scholars research the field in exacting detail, and veterans revisit the crucible with both nostalgia and pride.

New books on the Canadian navy will necessarily be measured against the substantive documentation already available and will be expected to build upon what has gone on before. John Harbron, a retired officer of the Royal Canadian Navy, has declined most of the legacy in favor of offering a warm-hearted ramble down memory lane. The resultant coffee-table book at once provides both more and less than his title promises. While he does not offer us any new insights into the war at sea, and while his impressionistic approach obscures important distinctions that a well-researched study would have made clear, his eclectic mix of photos about ships, people, and circumstances effectively shares some very fond memories. The first three pictorial chapters chat about the early formation and mobilization of the navy, shipbuilding, and convoys, while the next three present photo stories about two typical families, about the "Wrens" (Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service), and about the German U-boats and their crews. The final two chapters show the navy disbanding and conclude with sentimental reflections on the nature of wartime friendships.

If the more which Harbron offers in this uneven work appeals to the old salts (and a rave review in a recent newsletter of the Naval Officers Association of Canada suggests that it does), then the less which he offers disenchant those in search of more substantive fare. His two-part bibliography strikes one as symptomatic of his method. His list entitled "Books about the Royal Canadian

Navy" presents a rather odd selection of nineteen titles — including a wartime work on Norwegian shipping. Thus he mentions W. A. B. Douglas's *The RCN in Transition, 1910-1985* (1988), but not James Boutillier's *The RCN in Retrospect 1910-1968* (1982) which virtually launched the modern era of Canadian naval historiography and in any event contains important information for his story. He includes Marc Milner's *The North Atlantic Run* (1985) but none of his seminal articles. Nor does he mention any of the veterans' important memoirs, although books like those of Alan Easton, Jeffry Brock, Hal Lawrence, James B. Lamb, Tony Law, and Gordon Stead are icons of the trade. Given the fact that one of the book's aims was to awaken the young to Canada's maritime heritage, the omission of these eminently readable yarns is unfortunate. Nor does he mention the other two pictorial accounts: J.A. Foster's *Heart of Oak: A Pictorial History of the Royal Canadian Navy* (1985) and Mack Macbeth's *Ready, Aye, Ready: An Illustrated History of the Royal Canadian Navy* (1989). His section "Books about the German Navy that emphasize the U-Boat" is equally idiosyncratic.

Scholarly standards are perhaps not the only ones one should apply to popular histories which serve a different purpose and address a different market. As in art, so in the communication of traditions, the emotional equivalent of thought also has its place. Harbron's collection suggests as much: "The men who went to war in the Battle of the Atlantic . . . are old men now. But they never forget their long travail against the sea and the Germans. From out of their youth, the far distant ships pass by for them again, reminders that Canada, so often uncertain of herself in peace time, was brave and undaunted in the now remote years of their sea war" (122). This a heart-felt book, compiled out of deep respect for the achievements of the RCN, promoting as well the ethos of service and commitment to country. One senses as well both a quiet mourning for the passing of idealism and youth, and a reconciling generosity toward the former foe.

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Shorter Notices

B. MCL. RANFT, ED., *The Beatty Papers. Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, Vol. 2 (1916-1927)* (Aldershot: Scolar Press for the Navy Records Society, Publications of the Navy Records Society, vol. 132, 1993). xxiii + 500 pages. ISBN 0-85967-964-0.

Volume One of Lord Beatty's papers, published by the Navy Records Society in 1989, covered his sea career up to 1918. Volume Two begins with the terms of the naval armistice, and carries through Beatty's career as First Sea Lord (1919-1927); the 1916 date in the volume's title is explained by the inclusion of two letters of that year dealing with the Jutland controversy. Volume One was based mainly upon Beatty's personal papers. This volume, in contrast, because of Beatty's wider role in the postwar era, makes greater use of material from Admiralty, Cabinet, and Chiefs of Staff papers in the Public Record Office. The subject matter is wide ranging but above all concerns Beatty's determination to maintain Britain's world-wide naval supremacy — a goal which was of course unobtainable given postwar conditions and America's determination to possess a fleet second to none. Supplemental chapters deal with the issue of the Singapore naval base (1921-1926) and the Jutland issue (1916-1927). Altogether this is an important source for any study of interwar naval affairs, prepared to the usual fine standards of the Navy Records Society.

JOBST BROELMANN AND TIMM WESKI, "*Maria*" HF 31 (Seefischerei unter Segeln Munich: Deutsches Museum, 1992). 190 pages, illustrations, tables, bibliography. ISBN 3-924183-19-8.

For generations through the nineteenth century, hardy German fishermen in sturdy "Kutters" (in English, such a vessel with fore-and-aft rigged mainmast and smaller mizzen would more probably be terms a ketch) prowled the notorious North Sea fishing grounds off Borkum, Helgoland, Sylt, and the Horns Reef. *Maria* (HF 31) was one such vessel, a mere twenty meters overall, and her permanent exhibition at the Deutsches Museum in Munich preserves a significant artifact of a vanished profession and way of life. This handsome oversized (8½" x 10¾") volume is a visual record of the vessel itself, the fleet of which it is so representative, and the industry as a whole in the era of sail: 167 monochrome illustrations, principally photographs, are well selected to enhance an authoritative text (in German). Detailed plans are included, making this a volume which might interest modelers as well as those interested in the history of Europe's struggle to put the North Sea to good use. Concluding pages even answer the question of why such an interesting exhibit came to rest in Munich, not exactly a famous seaport. (Deutsches Museum, Museumsinsel 1, D-8000 Munchen 22, Germany.)

WIM JOHNSON, ED., *"Shaky Ships": The Formal Richness of Chinese Shipbuilding* (Antwerp: National Maritime Museum, 1993). Softcover, 119 pages, illustrations, bibliography. Bfr. 700.

This is a handsome catalog of an exhibition (May-December 1993) of a unique collection of Chinese ship models held by the Belgian National Maritime Museum. Over 120 photographs, a few in color, illustrate a large variety of Chinese junk types (the peculiar phrase "shaky ships" seems to refer to the junks, rather than the models themselves), combined with a discussion of rigs, Chinese nautical terminology, and a brief history of navigation in China, written by several hands. The collection was actually part of the Chinese exhibit for the 1904 World's Fair in St. Louis, moved on to a similar exhibition in Liege, Belgium, the next year, and somehow passed into the hands of the Belgian government, vanishing into the storerooms of the Royal Museums of Art and History. It is an impressive collection, and this well-prepared catalog should interest any student of Chinese maritime history. (Available from the National Scheepvaartmuseum, Steenplein 1, B-2000 Antwerpen, Belgium).

IAN MARSHALL, *Ironclads and Paddlers* (Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1993). 108 pages, index, bibliography. ISBN 0-943231-62-0.

In essence this book is a showcase for thirty-eight paintings by Ian Marshall, who supplies a text to accompany each. The paintings, all reproduced in color, appear to be watercolors in their original form, though little information such as medium, dimensions, or current location is supplied. They are, however, most attractive, providing both an accurate rendering of the vessel or vessels featured in each and the atmosphere of selected harbors around the world. The warships themselves range from Civil War ironclads of the 1860s to turn-of-the-century dreadnoughts, spanning an era of much transition in the development of capital ships. Inevitably, the majority of vessels illustrated are American (*Monitor*, *Main*, etc.) or British (*Warrior*, *Iron Duke*, *Devastation*, *Renown*, *Illustrious*, etc.), but the collection is filled out with a variety of the ships of other nations. Though the expert historian is more likely to refer to other more extensive works for the detailed history of the warships of this era, Marshall's research is certainly extensive and his paintings sufficiently masterful to belong in any collection of maritime art, all the more so since few maritime artists seem to have chosen nineteenth-century battleships, some of which were quite ungainly compromises, as their subject matter.

R. C. ANDERSON, *The Rigging of Ships in the Days of the Spritsail Topmast, 1600-1720* (New York: Dover, 1994). Paper, xii + 278 pages, index, illustrations. ISBN 0-486-27960-X. \$8.95.

R. C. Anderson's classic work on seventeenth-century riggings was first published by the Marine Research Society of Salem in 1927, and has now been made available in a useful paperbound edition by Dover. A detailed, fully illustrated reference work, it is essential for model-makers and any one else with an interest in the detailed rigging of European ships in that era.

JOHN SELLER, *The Sea-Gunner* (Rotherfield, East Sussex, England: Jean Boudriot Publications, 1994). xiv + 234 pages. ISBN 0-948864-25-5. (Limited edition of 700 copies).

Another in the Boudriot reprint series of scarce sources, Seller's *Sea-Gunner* was first published in 1691 as a gunner's reference manual — small enough in fact to fit into a pocket for easy access (this edition is roughly four by six inches). Seller himself seems to have been a nautical book and instrument maker rather than a gunner, and he borrowed copiously from the works of others. *Sea-Gunner* is a book full of lore for the interested student of basilisks, rabonets, and their ilk, together with their proper care and handling; chapters treat such interesting subjects as "How much Rope with make Breechings, and Tackles for any Piece," "The Practical way of making Gun-Powder," and such like.

JOHN E. REYNOLDS, *Thames Ship Towage, 1933-1992* (Durham: Pentland Press, 1993). 299 pages, illustrations. ISBN 1-85821-028-3. £16.50.

Frank C. Bowen's book *One Hundred Years of Towing* was published in 1933 to mark the centenary of towage on London's Thames River by William Watkins Ltd., the oldest firm on the river. John Reynolds' new volume picks up where Bowen left off, recording year by year the subsequent fortunes of Watkins and all other firms. In a way it is a sad record, as with few exceptions there were fewer tugs and fewer firms each year; in fact, by 1969 there existed only an amalgamated concern known as "London Tugs Ltd." Although a fairly dry chronicle at first sight, the book actually records some challenging long-distance tows outside the London area, together with more than a few moments of danger and heroism as tugs fought collisions, fires, and strandings on a notoriously difficult and crowded river. The author,

incidentally, knows whereof he speaks, having worked his way from cook to tug master. The last third of the volume is a detailed listing of each of the 166 tugs mentioned, giving such data as dates the vessel worked, tonnage, ownership history, and the like, providing a small photo in each case. It is this section in particular which makes this book an important addition to any comprehensive vessel reference collection. (Available from Pentland Press, 1 Hutton Close, South Church, Durham, England).

IAN NICHOLSON, *Log of Logs: A Catalogue of Logs, Journals, Shipboard Diaries, Letters, and All Forms of Voyage Narratives, 1788 to 1993, for Australian and New Zealand, and Surrounding Oceans*, vol. 2. (Published by the author: 18 Wunnunga Crescent, Yaroomba, Queensland, 4573 Australia [Roebuck Society Publication No. 47] 1993). 607 pages, illustrations. ISBN 0-646-09182-4.

This is an important supplement to Nicholson's first volume of *Log of Logs* published in 1990. Not only are many new logs and other sources listed for vessels unmentioned in Volume One, but in many cases new information is provided for ships already treated in the first volume. For example, Volume One provides a paragraph on the Commonwealth Line steamer *Moreton Bay* which ran between England and Australia in the interwar years; Volume Two, however, adds another paragraph on her service in World War II, together with a photo and information on her eventual demise. The phrase "surrounding oceans" is taken with the widest definition. The reader will find, therefore, information on the log of HMS *Bellerophon*, which fought at Trafalgar, of which a microfilm copy is to be found in Sydney. Inevitably there are glitches: the researcher interested in *Bellerophon*'s later career is told to "see reference under Hulks," but, alas, she seems to have been sunk on her passage to that anchorage, for no such reference is made. Such minor flaws aside, these two volumes, taken together (and it must be stressed that the value of each is much diminished without the other) are a mine of information on vessels, logkeepers, and published and unpublished sources on both, since wherever known such information is provided (often with an illustration of the ship) along with each entry. Both

volumes belong in every serious maritime reference library; they are available, along with such other reference works from the Roebuck series as are still in print, from the author at the address given above.

BJORN L. BASBERG, JAN ERIK RINGSTAD, AND EINAR WEXELSON, EDS., *Whaling and History: Perspectives on the Evolution of the Industry* (Sandefjord, Norway: Kommandor C. Christensens Hvalfangstmuseum, 1993). 214 pages, illustrations. ISBN 82-990595-6-9. \$52.00.

The fifteen papers collected in this volume were delivered in 1992 at a symposium honoring the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Kommandor C. Christensens Whaling Museum in Sandefjord. Roughly half of the volume focuses on Norwegian whaling, from the medieval era to the present, though most Norwegian chapters build on Arne Odd Johnsen's massive 1959-70 four-volume history, concentrating especially on the social side of modern whaling. E. Niemi, for example, discusses modern whaling on the Norwegian Arctic coast, while E. Wexelsen considers working conditions on Norwegian floating factories. Other papers carry the Norwegian theme into more distant waters, as in Robert Webb's on the Pacific Northwest or A. Dickinson and C. W. Sanger's on Newfoundland. Gordon Jackson extends the focus to Britain in the nineteenth century and Klaus Barthelmess to German whaling. South Georgia is discussed in two papers; geological discovery in Antarctica in another (by R. Headland). Stuart Frank concludes the collection with an overview of scrimshaw, A.D. 800-1960. All selections give full citations and most are well illustrated with photographs and charts. The volume contains a note on contributors but lacks a general index. Since the format (8½" x 12") is somewhat larger than normal, the text is more extensive than the number of pages would indicate. Altogether, this is a valuable volume for any whaling history collection. (Available from the publisher, Sandefjordmuseene, Museumsgr. 39, Sandefjord, Norway.)

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
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
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
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21	1961			x	x
22	1962	x	x		x
23	1963	x	x	x	x
24	1964	x	x	x	x
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26	1966	x	x	x	x
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49	1989	x	x	x	x
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